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This dissertation argues that a particular—and often overlooked—strand of natural law 
theory played an essential role in arguments for the secularization of political power in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Between the start of the Protestant Reformation (1517) and 
the English Restoration (1660), European conceptions of political and legal authority underwent 
a series of sweeping changes. Among the most drastic of these changes was the secularization of 
the idea of civil authority, which consisted of three developments. First, the legitimacy of civil 
sovereigns was no longer dependent on religious qualifications. Heretics and pagans could hold 
legitimate civil authority over Christian subjects. Second, civil authority came to be seen as the 
product of human agency rather than divine will alone. Kings were placed on their thrones by 
their subjects and were thus accountable to the communities they governed. Third, civil 
jurisdiction was limited to the pursuit and enforcement of temporal goods: civil peace, personal 
security, and the public virtues necessary for these ends. Civil sovereigns no longer had the right 
to determine citizens’ religious, spiritual, or supernatural obligations. My dissertation 
demonstrates that these three developments were made possible by the philosophical framework 
of natural law, which was deployed by both Catholic and Protestant political thinkers of this 
period. 
I trace the origins of this natural law secularism to the legal philosophy of Thomas 
Aquinas, who first distinguished between two forms of legal obligation: natural law and divine 
law. Although both were given to human beings directly by God, natural law could be accessed 
and understood by all rational human beings while divine law required a special revelation 
through God’s chosen representatives. This distinction between the natural and the supernatural 
served as a core theoretical construct upon which early modern thinkers argued for the separation 
and co-autonomy of the civil and the ecclesiastical powers. In the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, Catholic natural law philosophers such as Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suárez 
defended the autonomy of civil power from the Church. The Jesuits, such as Suárez, Robert 
Bellarmine, and Luis de Molina, used this natural-supernatural framework to argue that civil 
governments were created by human agency, while church governments were the handiwork of 
God alone. Some Protestant thinkers were deeply influenced by this Catholic natural law theory 
and some, especially John Locke, took up the secularist defense of the separation of civil and 
ecclesiastical authorities. Locke’s contribution to political secularism was his reconciliation of 
the Lutheran notion of freedom of conscience with the autonomy of the civil sovereign. This was 
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This dissertation project is a historical and conceptual analysis of the relationship 
between two strands of early modern European political thought: Thomist natural law theory and 
political secularism. Although both topics have received extensive treatment by historians of 
political thought, relatively little has been written about the ways in which these two strands of 
thought intersect and influence each other. In this project, I seek to uncover the ways in which 
early modern arguments for the secularization of political power were constructed out of a set of 
ideas that originated in Aquinas’s philosophy of natural law. These arguments are part of a 
political debate spanning nearly two centuries, from the start of the Reformation to the Glorious 
Revolution. Over the course of this debate, new ideas emerged about the proper relationship 
between civil power and religion, often drawing on much older ideas from the Middle Ages. By 
the end of this period, some political thinkers were beginning to articulate a radically new vision 
of the civil commonwealth—one that modern readers would recognize as a fully secular state.  
The political secularism that I describe in this dissertation is primarily a political 
philosophy and only secondarily a set of institutions and practices. It is a way of thinking about 
politics that is grounded in temporal and corporeal reality, even though it is still ultimately 
endorsed by a divine creator. This secularism is a new way of justifying and criticizing political 
rule based solely on temporal ends such as self-preservation, protection of property, and political 
justice. Defined in this way, it may be seen as an ancestor of the idea of “public reason” later 
described by John Rawls.1 This secularist philosophy contains three interlocking ideas. First, civil 
                                               
1 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993), Lecture VI. 
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power arises out of natural necessity and therefore does not depend for its legitimacy on religious 
authorities. This means that the legitimacy of civil governments cannot be challenged for 
religious or spiritual reasons. Second, civil authority came to be seen as the product of human 
agency rather than divine will alone. Kings were placed on their thrones by their subjects and 
were thus accountable to the communities they governed. Third, civil jurisdiction was limited to 
the pursuit and enforcement of temporal goods: civil peace, personal security, and the public 
virtues necessary for these ends. Civil sovereigns no longer had the right to determine citizens’ 
religious, spiritual, or supernatural obligations. 
In what follows, I argue that the defense of these three ideas relied heavily on the 
philosophy of natural law that originated with Thomas Aquinas. This Thomist version of natural 
law allowed political philosophers to describe the civic domain of human life as operating 
independently of the religious and spiritual aspects of human life. The natural law theorists I 
discuss argued that the civil sovereign derived its legal powers to bind its subjects from the 
principles of natural law to which all rational human beings had access. For this reason, heretical 
or non-Christian rulers had the same legal authority over their subjects as orthodox Christian 
rulers. This was all the more important in the period of intense religious conflict in which my 
narrative unfolds: according to the natural law theory of civil power, theological disputes should 
have no effect on the status of civil leaders. The key distinction here was between natural law 
and divine positive law. Although both were part of God’s eternal law and equally binding, they 
were promulgated in different ways. Natural law was discovered through natural reason and 
could be known even to those who were ignorant of God. Divine positive law was promulgated 
directly through revelation and then indirectly through Scripture. It was only through acting on 
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this special knowledge that humans could attain their supernatural end of spiritual redemption 
and eternal blessedness.  
Intellectual historians and political theorists have long recognized the centrality of the 
idea of natural law in early modern political thought. The contributions of natural law 
philosophers to theories of individual rights, federalism, popular resistance, and international law 
have been well documented.2 However, until now, there has been nearly no examination of the 
influence of natural law theories on secularization. This is especially surprising given that the 
concept of natural law straddles the boundary between the sacred and the secular and has often 
served to adjudicate spiritual and temporal claims to political power.  
One work that does examine this question is Quentin Skinner’s Foundations of Modern 
Political Thought. Although his focus is more broadly on the rise of the modern constitutional 
state, rather than the secular state as such, Skinner recognizes secularization as part of this 
process. He concludes his study by describing four “preconditions for the acquisition of the 
modern concept of the state”: (1) the rise of politics as a “distinct branch of moral philosophy”; 
(2) the autonomy of the civitas from outside powers (e.g. the church); (3) the supremacy of each 
regnum within its territory; and (4) the idea that political society exists only for “political 
purposes.”3 The second and fourth of these propositions are particularly relevant to my study. 
                                               
2 Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500-1800, Ernest Barker, trans. and ed. 
(Cambridge University Press, 1934); James Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in 
Contexts (Cambridge University Press, 1993); Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on 
Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law, 1150-1625 (Emory University: 1997); Richard Tuck, 
The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant 
(Oxford University Press, 1999); Samuel Moyn, Christian Human Rights (University of Pennsylvania, 
2015). 




Natural law does not play a central role in Skinner’s account of the period, but he credits 
sixteenth-century natural law philosophers—especially Vitoria, Bellarmine, and Suarez—with 
contributing to these four developments. Skinner focuses on two aspects of their work: the 
separation of secular and ecclesiastical power and constitutional limits on state power.4  
Skinner certainly deserves credit for recognizing the contributions of Thomist thinkers to 
the modern concept of the state. However, he misses the fundamental connection between 
natural law and the autonomy of the state from the church, which runs throughout the thought of 
Vitoria, Bellarmine, and Suárez. Instead, he focuses on the Thomists’ critiques of Machiavelli, 
Luther, and Sepúlveda.5 True to his stated purpose, Skinner places these thinkers in their 
historical and ideological context, but in seeking to present a comprehensive view of their 
thought, he often fails to draw out the particular strands of their thought that contributed to the 
modern idea of the state.6 In this case, that central idea was the distinction between the natural, 
civil domain and the supernatural Church. One result of this is that the views of these thinkers 
often appear as a collection of contradictory political positions. He states that Bellarmine 
supported separation of secular and ecclesiastical power, while Vitoria and Suárez argued for 
papal power over princes.7 In reality, all three thinkers argued that secular powers were both 
autonomous from the Church and subject to the spiritual authority of the pope. One cannot make 
sense of these positions without taking full account of the underlying legal philosophies. 
                                               
4 For the separation of secular and ecclesiastical power, see Skinner, Foundations (II), chapter 5. For 
constitutionalism, see (II) chapter 6. 
5 Ibid, 138-173. 
6 Ibid, Volume 1, Preface. 
7 Ibid, Volume 2, 179-180. 
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My argument also builds off of the scholarship by historians of political thought on the 
rise of “modern” natural law. The overarching trend among historians of natural law in the last 
thirty years has been an attempt to separate out a distinctly modern, secular idea of natural law 
from the natural law theories of the Salamanca School. This scholarship is largely built on the 
work of Richard Tuck, who first identified a “modern theory of natural law” as distinct from the 
“scholastic” and Kantian versions.8 In the decades since Tuck’s seminal article, much has been 
written on the revival and transformation of natural law theory in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. The work of Ian Hunter is especially relevant to my project because it directly 
addresses the connection between the rise of “modern” natural law and the secularization of the 
state. Hunter sees the secularization of the academic study of natural law (and jurisprudence 
more generally) as an essential precondition for the secularization of political power.9 He argues 
that “Catholic natural law” placed supreme legal authority in the hands of the church, giving it 
“the right and the moral duty to determine the legality of positive civil law.” The autonomy of 
the state, says Hunter, requires the transformation of natural law from a “transcendent” and 
“metaphysical” doctrine in the hands of the clergy to a natural law rooted solely in “observable 
human nature” and thus placed in the hands of the civil sovereign. It is only with the emergence 
of “post-scholastic” and “desacralised” natural law in the works of Hobbes, Pufendorf, and 
Thomasius that natural law could be used to argue for a secular notion of the state.10 
                                               
8 Richard Tuck, “The ‘Modern’ Theory of Natural Law,” in Anthony Pagden, ed., The Languages of 
Political Theory in Early-modern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
9 Ian Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Germany 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001), 6-7. 
10 Ian Hunter and David Saunders, “Introduction,” in Hunter and Saunders, eds., Natural Law and Civil 
Sovereignty: Moral Right and State Authority in Early Modern Political Thought (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 2-4. 
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There is a kernel of truth in these sweeping generalizations. Dominican and Jesuit natural 
law thinkers were theologians by trade and studied law as a sub-discipline of theology. The study 
of politics thus did not achieve the disciplinary autonomy that Quentin Skinner describes as a 
precondition for the modern concept of the state.11 More importantly, as Skinner demonstrates, 
the Salamanca theologians stopped short of arguing for the full secularization of the state, 
ultimately placing secular rulers under the pope’s indirect temporal power.12 However, their lack 
of a complete theory of the secular state is not due to their theological approach to natural law. In 
fact, as I argue, the presence of God in their natural law is precisely what makes it an effective 
tool in arguments for secularization. The Thomists’ arguments for secularization were 
undermined not by natural law but by another Catholic doctrine: the canonist view of the Church 
as an earthly kingdom. Thus, it is partly true that natural law had to be liberated from the 
confines of papalist orthodoxy in order to be an effective tool for secularization. It was only in 
the hands of thinkers like John Locke that the Thomist view of natural law was given its full 
secularizing force. However, the idea of natural law employed by Locke was remarkably similar 
to that of the Dominicans and Jesuits of the previous century.  
I thus avoid using the distinction between “scholastic” and “modern” theories of natural 
law, which many respected historians of natural law have accepted.13 Since Tuck’s recovery of 
                                               
11 Skinner, Foundations (II), 349-50. 
12 Ibid, 175-9. 
13 James Tully, “Introduction,” in Tully, ed., Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizens According to 
Natural Law (Cambridge University Press, 1991), xvii-xix; Richard Tuck, Philosophy and 
Government, 1572-1651 (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 172-3, 197-200; Tuck, Rights of War 
and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford University 
Press, 1999) 5-13; Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the 
Scottish Enlightenment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 15-26; J. B. Schneewind, The 
Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
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the work of Jean Barbeyrac, other scholars have unquestioningly adopted the self-congratulatory 
historiography of Barbeyrac and other eighteenth-century legal scholars, such as Christian 
Thomasius, and Friedrich von Glafey. These Enlightenment men saw themselves as modern, 
secular thinkers and wanted nothing to do with medieval theology. They thus looked to Grotius 
as their intellectual hero who unshackled legal philosophy from the legacy of Aquinas and the 
“school-men.” In their histories Grotius revived natural law by making it relevant for the modern 
world.14 Against this trend in legal history, I emulate the recent work of Harro Höpfl and Annabel 
Brett, who sympathetically treat both Catholic and Protestant natural law without relying on 
misleading categories like “scholastic” or “modern.”15 
My analysis of the history of natural law focuses instead on the question of how this 
concept is actually defined and used. The Thomist view can be distinguished from several other 
prominent definitions of natural law. The Roman jurist Ulpian defined natural law as instinct and 
thus common to both humans and animals. Early Christians like Isidore of Seville proposed that 
natural law was written on the hearts of human beings.16 The Roman Stoics viewed natural law as 
the law that was binding across national boundaries or in the absence of civil law.17 In the 
                                               
58-73; Anthony Pagden, “Stoicism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Legacy of European Imperialism,” 
Constellations, Volume 7, Issue 1 (March 2000), 9-10. 
14 Richard Tuck and Jerome Schneewind understand this historiography and thus avoid making these stark 
distinctions. See Tuck, Philosophy and Government, xv; Schneewind, Invention of Autonomy, 66-7. 
15 Harro Höpfl, Jesuit Political Thought The Society of Jesus and the State, 1540-1630 (Cambridge UP, 
2008); Annabel Brett, Changes of State: Nature and the Limits of the City in Early Modern Natural 
Law (Princeton UP, 2011). 
16 Fred D. Miller, “Early Jewish and Christian Thought,” in Fred D. Miller Jr. and Carrie-Ann Biondi, eds., 
A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, Volume 6: A History of the Philosophy of 
Law from the Ancient Greeks to the Scholastics, Second Edition (Springer, 2015), 183; Brett, Changes 
of State, 21. 
17 Phillip Mitsis, “The Stoic Origin of Natural Rights,” in Topics in Stoic Philosophy, Katerina 
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sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, some Protestant thinkers identified natural law with the 
Mosaic Law revealed by God to the ancient Hebrews.18 Because many thinkers incorporate 
various definitions into their arguments, it is misleading to speak of “schools” of natural law 
(with the exception of the Salamanca School).19 Grotius, for example, employs nearly all of these 
ideas in different works and contexts.20 Moreover, there are groups of thinkers who employ the 
same concept of natural law but sharply disagree about other fundamentals and thus do not 
constitute a “school” in any meaningful sense. The focus of this dissertation is on the political-
philosophical uses of the Thomist conception, which defines natural law as the indemonstrable 
first principles of practical reason, from which civil laws are derived. This conception was used 
not only by Catholic theologians like Almain, Vitoria, and Suárez but also by Anglican divines 
like William Perkins and Richard Hooker, by lay academics like Robert Sanderson, Nathaniel 
Culverwell, and John Locke, and (when convenient to their purposes) by statesmen like Grotius.  
A final methodological issue that arises with any study of natural law is sorting out the 
different terms that are used to signify this concept. The most prominent linguistic ambiguity is 
between the two Latin words often translated as “law”: lex and ius. A second area of confusion is 
the difference or similarity between ius naturale (natural law or right) and ius gentium (law of 
peoples or law of nations). A third issue arises with the use of the word dominium, which is 
                                               
Ierodiakonou, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 153–77.  
18 Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 216-7; Michael Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the 
Origins of Radical Politics (Harvard University Press, 1965), 40 
19 Schneewind, Invention of Autonomy, 73; Knud Haakonssen, “Hugo Grotius and the History of Political 
Thought,” Political Theory, Vol. 13, No. 2 (May, 1985), pp. 239-265 (especially pp. 239, 249). 
20 See Benjamin Straumann, Roman Law in the State of Nature: The Classical Foundations of Hugo 
Grotius’ Natural Law (Cambridge UP, 2015). 
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commonly intended to signify property rights or political power. When conducting a study of 
“natural law,” all of these words seem relevant, yet they can also be used to signify completely 
different concepts such as power, possession, or custom. One approach is to focus on a particular 
word or phrase and follow its many meanings and uses through a particular time. Another 
method is to follow a particular concept, which may be signified by a variety of words, to see 
how it is employed, altered, and combined with other concepts. An example of the first method 
is Annabel Brett’s excellent study of the meanings of ius from the thirteenth to the seventeenth 
century.21 An example of the second method is Richard Tuck’s study of “natural rights” from 
Gerson to Hobbes.22 Because my interest lies in how a particular set of ideas was used to argue 
for secularism, I primarily employ the second method. This allows me to recognize that John 
Locke’s laws of nature, Vitoria’s ius naturale, and Suárez’s dictum rationis naturalis are all 
essentially the same as Aquinas’s lex naturalis. It also leads me to mostly exclude the ideas that 
are labeled “natural law” by John Selden and Thomas Hobbes, because they are clearly different 
from the concept on which my project focuses. 
 
Outline of the Argument: 
Chapter 1 describes two theories of government that preceded political secularism: hierocracy 
and caesaropapism. The idea of the secular state, as articulated and defended in early modern 
Europe, arose in opposition to these two medieval schools of thought. Both hierocracy and 
caesaropapism are attempts to sacralize political power by uniting spiritual and temporal 
                                               
21 Annabel Brett, Liberty, Right, and Nature: Individual Rights in Later Scholastic Thought (Cambridge 
UP, 1997) 
22 Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge UP, 1979) 
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authority. Hierocracy attempts to bring the many temporal powers of the world under the 
authority of a single spiritual power, while caesaropapism attempts to reduce spiritual power to 
an office of the temporal sovereign. I conclude the chapter by outlining the features of a secular 
theory of political rule. 
Chapter 2 lays out the Thomist natural law framework, focusing on Aquinas’s distinction 
between the natural and the supernatural. This distinction gives rise to two distinct sources of 
law: natural reason and supernatural revelation. On this view, all civil law is derived solely from 
the precepts of practical reason and requires no understanding of God or his commandments. 
However, when discussing civil power and ecclesiastical power, Aquinas defends a hierocratic 
position in which the government of the prince is ultimately subordinated to the rule of the pope. 
Chapter 3 examines the first principle of political secularism—the autonomy of civil 
power from ecclesiastical power—as defended by Francisco de Vitoria. Drawing on Aquinas, 
Vitoria argues that civil power arises out of natural law, which is accessible to all reasonable 
people, including pagans and non-Christians. He reaches the controversial conclusion that the 
commands of all civil authorities are no less morally binding than ecclesiastical law. I also 
explain how Vitoria’s secularist project is undermined by his commitment to the canonistic 
understanding of the Catholic Church as a political entity in its own right.  
Chapter 4 explores the second principle of political secularism: the elevation of human 
agency as the efficient cause of political institutions. I show how this principle was developed by 
early Jesuit political thinkers: Luis de Molina, Robert Bellarmine, Francisco Suárez, and Juan de 
Mariana. This Jesuit school sought to undermine the idea that God directly constitutes the form 
of civil governments. They developed a secular and egalitarian theory of natural rights in order to 
explain and defend the necessity of human agency in constituting civil constitutions and electing 
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rulers. The Jesuits deployed this theory in order to invalidate the absolutist, “divine right” theory 
of civil power. 
Chapter 5 explores the complex relationship between Martin Luther’s political thought 
and political secularism. Luther rejects the Thomist theories of civil power by arguing that 
Christians are free in conscience and not spiritually obligated to obey any human laws. At the 
same time, Luther argues that princes have absolute power to control and dispose of their 
subjects’ bodies and property. These two conflicting ideas in Luther’s theology give rise to two 
divergent developments in Protestant thought: Erastianism and radical non-conformism. Both of 
these approaches were attempts to resolve the central question raised by Luther’s theology: do 
civil powers have the authority to govern the religious worship of their citizens? Erastians argued 
for state-imposed worship, while non-conformists argued for liberty of conscience.  
In Chapter 6, I argue that John Locke responds to this Lutheran question by articulating 
the third principle of political secularism: the limitation of civil sovereignty to temporal matters. 
Against the radical dissenters, Locke argues that the state has authority to bind the consciences of 
its citizens in order to defend the “civil interests” of the commonwealth. Against the Erastians, 
Locke argues that the magistrate is only authorized to secure these civil interests and has no 
authority over consciences in spiritual and supernatural matters. By turning back to Thomist 
natural law, Locke restores the dualism of his Catholic predecessors but locates the natural-
supernatural division within the conscience. 
 
Although these historical questions are fascinating in their own right, I also pursue this 
project with an eye toward contemporary debates in liberal democracies. Especially in the United 
States, religious citizens often perceive secular government as incompatible with their right to 
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live according to their spiritual convictions. Whereas secular government was once championed 
by religious minorities, today it is perceived as hostile to all religion and allied with moral 
skepticism and atheism.23 While this may be true of some present-day secularists, I argue that the 
origins of political secularism are not found in skepticism or atheism but in the desire on the part 
of Christians to protect their faith from political influence and insulate politics from religious 
discord.24 In the face of the religious sectarianism of the Reformation era, secularists sought to 
ground state power in a philosophy that was both theologically neutral and morally authoritative. 
Natural law served this purpose by demonstrating that civil communities were founded on self-
evident truths found out by natural reason, not on shared culture, religious beliefs, or forms of 
worship. These truths were moral principles that could unite all reasonable human beings beyond 
theological controversy and even beyond Christianity. The philosophical foundations of 








                                               
23 For a recent account of secularist hostility to religion, see Philip Gorski, American Covenant: A History 
of Civil Religion from the Puritans to the Present (Princeton UP, 2017), especially chapters 1 and 8. 
24 This was evident to nineteenth-century Europeans like Tocqueville and Marx, who argued that 
America’s political secularism allowed religion to flourish there. See Marx, On the Jewish Question, 








The philosophy of political secularism that emerged in early modern Europe was a 
response to two much older political philosophies: hierocratism and caesaropapism. These two 
views of political rule correspond to the two ideal types of institutional arrangements described 
by Max Weber in his discussion of political and religious legitimacy.25 In this discussion Weber 
demonstrates the centrality of religious beliefs and institutions in determining the legitimacy of 
political rule. For Weber, there is no purely secular path to political legitimacy; all political 
authority must be rooted in the sacred or the supernatural in order to be reconciled with subjects’ 
spiritual beliefs.26 His theory thus serves as a point of departure for a discussion of the variety of 
ways in which political rule can be non-secular. It also underscores the revolutionary character of 
the political secularism that gradually emerged in Western political thought. In this chapter, I 
describe the basic features of the hierocratic and caesaropapist philosophies as they appeared in 
medieval to early modern Europe. I conclude the chapter by refining the concept “theocracy” to 
encompass both of these approaches. This definition of theocracy clarifies the meaning of 
political secularism, which breaks away from Weber’s theory of religious legitimation. 
                                               
25 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Volume 3, Guenther Roth and 
Claus Wittich, eds., (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 1158-75. Weber’s typology, which has been 
largely adopted by historians of medieval thought, contains three ideal types of political-religious 
power: hierocracy, theocracy, and caesaropapism. The theocratic type is mostly absent from Weber’s 
discussion, which focuses on conflict and compromise between hierocratic and caesaropapist rulers.  
26 Weber, Economy and Society, 1162. 
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Weber’s discussion focuses primarily on institutional arrangements and the achievement 
of political legitimacy in different religious contexts. Weber defines hierocracy and 
caesaropapism as the two extremes on a spectrum of possible solutions to secular-ecclesiastical 
conflict. In a hierocratic system, secular power is subordinated to an ecclesiastical system that 
exists outside of and independent of the secular power. The secular ruler possesses no 
autonomous legitimacy of his own but only what is granted by the ecclesiastical authorities.27 
This was the type of system advocated by the Roman Church throughout the Middle Ages and 
the early modern era. In a caesaropapist system, the positions are reversed, and all religious 
authority is subordinated to the secular ruler. All ecclesiastical powers become state functions, 
and all aspects of religious doctrine and practice are determined by the secular sovereign.28 Weber 
argues that one rarely finds either of these two ideal types in their pure form. More often, one 
finds a compromise between civil and ecclesiastical authority in which each retain some 
autonomy and respect each other’s authority. The compromise arises, Weber explains, because 
the two powers need each other to secure their legitimacy. Secular rulers find it difficult to attain 
legitimacy when they contradict accepted theological doctrines or are condemned by religious 
authorities. Religious authorities require the support of secular rulers to secure conformity with 
church orthodoxy.29  
While Weber focuses his discussion on political realities and institutional arrangements, 
my focus is on the arguments used to justify these arrangements. In order to describe these 
political ideas, I describe some of the political and religious institutions to which these ideas 
                                               
27 Ibid, 1160. 
28 Ibid, 1161. 
29 Ibid, 1161-2, 1174-6. 
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refer. The basic hierocratic argument is that the legitimacy of secular political power rests on its 
alignment with higher, spiritual ends. For hierocrats, there is no merely natural or secular basis 
for political authority. This set of arguments was used to defend hierocratic institutions, such as 
the papal deposition of kings. According to the caesaropapist argument, every political society is 
ruled by a single power that contains both civil and ecclesiastical authority within it. 
Caesaropapists advance different reasons for this unity. Some argue that a civil community must 
be more than a mere community of interest; it must also be a religious community defined by a 
common set of beliefs and public forms of worship. Others argue that ecclesiastical autonomy 
and religious pluralism pose grave threats to civil peace. Still others argue that God anoints 
secular rulers to enforce His laws and lead their subjects to true faith and salvation. These 
arguments were used to give European monarchs absolute power over the religious institutions 
and practices within their realms. 
Both of these views argue for the unity of the spiritual and temporal spheres of life. 
Hierocracy attempts to bring the many temporal powers of the world under the authority of a 
single spiritual power. Caesaropapism attempts to reduce all spiritual authority to an office of the 
temporal sovereign. The philosophy of political secularism described in this dissertation rejected 
this temporal-spiritual unity in order to insulate political power from religious conflict and in 
order to protect religion from political influence. The roots of political secularism thus lie in 
medieval “dualism,” which sharply distinguished between the temporal and spiritual.  
 
1.2 Early Dualism: Gelasius, Hugh of St. Victor, Bernard of Clairvaux 
The medieval defenders of hierocracy and caesaropapism took as their point of departure 
the existence of two types of authority in the Christian world: the secular powers of the king and 
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the spiritual powers of the priest. This distinction was articulated by “dualist” thinkers who 
sought to maintain a clear separation of authority between the priestly and the princely powers.30 
Robert and Alexander Carlyle argue that dualism was the earliest theory of temporal and spiritual 
authority in the Middle Ages: “To the Western Church it was in the main clear that there were 
two great authorities in the world, not one, that the Spiritual Power was in its own sphere 
independent of the Temporal, while it did not doubt that the Temporal Power was also 
independent and supreme in its sphere.”31 These early dualist statements established the basic 
premise from which later authors proceeded: the existence of the temporal and spiritual as two 
distinct spheres of human life. 
The ideas of the temporal and the spiritual can be traced to the founding of the Western 
Church and the experience of the first Christians living under the pagan Roman Empire. The 
beliefs, practices, and institutions of the early church were ordered toward an otherworldly 
goal—unity with Christ. This goal required Christians to manifest certain temporal actions, such 
as charity and meekness, and to create a particular kind of society among themselves, as Christ 
commanded in Scripture. However, these temporal activities were always ordered toward the 
next life. The temporal and spiritual are never wholly separate because all Christians live both a 
temporal and spiritual existence at the same time. They lived under the same temporal 
constraints as non-Christians, but they were infused with a spiritual purpose that transcended the 
temporal world. As formulated by Augustine several centuries later, Christians must live in this 
                                               
30 On the concept of dualism, see Brian Tierney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought, 
1150-1650 (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 10; J. A. Watt, “Spiritual and Temporal Powers,” in 
The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c. 350 – c. 1450, J. H. Burns, ed. (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 368. 
31 R. W. Carlyle and A. J. Carlyle, A History of Mediaeval Political Theory, Volume V (Edinburgh: 
William Blackwood and Sons, 1950), 454, cited by Watt, “Spiritual and Temporal Powers,” 367. 
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world, but they must not take delight in it. As pilgrims on their way to their eternal destination, 
they may use the goods of this world, but they must not seek these goods for their own sake.32  
For the early church, there was a clear distinction between the spiritually oriented 
activities of their society and the secularly oriented activities of the Roman government. The 
church pursued spiritual unity with Christ, while the government pursued temporal necessities 
such as peace and wealth. The church could never hope to attain any secular political power but 
only toleration by secular authorities. Moreover, Christ himself, though he claimed supreme 
spiritual authority over all mankind, was politically powerless and thus suffered judgment and 
death at the hands of the Roman government. When Christ was being interrogated by Pontius 
Pilate about whether he was “king of the Jews,” Christ insisted, “My kingdom is not of this 
world” (John 18:36). Following their savior’s example, the early church suffered persecution at 
the hands of their pagan rulers while awaiting the kingdom of God in the next life.33 This passive 
dualism was complicated by the conversion of Constantine in 312 and the gradual ascent of the 
Christian religion to official religion of the Roman Empire in 380. The Roman emperors were 
now allies of the Church, enforcing Nicene Christian orthodoxy and punishing paganism and 
heresy. The Church needed a new theory for this imperial power that was both Christian and “of 
this world”.  
Pope Gelasius I (d. 496) authored one of the earliest formulations of this new dualism. In 
his letter to the Eastern Roman Emperor, Anastasius I, Gelasius writes that the priesthood and 
the emperor constitute the two powers by which the world is ruled. The emperor receives his 
                                               
32 Augustine, Concerning the City of God against the Pagans, Henry Bettenson, trans. (Penguin, 1984), 
15, 566. 
33 Brian Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, 1050-1300 (University of Toronto Press, 1988), 7-8.  
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authority directly from God, and the bishops must obey him “as far as the sphere of public order 
is concerned.” However, Gelasius tells the emperor, “you piously bow the neck to those who 
have charge of divine affairs and seek from them the means of your salvation.”34 According to 
Gelasius’s account, each power is supreme within its own sphere of authority and is to be obeyed 
by the other within this sphere. As emperor in the secular sphere, Anastasius has no superior. As 
a Christian, he is a son of the church and no greater than any other disciple of Christ.  
More detailed accounts of this dualism were developed by two twelfth-century 
theologians: Hugh of St. Victor (1096-1141) and Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153). Hugh of St. 
Victor’s contribution to the question is found in Book II of On the Sacraments of the Christian 
Faith. He begins by defining the Church (ecclesia) as one body of Christ consisting of two parts, 
laity and clergy, corresponding to the left and right sides of the body, respectively. By placing 
both temporal and spiritual powers within the Church, Hugh imposes an overarching unity on the 
two spheres that prioritizes the spiritual. This expansive definition of the Church, encompassing 
both temporal and spiritual, would be useful for later hierocratic theories.35 Hugh insists that the 
clergy is the right side because it is superior to the laity: “For that which is on the left hand of the 
body is of the body and is good, although it is not the best.” Hugh’s corporal analogy is drawn 
from St. Paul’s description of the Christian community as the body of Christ: “For as in one body 
we have many parts, and all the parts do not have the same function, so we, though many, are 
one body in Christ…” (Romans 12:4). Elsewhere Paul describes Christ as directly ruling over the 
community as head of the Church: “And he is the head of the body, the church…” (Colossians 
                                               
34 Ibid, 13-4. 




1:18). Absent from Hugh’s description is the role of the pope in relation to temporal and spiritual 
powers. Later hierocrats would expand on Hugh’s analogy by arguing that the pope, as Vicar of 
Christ, was the head of the Church and thus sovereign over both temporal and spiritual powers. 
Hugh is more interested in describing the relationship between the secular and spiritual 
halves of the Church. In the section most often cited by later medieval hierocrats (Book II, Part 
two, Chapter 4), Hugh makes four points about this relationship: (1) the spiritual power is 
superior to the secular power “in honor and dignity”; (2) the spiritual power establishes the 
secular power in order to fulfill spiritual purposes; (3) the spiritual power can judge the secular 
power and can only be judged by God; and (4) the secular power is sanctified by the spiritual 
power.36 Some point to these statements as clear evidence that Hugh is unequivocally hierocratic.37 
The latter three are especially significant because they seem to eliminate the autonomy of 
temporal authority. Because the sole reason for the existence of secular power is the fulfillment 
of spiritual purposes, its authority is derived from its sanctification by the priesthood. 
In later chapters, however, Hugh argues that the secular power must remain separate and 
retain some autonomy from the spiritual. Because the spiritual powers only pursue spiritual 
purposes, they have authority over spiritual matters, while earthly matters are left in the hands of 
secular authorities. For example, secular authorities have the authority to distribute property 
rights and resolve questions of justice regarding earthly possessions.38 Like the Levites of the 
ancient Hebrews, members of the priesthood are a special class that has no property rights 
                                               
36 Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith, Roy J. Deferrari, trans. (Cambridge, MA: 
Mediaeval Academy of America, 1951), Book II, Part 2, Chapters II-VII, pp. 254-8. 
37 Watt, “Spiritual and Temporal Powers,” 368-9. 
38 Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments, II, 2, VI, 257. 
  
 20 
(dominium potestativum) or rights of usage (dominium utile) over earthly things unless these are 
granted to them by the laity. Hugh states that laypersons generally grant rights of usage to the 
clergy, but the clergy can never possess jurisdictional rights over property. Only the secular 
authorities have this power to create and transfer property rights.39 While he was often cited by 
hierocrats, Hugh’s theory is incompatible with pure hierocracy because it grants secular rulers 
independent jurisdictional authority. Although this authority may have been granted and 
sanctified by the clergy and may ultimately exist for spiritual purposes, it is exercised 
independently by the laity.  
The other work frequently cited on the question of secular and spiritual powers is Bernard 
of Clairvaux’s On Consideration, written between 1148 and 1153 as a spiritual guidebook for 
Pope Eugene III. Unlike Hugh, Bernard is principally concerned with the papacy and explains in 
great detail the extent and limits of the pope’s worldly power. The most-cited passage is 
Bernard’s interpretation of the famous “two swords” passage in Luke 22:38 (Book IV, Chapter 
3). Bernard follows the traditional reading of the two swords as referring to the spiritual power of 
the Church and the temporal power of the king. Bernard emphasizes that the Church only wields 
the spiritual sword, symbolizing the power of the Word of God, and never uses a temporal, literal 
sword: “ ‘You instruct me to feed dragons and scorpions, not sheep,’ you reply. Therefore, I say, 
attack them all the more, but with the word, not the sword. Why should you try to usurp the 
sword anew which you were once commanded to sheathe?”40 The key passage for later hierocrats 
follows immediately after: 
                                               
39 Ibid, II, 2, VII, 257-8. 
40 The reference is to Matthew 26:52 in which Jesus commands his disciples to put away their swords after 
one of them attempts to prevent Jesus’s arrest by cutting off the ear of the arresting official. 
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Yet he who would deny that the sheathed sword is yours seems to me not to have paid 
enough attention to what the Lord is saying when he says, ‘Put up thy sword into the 
scabbard.’ Therefore this sword is also yours and is to be drawn at your command 
although not by your hand… Both swords, spiritual and material, then, belong to the 
church; the one exercised on behalf of the church, the other by the church: the one by the 
hand of the priest, the other by the hand of the soldier, but clearly at the bidding of the 
priest and the order of the emperor.41  
 
Bernard made this idea more explicit when in 1150 he urged Eugene to call for the Second 
Crusade: “Put forth both swords, now that Christ is suffering again where he suffered before.”42 
These passages were used throughout the medieval and early modern periods to justify the 
complete subordination of princely power to the papacy. Yet Bernard cannot be called a 
hierocratic thinker because he takes no interest in the foundations or limits of the secular power. 
Bernard’s advice to the pope is certainly not intended as a political or legal treatise but rather as a 
series of reflections on the pope’s unique place in the world. 
Although popes have a duty to command the temporal sword, at other places in On 
Consideration, Bernard makes it clear to Eugene that the papal office does not consist of political 
rule but of spiritual servitude. Unlike the prince, the pope does not possess dominium—usually 
translated as “lordship”—over his people.43 Rather, he acts as a servant to his flocks and minister 
of Christ, which is a more honorable and dignified position than that of the prince.44 The pope’s 
position over the faithful is that of a steward and a tutor, not a possessor, ruler, or master. The 
                                               
41 Bernard of Clairvaux, On Consideration, Book IV, Chapter 3, 117-8. 
42 I.S. Robinson, “Church and Papacy,” in The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c. 350 – 
c. 1450, J. H. Burns, ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 304. 
43 The notion of a prince holding dominium over his subjects implies a master-servant relationship and 
points to the Augustinian idea of political power. See City of God, XIX.15. 
44 Bernard, On Consideration, II.6, 56-9. 
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tutor instructs and guides his pupil but cannot rule over the pupil as the father does. The duty of 
the pope is to counsel, minister, and serve.45 Finally, Bernard warns the pope against wealth and 
extravagance, which belong in the courts of emperors and are not the rightful possessions of the 
humble shepherd. Bernard chastises Eugene for accumulating wealth like Constantine instead of 
serving his people like St. Peter.46 In these admonitions, Bernard recalls the humble life of Christ 
and the first apostles, who shunned earthly power and riches, whose kingdom was not of this 
world, and who rendered unto Caesar that which was Caesar’s. This is an especially important 
contrast with later hierocrats, who would claim that the pope has original dominium over all 
property, which he can delegate to secular rulers.  
The picture of secular-spiritual relations that emerges from the writings of Gelasius, 
Bernard, and Hugh is on the whole a dualist one: secular rulers have rights and powers that are 
not granted by spiritual authorities and that cannot be abrogated by spiritual authorities. 
However, their dualism is not a balanced division of authority between two equal spheres; it is 
premised on the unity of the temporal and spiritual as two halves of the Church and the 
superiority of spiritual authority over temporal authority. The spiritual authorities are superior in 
the worth and dignity of their offices, which does not directly translate into legal or political 
power over princes and emperors. However, because these early dualists were not interested in 
propounding a systematic political philosophy, their notions of dualism are sometimes vague and 
incomplete. Most importantly, none offers an explanation of why temporal power ought to be 
autonomous from spiritual power. For this reason, their theories were often cited by hierocrats as 
supporting a universal papal monarchy. As we will see in the next chapter, a more thorough 
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defense of dualism would arise with Thomas Aquinas’s revival of Aristotelian political 
philosophy. 
Many pressing political and legal questions remain unanswered in these early writings. 
Are members of the clergy subjects of the prince in whose territory they reside, and as such, are 
they bound to pay taxes to the prince and submit to his legal jurisdiction? Does a non-Christian 
prince have authority over Christian subjects and the churches in his territory? What recourse 
does the pope have with a heretical or disobedient prince? Does the pope have the right to depose 
the prince or at least to encourage the prince’s subjects to depose the prince? Prompted by 
continuing conflict between kings and popes, later thinkers—hierocratic, caesaropapist, and 
dualist—sought to clarify these issues. 
 
1.3 Hierocratic Theories of Government 
Unlike caesaropapist arguments, which reject the dualists’ sharp separation of temporal 
and spiritual powers, hierocratism maintains this distinction in order to subordinate the temporal 
completely to the spiritual. Hierocrats maintain the distinctiveness of the temporal authority of 
princes while denying their autonomy from the universal spiritual powers to which all humans 
are subject. The fundamental idea that underlies these arguments is the hierarchy of spiritual and 
physical realities. The world consists of an invisible spiritual realm, over which God and Christ 
directly exercise power, which is prior to the visible, corporeal realm in which emperors and 
princes hold supreme power. Likewise, human beings consist of spiritual and physical 
components: while temporal powers can control and punish the physical body, they hold no 
power over the soul. These arguments can be divided into two types. The first is an institutional 
hierocratism, which subordinates secular authorities to ecclesiastical authorities. The most well-
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known and successful example of this is the papal hierocratic theory supporting the pope’s 
universal political dominion. The second is theological hierocratism, in which a theological 
construct is used as a legal standard for determining the legitimacy of secular rulers and secular 
law.  
 
1.3.1 Institutional Hierocratism: The Late Medieval Papacy 
The papal hierocracy—in theory if not reality—reached its high point in the years from 
the papacy of Gregory VII (1073-1085) to that of Boniface VIII (1294-1303). Beginning with the 
“papal revolution” of Gregory VII, the Roman Church took on the characteristics of a state, with 
a centralized bureaucracy and system of legislation under the sovereignty of the pope.47 Having 
consolidated all ecclesiastical authority, the papacy now claimed to be the only true sovereign in 
the world, having authority to judge and depose all secular rulers.48 Papal hierocrats viewed all 
emperors and kings as merely the lay equivalent of bishops in the hierarchy of the global Church: 
they could be installed, disciplined, and removed by the pope. Kings were also subject to the 
ecclesiastical laws issued by the pope, and any disobedience was to be met with the severest 
punishment. The pope had the authority to judge kings not only in spiritual matters but in all 
aspects of their office: kings who failed to carry out their political duties or who were ineffective 
leaders could be deposed.49 Moreover, according to papal hierocratic theory, the secular ruler’s 
jurisdiction was limited to secular affairs and did not extend to members of the clergy living 
                                               
47 Harold Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1983), 113-4.  
48 Joseph Canning, Ideas of Power in the Late Middle Ages, 1296-1417 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 12-13; Tierney, Crisis of Church and State, 172. 
49 Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty, 283-4. 
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within the borders of his kingdom. This required a clearer separation between ecclesiastical and 
secular authorities, which were intertwined in the early Middle Ages. Before the papal 
revolution, ecclesiastical authority was widely dispersed among local political authorities. The 
bishops of the Church were part of the political administration of each kingdom and were often 
appointed by emperors and kings rather than by pope. This blurring of jurisdictional lines often 
meant that kings exercised extensive authority over the Church and clergy in their territories.50 
Hierocracy was an attempt to segregate these functions by placing temporal matters under lay 
political rulers and spiritual matters under the clergy. 
The prolonged conflict between King Philip IV of France and Pope Boniface VIII 
resulted in an explosion of hierocratic and anti-hierocratic arguments. The conflict centered on 
two areas of lay jurisdiction over the clergy: taxation and criminal prosecution.51 In response to 
Philip’s attempts to tax the French clergy to pay for his ongoing war against England, Boniface 
issued the bull Clericos laicos (1296), which denied the French king’s sovereignty over all who 
resided in his kingdom. The bull stated that all ecclesiastical persons and property were under the 
jurisdiction of the pope alone and could not be commanded or used by the king without papal 
permission. Any king who demanded taxes from the clergy without papal approval would be 
excommunicated, a sentence that would render him incapable of ruling.52 Three years later, Philip 
                                               
50 Francis Oakley, Empty Bottles of Gentilism: Kingship and the Divine in Late Antiquity and the Early 
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again provoked papal outrage by trying and imprisoning a French bishop for blasphemy, heresy, 
and treason. Boniface responded with a letter reminding the king that he was not truly sovereign: 
“Let no one persuade you that you have no superior or that you are not subject to the head of the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy…”53 The incident also prompted Boniface to issue the bull Unam 
Sanctam (1302), the most definitive statement of the papal hierocratic position from this period. 
The main issue at stake in this bull was the unity of the Church as a political entity encompassing 
all secular kingdoms. Expanding on Hugh of St. Victor’s argument for the unity of the Church, 
Boniface argues that Christ is the head of the Church and that he appointed Peter and Peter’s 
successors as his vicars in this regard. Following Bernard of Clairvaux, Boniface argues that this 
unity requires a hierarchical ordering of the two swords—the spiritual sword wielded by the pope 
and the temporal sword wielded by kings: the temporal sword is not independent and must only 
be used at the pope’s command. Quoting Hugh of St. Victor, he argues that the spiritual power 
must judge the temporal power when it errs, while the spiritual power can be judged by God 
alone.54  
In the late Middle Ages, the concept most often used to describe the pope’s authority over 
secular kingdoms was his “plenitude of power” (plenitudo potestatis).55 Hierocrats held that this 
power contained two distinct parts: the power of jurisdiction (potestas iurisdictionis) and the 
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power of order (potestas ordinis). The power of order was the sacramental power conferred on all 
members of the priesthood through their ordination. The jurisdictional power, however, was a 
royal and governmental power belonging only to the pope. These two powers reflected the dual 
nature of Christ as both human and divine. Through the powers of order, the entire priesthood 
inherited Christ’s human aspect—the powers that Christ himself wielded while he lived as a man 
on earth. Through the power of jurisdiction, the pope stands in the role of the transcendent God 
by wielding absolute power over the entire Church.56 In order to effectively rule over the Church, 
the pope must possess the power to make judgments and issue punishments. A central issue of 
contention between hierocrats and their opponents was whether the pope’s jurisdictional power 
was limited to spiritual matters or extended to temporal matters. Against the hierocrats, John of 
Paris argued that the pope’s jurisdictional power did not amount to political “lordship” 
(dominium). Like Christ, the pope had the authority to pass judgments on the sins of all members 
of the Church and to determined the penance necessary for them to be absolved.57 Hierocrats held 
that the pope’s spiritual authority as head of the church included the authority to install, 
command, and judge all secular rulers. 
Most of these papal claims of hierocratic sovereignty were statements of the legal and 
spiritual relations between popes and kings and did not attempt to justify these relations. Such 
normative justifications were made by several late medieval theologians and jurists, including 
Henry of Segusio (Hostiensis), James of Viterbo, Augustinus Triumphus of Ancona, Alvarus 
Pelagius, and Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio. There is wide agreement that the most extreme 
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argument for papal hierocracy was Giles of Rome’s (Aegidius Romanus) De potestate ecclesiae 
(On Ecclesiastical Power). Charles McIlwain describes the work as “the completest and most 
thoroughgoing of all the theological and philosophical defenses of the furthest doctrines of the 
canonists, that the Pope is supreme lord in his own right over all the world and in all matters 
temporal as well as spiritual…” The later works of Augustinus and Alvarus, he writes, did not 
carry the argument any farther.58 
The core principle that Giles defends in his massive treatise is the strict hierarchical 
ordering of ecclesiastical and secular powers as the two halves of a single church: the temporal 
sword must be completely subordinate and obedient to the spiritual sword. Despite his frequent 
citations of Hugh of St. Victor, Giles implicitly rejects Hugh’s characterization of clergy and 
laity existing side-by-side. Giles also rejects the more nuanced canonist argument that spiritual 
powers are superior in spiritual matters and secular powers superior in temporal matters.59 While 
Giles restates Hugh’s claim that spiritual matters are superior to temporal matters “in honor and 
in dignity,” this claim is not sufficient to establish the complete legal superiority of the pope. 
Contemporary royalists, like John of Paris, also acknowledged that spiritual matters were 
superior in dignity to temporal matters but insisted that this did not diminish the legal autonomy 
of temporal powers.60 Giles thus offers two further justifications for this subordination: (1) the 
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hierarchical ordering of the spiritual and the temporal and (2) the power of the internal to direct 
the external.  
As R.W. Dyson observes, Giles’s argument for a universal hierarchy combines “a 
Neoplatonist metaphysic” with Aristotelian teleology.61 Giles employs the concept of “hierarchy” 
as first coined by Pseudo-Dionysius in On the Celestial Hierarchy.62 Citing this influential 
Neoplatonist work, Giles argues that the universe must be hierarchically ordered in such a way 
that all lower things are led to the highest—God—through intermediaries. Giles maintains that 
“orderliness,” defined as the proper subordination of inferiors to superiors, is a good in itself and 
a necessary feature of political justice. Here he cites Augustine’s City of God, which in turn cites 
Plato’s Republic: true justice consists of the orderly subjugation of the passions to reason, of 
body to the soul, and of the soul to God.63 Because they correspond to the spiritual and the 
corporeal, papal and princely power cannot exist as equals, or as unequal yet autonomous 
entities. Justice demands that the temporal sword find its proper place in humble service to the 
spiritual sword.64 
Giles’s hierarchical argument also draws on the teleologies of Aristotle and Augustine, 
both of whom are cited in nearly every chapter of the work. The essence of Giles’s argument is 
that “the whole of corporeal nature is ordered toward the spiritual.”65 This tendency in hierocracy 
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to subsume the entire physical universe under a single spiritual purpose was famously labeled by 
Henri-Xavier Arquillière as “political Augustinianism” (“L’augustinisme politique”). On 
Arquilliere’s extreme hierocratic reading of Augustine, all the temporal ends of human life are 
merely intermediate goods through which fallen humans may achieve their ultimate spiritual 
end.66 Thus, physical security, property, and civic virtues are only valuable if they are “ordered 
toward spiritual ends”, such as the unity of the Church and the conversion of the infidels. While 
other medieval hierocrats (including Giles himself in his De regimine principum) conceded that 
there are temporal things that are ends in themselves, Giles’s theory does not allow humans to 
possess, use, or enjoy any temporal goods except as means to a spiritual end. The inspiration for 
this view is in Book 19 of City of God, in which Augustine critiques the pagan philosophers for 
teaching that the ultimate human good can be achieved in this life.67 For Augustine, the attempt to 
achieve fulfillment in this life leads us to construct perverse imitations of our ultimate ends.68 
Rather than taking delight in the goods and pleasures of this life, the citizens of the City of God 
merely use these goods during their pilgrimage toward eternal happiness.69  
While Augustine’s focus is on directing our earthly activities toward the next life, Giles 
uses this logic to place all the things of the corporeal world “under the lordship [dominium] and 
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power of the Church.”70 A prince has a certain power to order and dispose of the temporal things 
of his realm, but unless these things are used to lead the prince’s subjects to their ultimate end, 
they are being used unjustly will lead to the “damnation of the soul.” The pope alone can 
determine how these temporal things can be properly used: “he is lord of temporal things 
inasmuch as they are temporal, because temporal things as such are the servants of spiritual 
ends.”71 
The second thrust of Giles’s argument is that all corporeal substances require an invisible 
force to direct them toward their proper ends. The human body should not merely follow the 
inclinations of the flesh but must be moved by the spirit to act virtuously. Our bodies are 
intended to achieve nobler ends than the mere survival and base pleasures sought by the body 
itself.72 Likewise, all corporeal objects are moved to serve some higher end by their invisible 
internal nature and ultimately by the first mover—God.73 In the same way, the material sword, 
while wielded by the hand of the prince, must be directed by the spiritual powers toward its 
proper end, which is the virtue of the subjects and defense of the faith.74  
For Giles, this internal-external dichotomy also explains Bernard’s claim that the spiritual 
powers must not directly wield the temporal sword: to act directly in the material world is less 
noble than to direct the material world by one’s spiritual power; thus the spiritual leader is like 
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God and the angels, who move corporeal substances through their invisible powers.75 In another 
telling analogy, Giles compares the king and his temporal dominion to a hammer and an iron. 
The king acts directly on temporal things and shapes them with his temporal power. But the pope 
is the blacksmith who wields the hammer and is thus the efficient cause of all temporal power.76 
The secular powers only exercise a crude control over the bodies of their subjects, inflicting 
corporal punishment. The pope, by virtue of his potestas iurisdictionis, is given power over the 
souls of his subjects and can thus direct their bodies more completely.77 
Throughout his treatise, Giles seeks to undermine the notion that laypeople possess rights 
over political power and property (dominium) that are independent of the Church and therefore 
cannot be revoked by the Church. His argument is twofold. First, because all earthly possessions 
exist for the achievement of spiritual ends, when possessors misuse their power or property in a 
way that fails to achieve these ends, they lose their rights over these things.78 Secondly, all 
dominium—both of use and jurisdiction—belongs ultimately and originally to the Church. This 
is because the Church rules over spiritual things, including the souls of all believers, while 
princes and laypeople rule over temporal things such as bodies and material objects. Because the 
soul rules over the body, that which rules the soul has a right to rule the body. Giles references 
Hugh’s differentiation between dominium utile and dominium potestativum and directly refutes 
Hugh by insisting that both of these dominia belong originally and ultimately to the Church.79 
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Giles extends the logic of this argument to non-believers: those who do not receive the 
sacraments of the Church are cut off from God and therefore cannot use their bodies and 
possessions to serve God’s purposes. Thus, the Church has the right to step in and rule over these 
people and their property. All property rights are given by God, but one has no relationship with 
God outside the Church and can therefore possess nothing outside of the Church.80 Giles thus 
defends the idea that dominium is founded on divine grace, which is only available through the 
Church. This idea of “grace-founded dominium” was influential throughout the late Middle 
Ages, among both supporters and enemies of the papacy.81 
This hierocratic logic was used by the papacy to both subjugate Christian kingdoms and 
to govern European relations with non-Christian peoples such as the Jews, Muslims, and 
Mongols. The extreme hierocratic position on this latter question was influentially propounded 
by Hostiensis (d. 1271), who argued that because all dominium required divine grace as 
mediated by the Church, non-Christian nations possessed no legitimate rights to their territories. 
Prior to the coming of Christ, these nations had possessed dominium over their lands according 
to natural law, but Christ ushered in a new international legal order under the jurisdiction of his 
successors, the popes. Infidel kings may be tolerated and allowed to rule over their subjects, but 
the pope possesses de iure authority over these lands and may intervene at any time.82  
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 The papal-hierocratic theory suffered a gradual decline with the rise of modern, 
centralized states. The Roman Church may have been the first modern state, but it was quickly 
followed by much larger, wealthier, and militarily stronger states that felt no need to bend to the 
pope’s command. The de facto autonomy of secular states was already apparent in 1296 with the 
outcome of Philip IV’s confrontation with Boniface VIII. After Boniface denied Philip’s 
sovereignty in Clericos laicos, Philip responded by demonstrating his power and issuing an 
embargo on precious metals exports. Facing financial ruin, Boniface was forced to capitulate, 
issuing the bull, Etsi statu (1297), conceding that clergy may pay taxes to their kings in cases of 
national necessity without papal permission.83 By the sixteenth century, most defenders of the 
pope’s temporal power had retreated to a moderate dualist position in which the pope only 
wielded indirect temporal authority in cases of spiritual necessity. Despite the waning of the 
papacy’s worldly political pretensions in the modern era, the hierocratic worldview, rooted in 
“political Augustinianism,” persisted throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and into 
the modern era. 
 
1.3.2 Theological Hierocratism: FitzRalph and Wycliffe 
Like institutional hierocracy, theological hierocracy renders civil rights and political 
justice completely dependent on spiritual realities. Weber gestures toward this second type of 
hierocracy when he defines hierocracy as the subjugation of political authority to systematic 
theological claims.84 Unlike papal hierocracy, theological hierocracy lacks a clear spiritual 
authority with the power to make judgments about spiritual ends and to exercise power over 
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temporalities. All the proponents of this view explicitly rejected the pope’s authority to know or 
determine who was a recipient of God’s grace. In some instances, this left the theory without any 
real political relevance. However, this anti-papal hierocratic account of political legitimacy was 
often used by laypersons to challenge the political and civil rights of those whom they deemed to 
be mortal sinners. Theological hierocracy was embraced by two fourteenth century divines—
Richard FitzRalph and John Wycliffe. Like Giles of Rome, both men rejected the Thomist-
Aristotelian theory of natural law in favor of an Augustinian approach to understanding civil 
power and justice.85 Their theories of grace-founded dominium were part of a larger trend in favor 
Augustinian views of power in late medieval thought.86 As we will see in Chapter 3, it was 
against these two philosophers that Francisco de Vitoria developed his natural law arguments for 
the autonomy of civil authority from divine grace. 
In his contribution to the debates on Franciscan poverty, On the Poverty of the Savior, 
Richard FitzRalph (1300-1360) argues that fallen human beings have lost their natural right to 
hold dominium. He defines dominium as a species of right (ius), by which rational creatures 
have authority to possess and use things. This capacity is intrinsic to human beings by virtue of 
their rational nature, which sets them apart from non-humans.87 FitzRalph’s theory of grace-
founded dominium turns on two fundamental points. First, contrary to Aquinas, he argues that 
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grace does not perfect man’s nature; rather, the state of grace is the defining characteristic of 
man’s nature. Second, the fall of Adam and Eve eradicated this human nature by taking man out 
of the state of grace. Humans were originally created in the image of God, in a state of perfect 
justice and grace. Through their very existence, they participated in God’s perfection. Because 
all human dominium descends from God’s original lordship over the universe, it is only through 
their participation in God’s nature that human beings merit their own dominium. All of these 
divine human qualities, including rationality, were lost to humanity when Adam and Eve 
betrayed God.88 Fallen human beings thus lost all their rights to exercise authority and ownership 
over the created world, and only through the redeeming grace available through Christ can they 
regain those natural rights.  
This understanding of human nature led FitzRalph to articulate the same idea of 
dominium defended by Giles of Rome in his defense of the papal monarchy. In his Summa on 
the Armenians, FitzRalph writes: 
So far as I can judge no man in a state of mortal sin has true lordship [dominium] over 
other creatures in God’s sight. He ought rather to be called a tyrant, a thief or a robber, 
though he may keep the name of prince or lord, by reason of possession or hereditary 
succession, or the approval of the people who are subject to him, or by some other human 
law. But he has no true lordship [dominium] until he repents, and until the grace of 
penance has restored him to a state that is acceptable to God.89 
 
Fitzralph never directly argues that mortal sinners should be deprived of the goods and offices 
that they possess, but his proposition clearly suggests that a prince who is a non-Christian or an 
unrepentant Christian holds merely human power over his subjects and may be resisted without 
violating divine law.  
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 John Wycliffe (1330-1384) elaborated on FitzRalph’s theory of grace-founded dominium 
in two major works: On Divine Dominion (De domino divino) and On Civil Dominion (De civili 
dominio). Wycliffe defines dominium more narrowly than FitzRalph, as a special kind of 
relation that is distinct from right (ius) and power (potestas).90 He defines it as “the relational 
disposition of a rational nature according as it is characterized as being over some person or 
thing that serves it.” Civil dominion differs from other types of dominion in that it is coercive, 
the clearest example being the relationship between master and servant.91 Like FitzRalph, 
Wycliffe, makes civil dominium dependent on humans’ resembling and reflecting God’s 
perfectly just nature. Wycliffe adopts a more thoroughly Augustinian view, explaining that all 
“being” (esse) descends from and participates in God’s perfect being.92 According to Augustine, 
the introduction of sin into the world represented not a new existence but an absence—the 
destruction of humans’ good existence.93 When human beings are infected by sin, they lose their 
very being and “become nothing,” forfeiting their original nature and their right to hold 
dominium.94 Here, Wycliffe is directly opposing the view of Aquinas, who had argued that sin 
diminishes the “good of nature” but cannot destroy it entirely: the laws and rights of nature 
continue to operate in all human beings regardless of their state of grace.95 Thus, Aquinas held 
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that non-Christians could hold legitimate dominium over Christians.96 Against this view, Wycliffe 
insists that nature does not continue to operate in sinful human beings, because it requires the 
continuous willing of God. It is God alone who bestows rights and powers on all beings.97 If God 
chose to bestow the same dominium on both sinners and the redeemed, this would mean that 
God treated his friends and enemies alike, in violation of his prudent nature.98  
By collapsing human nature and divine grace into a single hierarchy governed by God’s 
direct action, Wycliffe seeks to eliminate the possibility of partially righteous individuals, who 
are mortal sinners yet possess some of their original divine nature. For Wycliffe, the fundamental 
virtue that legitimates dominium is justice (iustitia), which he defines, like Giles of Rome, in an 
Augustinian fashion. Justice is primarily a mode of being and only secondarily a mode of action 
and relation. The definition of a sinner is therefore not someone who acts unjustly but someone 
who is fundamentally unjust to his core: “when mortal sin poisons a nature, it much more 
evidently poisons every mode or accident of the nature; so if people’s lives are unjust, so that 
they live unjustly, then each of their actions is unjust.”99 Wycliffe gives the example of a sinner 
who gives away his possessions as alms for the poor. His actions appear to be just and outwardly 
resemble the actions of a just man. However, because his entire nature is sinful, he “acts without 
grace” and thus acts unjustly.100 There is no partial goodness or partial right because these are 
gifts from God, who “does not reconcile or forgive except wholly.” Quoting from the Book of 
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James, he writes, “He who offends in one thing has become guilty of all” (James 2:10).101 This 
refusal to grant the natural world autonomy from God’s voluntary and direct action allows 
hierocrats like Giles and Wycliffe to undermine political authority on spiritual grounds. 
One obvious problem with FitzRalph’s and Wycliffe’s approach to grace-founded 
dominium is that it lacks an arbiter who can determine whether a prince or owner is in a state of 
grace and thus holds dominium over that which he possesses. The papal hierocratic theory of 
grace-founded dominium does not have this problem because the pope and his bishops have the 
“power of the keys” to actually determine who receives God’s grace and can thus directly depose 
and dispossess sinners, heretics, and infidels. Wycliffe himself recognizes this problem because, 
like Augustine, he believed that the redeemed were indistinguishable from mortal sinners while 
on earth. He thus had to ultimately concede that rulers who lacked grace must still be obeyed out 
of respect for the divinely ordained offices they occupy.102  
Despite the difficulties of discerning the state of others’ souls, FitzRalph’s and Wycliffe’s 
ideas could be used by Christians to justify the dispossession and conquest of non-Christians, 
who obviously lacked grace. This was made evident when the Council of Constance (1414-7) 
condemned the teachings of Wycliffe as heretical because of their apparent implications for 
Christian-infidel relations. In the fifteenth century, the Church sought to mitigate international 
conflict with non-Christian states by moving away from the hierocratic doctrines of Hostiensis, 
Boniface, and Giles. It asserted that non-Christians possess legitimate dominion over their 
territories and could not be dispossessed by Christians for mere unfaith. The Church thus sided 
with the pagan Lithuanian people against the invading Teutonic Knights, who justified their 
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invasion on the grounds that the Lithuanians could possess no dominion. In defending the 
Lithuanians, the Church felt compelled to condemn Wycliffe’s doctrine of grace-founded 
dominion.103 
 
1.3.3 Modern Hierocratism 
Despite the steady decline of papal power in European affairs, hierocratic thinkers 
continued to insist on the pope’s temporal dominion into the modern era. At the dawn of the 
Reformation, the Fifth Lateran Council (1516) re-promulgated Unam sanctam, reiterating the 
pope’s claims to supremacy in temporal affairs.104 When the establishment of Protestant political 
control over large portions of Europe with the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, the papacy held more 
firmly than ever to strict hierocratism. In 1559, Pope Paul IV issued the bull Cum ex Apostolatus 
officio, in which he re-asserted the pope’s “plenitude of power over nations and kingdoms” and 
his right to deprive any heretic of his secular or spiritual power.105 A more extreme and explicit 
statement was issued by Pope Pius V in Regnans in Excelsis (1570), which excommunicated and 
deposed Elizabeth, the “pretended Queen of England.” After enumerating the ways in which 
Elizabeth suppressed the true faith, promoted heresy, and divided the body of Christ, Pius 
declared that all English subjects are “perpetually absolved” from the duty to obey the pretended 
Queen. Any subjects who continued to obey her would be excommunicated.106  
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Needless to say, most Catholic subjects in Protestant kingdoms felt greater compulsion to 
obey their temporal sovereigns than their spiritual lord. Most Jesuit theologians did not directly 
contradict papal statements, but they proposed a compromise—an indirect papal power (potestas 
indirecta) by which the people as a whole or the estates of the realm, not the pope, has the legal 
authority to depose the monarch. Some members of the French Catholic League, however, took a 
more hierocratic approach and considered all Protestant kings already deposed by the pope. If a 
deposed king continued to issue commands and punishments, he was a tyrant and could be 
resisted by force. These arguments seemed to inspire and justify the assassinations of Henri III in 
1598 and his successor Henry IV in 1610, the latter after two failed attempts.107 England 
experienced its own brush with hierocratic fanaticism with the failed Gunpowder Plot of 1605.  
 At the same time, theological hierocratism developed within the more radical corners of 
Lutheranism in the German and Swiss cities.108 Leaders of the “Radical Reformation” rejected the 
Lutheran doctrine that all secular rulers are divinely ordained and must be obeyed in all matters. 
They argued instead that secular government is only just and legitimate when it acts according to 
divine law, as revealed in the Scriptures. The most influential and feared of the radical reformers 
were the Anabaptists, so named for their opposition to the Lutherans’ continuation of the rite of 
infant baptism. The Anabaptists are generally grouped into two camps: militant and pacifist. The 
most notorious militant Anabaptist, Thomas Müntzer, argued that secular governments are not 
legitimate unless they impose the truth of the Gospel by force and “wipe out the godless.” 
Princes who merely maintain civil peace fail to meet this standard and must be deposed by their 
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subjects.109 Like many Anabaptist leaders, Müntzer saw himself as a prophetic figure called by 
God to bring His judgment on the secular world.  
The pacifist wing of the Swiss Anabaptists rejected both Luther and Müntzer in favor of 
complete withdrawal from political society. Like the militant wing, they believed that true faith 
in Christ should produce not only an inner spiritual transformation but also a radical 
transformation of the political and social order. They saw all existing political institutions as the 
trappings of the fallen world, necessary only to restrain and punish the wicked. Those who were 
true Christians had no need of these things and were under no obligation to submit to them. They 
held similar views about private property and economic activity and sought to emulate the 
communism of goods among the apostles, as described in the Book of Acts. To maintain their 
purity, Christians must withdraw from the sinful world and form their own communities without 
government or property.110 Inspired by the teachings of charismatic preachers, Anabaptist 
communist societies sprang up throughout central Europe with varying degrees of success. The 
“Melchiorites,” led by Melchior Hoffmann, took control of the city of Münster and established a 
monarchical government that sought to abolish private property. The city attracted thousands of 
immigrants from Westphalia and the Netherlands.111 The Hutterites, inspired by Jakob Hutter, 
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established small communist settlements throughout Moravia, totaling between 20,000 and 
40,000 people.112 
 The success of the Anabaptists in the sixteenth century is evinced by the fierce opposition 
they met from Lutherans and Catholics. Alarmed by their growing numbers and their radical 
commitment to overthrowing or shunning existing institutions, political leaders attempted to put 
down the movement by force. Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V decreed the death penalty for all 
Anabaptists in 1528. Over the next two years, 352 Anabaptist executions were recorded.113 Luther 
wrote several tracts and sermons against the Anabaptists.114 In his lectures on civil government, 
the Jesuit Robert Bellarmine found it necessary to refute Anabaptist anarchism.115 
 
1.4 Caesaropapist Theories of Government 
Caesaropapist theories of government grant civil rulers authority over both the secular 
and spiritual affairs of the state, eliminating the traditional medieval distinction between spiritual 
and temporal powers. The existence of an autonomous ecclesiastical power is always at odds 
with the caesaropapist idea of sovereignty. Arguments for this unity of temporal and spiritual 
tend to fall into two categories, which I call “sacred ruler” arguments and “civil religion” 
arguments. “Sacred ruler” arguments prioritize the otherworldly aspects of religious life and thus 
focus on the divine qualities of the civil sovereign. As God’s vicars on earth, sovereigns are 
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responsible for enforcing both divine and human laws. The earthly kingdom is also a visible 
church, of which the sovereign is the high priest. Civil sovereigns thus occupy the position of 
supreme temporal and spiritual authority that hierocrats reserve for the pope.  
“Civil religion” arguments focus on the temporal effects of religion on the state and its 
citizens. Because religion possesses a unique power to influence and motivate human action, it 
can serve as an effective tool for civil purposes: instilling civic virtue, encouraging obedience, 
and creating a sense of community. In the wrong hands, however, religion can be turned against 
the state by turning citizens toward otherworldly aims, encouraging rebellion, and creating 
violent factions. For this reason, caesaropapists have argued that the sovereign must maintain at 
least some control over the religion of his people.  
 
1.4.1 Medieval Caesaropapism 
In the West, caesaropapist theory developed in parallel with hierocratic theory as kings 
sought to attain full control over all secular and ecclesiastical affairs in their kingdoms. As 
described above, prior to Gregory VII’s consolidation of the Church’s authority in the Roman 
see, ecclesiastical powers were widely dispersed among various kingdoms. Among the most 
successful examples of caesaropapism were the Carolingian kings, who exercised the functions 
of both priest and king beginning in the eighth century. As D. E. Luscombe writes, “Among the 
principal tasks of a Carolingian monarch were the convening of church councils, the nomination 
of bishops, the maintenance of clerical discipline and public morality, and the promulgation of 
sound religious doctrine.”116 These sacred qualities attributed to medieval monarchy were in large 
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part the result of the Christianization of ancient Germanic beliefs about the magical powers of 
their kings.117  
Beginning with the eleventh-century Gregorian reforms, popes continuously struggled to 
wrest ecclesiastical authority from these powerful kings, resulting in a series of bitter political 
and legal controversies. In twelfth century England, King Henry II famously clashed with the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Becket, over the royal supremacy over the English Church. 
Henry issued the Constitutions of Clarendon, asserting the king’s customary rights in all 
ecclesiastical matters and contradicting existing canon law.118 In thirteenth-century France, the 
bishops accused King Louis IX of failing to enforce the Church’s excommunication sentences. 
Louis responded that he alone was the final judge of divine law within his realms. He maintained 
the right to review all ecclesiastical judgments to ensure that they are in line with divine law. 
Powerful kings often cooperated with the Church in punishing ecclesiastical crimes and 
suppressing heresy, but they held firm to their secular and ecclesiastical autonomy.119 
As demonstrated by the failures of Boniface VIII, the de facto power of medieval 
monarchs generally forced the papacy to concede a great deal of jurisdiction. However, it was 
not until the fourteenth century that caesaropapism received a thorough philosophical defense. 
This was provided by Marsilius of Padua in his Defensor Pacis, written between 1318 and 
1327.120 The treatise was written partly as a defense of the German emperor Ludwig IV in his 
dispute with Pope John XXII. Marsilius saw the German emperors as the true heirs to the Holy 
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Roman Empire who could unite all of Christian Europe under his temporal and spiritual 
authority.121  
Marsilius begins his treatise with a vision of the well-ordered city (civitas) that combines 
pagan and Judeo-Christian understandings of temporal and spiritual well-being. Drawing on 
Aristotle’s definition of the polis, Marsilius argues that the “self-sufficient” city is one in which 
citizens are not only preserved but are able to live well, “having leisure for the liberal activities 
that result from the virtues both of the practical and of the theoretical soul.”122 However, the 
philosophers, of whom Aristotle is the greatest, were only able to grasp the worldly or temporal 
aspects of the good life, leaving aside the “heavenly” ends of life.123 These ends, which are only 
known through the “supernatural revelation of God,” must be included among the ends of the 
city because they are integral to living “the sufficient life.” Thus, the city must appoint spiritual 
teachers to guide its citizens toward their eternal good.124  
As the title of the work suggests, Marsilius sees “peace and tranquility” as the principal 
aims of the city. He opens the work with a quote from Cassiodorus praising tranquility as the 
“mother of good arts,” without which all of the higher ends of the soul are impossible. Marsilius 
folds this pagan understanding of civil peace into more spiritualized conceptions from Hebrew 
and Christian scriptures, citing the Book of Job and the Gospels.125 The main threat to this peace 
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and the principal cause of civil strife is a particular “perverted opinion” that has gained wide 
acceptance in Christendom. This is the doctrine that the Church has some autonomous 
jurisdictional power that it can impose on commonwealths.126 This undermines the unity and self-
sufficiency of the city by introducing an external power that does not represent the will of the 
citizens. Marsilius describes the confusion and unrest that would result from multiple 
overlapping jurisdictions, causing civil discord, competition between the two powers, and the 
breakdown of authority.127 In this way, the popes have eroded the civil tranquility of the 
principalities by claiming temporal jurisdiction directly from Christ.128 The solution is to have a 
single power ruling over each city and commanding all the resources necessary for the good life 
of its citizens. If this were the case, citizens would no longer look to foreign powers for that 
which is lacking in their own cities. 
Following Aristotle’s Politics (VII.8, 1328b), Marsilius describes six “offices” or 
“orders” that fulfill all the basic functions of the self-sufficient city: agriculture, manufacturing, 
finance, the military, the judiciary, and the priesthood.129 Self-sufficiency thus requires that the 
priesthood (sacerdotes) be rendered a civil function that is fully integrated with the temporal and 
spiritual ends of the city. In describing the temporal ends of religion, Marsilius makes a “civil 
religion” argument for caesaropapism. Citing classical sources, Marsilius argues that a good 
religion will bring tranquility to the city by inculcating civic virtues in its citizens. The civil 
religions of the ancients guarded against conflict by convincing citizens that their immoderate 
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actions would be punished with eternal torments in the afterlife. Coercive laws alone are not 
enough to curb these vices because they only regulate external actions that can be seen and 
judged. The worst citizens will still commit crimes in secret, believing that they can escape all 
punishment. Religion alone has the power to regulate the inner life, which is essential for making 
truly moral citizens. Thus, Marsilius suggests, pagan legislators have fabricated gods and 
religions to serve civil purposes, deceiving their people into believing in certain eternal rewards 
and punishments. Although these were false religions, they were still good insofar as they 
promoted civil peace.130  
Marsilius’s description of the self-sufficient commonwealth includes a legal argument 
aimed at denying the existence of any autonomous system of ecclesiastical law emanating from 
outside the commonwealth. He rejects the system of canon law, which both hierocrats and 
moderate dualists saw as legally binding on all Christian kingdoms.131 Marsilius proposes a new 
definition of the concept of law (lex). He defines lex as a “science or doctrine or universal 
judgment of those things that are just and advantageous in terms of the city, and their opposites.” 
He further narrows this definition to only include such doctrines or judgments that are 
commanded and accompanied by a penalty or reward in this life.132 He acknowledges other 
standard meanings of lex, including natural law and divine law, but for the purposes of the city, 
he clearly favors his own definition. On this new understanding of law, there are two reasons 
why the Church possesses no legal authority. First, it does not wield the temporal sword, as 
Hugh of St. Victor had already established and as even the most extreme hierocrats had accepted. 
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Second, what is “just and advantageous in terms of the city” can only be determined by the 
citizens, not by an external spiritual authority. Citing Aristotle’s Politics (1283b), Marsilius 
argues that what is just and advantageous for the city is to be determined by the universal body 
of citizens, or its “weightier part” (valentior pars) “because that to which the whole of that body 
tends, in both understanding and inclination, enjoys a more certain judgment of its truth and a 
more careful attention to its common utility.” Moreover, laws are more likely to be obeyed when 
they result from the consent of this universal body of citizens.133 Marsilius’s caesaropapism is thus 
closely connected to his defense of popular sovereignty.134 
Although he places great emphasis on the temporal effects of religion, Marsilius also sees 
the human legislator as occupying a sacred office, ensuring both the temporal well-being of his 
citizens and their eternal good. In a Christian city, the priesthood appointed by the sovereign 
pursues supernatural purposes, which transcend the city. These purposes were unknown to the 
pagans and Gentiles because they cannot be discovered through natural reason or philosophy; 
they are only revealed by God through his chosen representatives. Through the scriptures, we 
understand that we are born in sin and in need of redemption in order to attain our ultimate 
good.135 In various times and places, God has revealed to his representatives what actions they 
must take in order to redeem themselves and be justified in His eyes. While the Mosaic Law was 
only intended to redeem the Hebrews, the “law of grace” revealed through Christ was to be 
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promulgated to all mankind.136 The function of the priestly order in every city is to teach the 
citizens these divine laws, so that the people will know what they must do to overcome sin and 
attain eternal life.137  
In addition to instituting a priesthood for leading his people toward their eternal reward, 
the human legislator also creates laws and punishments intended to encourage obedience to 
divine law. Violations of divine law in themselves do not demand earthly punishment because 
God ensures that all such violations are punished in the afterlife. Although the priests are the 
foremost experts on the content of divine law, their office is merely to teach and admonish, never 
to punish. The right of punishment in this life belongs only to the civil powers.138 Like Augustine 
and Aquinas, Marsilius argues that many precepts of divine law cannot and should not be 
enforced by civil authorities. However, there are some violations of divine law that should be 
punished immediately on earth for civil reasons.139 The example that Marsilius highlights is the 
expulsion of heretics, schismatics, and infidels from the civil community.140 Although he leaves it 
up to the legislator to determine the reasons for such laws, he implies their spiritual significance 
by pointing out that their enforcement requires precise knowledge of divine law. For this, the 
legislator must employ the counsel of his priests. While the priests possess superior knowledge 
of divine law, it is the duty of the legislator to determine which divine laws ought to be enforced 
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by human laws.141 In the same way, the legislator may determine that all lepers should be removed 
from his realm, but in order to carry out this order, he must rely on the expert knowledge of 
physicians to determine which citizens are lepers.142  
The Defensor Pacis—widely condemned during Marsilius’s lifetime—was revived 
during the Reformation. Henry VIII commissioned the first English translation of Marsilius’s 
work by William Marshall during his struggle to bring the Church of England under royal 
authority.143 Hugo Grotius cited Marsilius approvingly in his Ordinum Pietas and De Imperio, his 
two principal treatises arguing for secular control over the Dutch Reformed Church.144 Thus, 
intellectual historians cite Marsilius as a key figure in the transformation of the idea of the 
church from a legislative and jurisdictional authority to a congregatio fidelium, and in the 
emergence of the idea of the secular regnum as the ultimate authority within each territory.145  
 
1.4.2 Protestant Caesaropapism 
European caesaropapism reached its high water mark in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries with the rise of Protestant “Erastian” governments, especially in England, Germany, 
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Scandinavia, and Zurich.146 In the Middle Ages, even powerful monarchs often felt compelled to 
compromise with papal jurisdictional claims, because as Christians, they still recognized the 
spiritual significance of the pope. However, with the advent of the Protestant Reformation, those 
monarchs who embraced Martin Luther’s new theology were able to claim undivided 
sovereignty over secular and ecclesiastical matters within their realms. The term “Erastian” 
initially signified those who endorsed Thomas Erastus’ attack on the practice of 
excommunication in Calvinist governments, but it soon evolved to describe any government in 
which ecclesiastical matters are placed under the civil sovereign’s jurisdiction.147 The term can be 
applied somewhat anachronistically to describe the Protestant kingdoms in which the church 
possessed no independent jurisdiction. It was thus opposed to both the continuing hierocratic 
claims of the Roman Church and to the emerging Calvinist model of the independent presbytery.  
In England, the caesaropapist revolution was championed by Thomas Cromwell, Henry 
VIII’s chief minister. In the 1530s, Cromwell proceeded through legislative action to strip the 
papacy of all its ecclesiastical privileges within the realm. The 1533 Act in Restraint of Appeals 
to Rome, drafted by Cromwell, discontinued the practice of allowing appeals from English 
courts to the papal court, which was one of the last remnants of the pope’s hierocratic power over 
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English politics.148 In the preface to the act, Cromwell argues that the king possesses both 
temporal and spiritual authority over his kingdom and is the sole arbiter of all questions 
regarding divine law.149 Through this and other acts, the powers traditionally reserved for the 
papacy were transferred to the king, notably the powers to appoint bishops, impose taxes, and to 
grant divorces. These moves were reinforced by the 1534 “Act of Supremacy,” which declared 
that Henry was the “supreme head of the Church of England.”150 Cromwell’s program was 
justified on the grounds that the English people constituted a self-sufficient empire (imperium) 
under no obligations toward foreign powers or princes.151 Allowing the spiritual lives of its 
citizens to be in any way governed by the Roman see would undermine this imperial status. 
In the Swiss city of Zurich, the Reformation was also carried out by the secular 
authorities, under the guidance of its preacher, Ulrich Zwingli. Zwingli used the power of the 
state to gradually purge the city of Catholic practices and doctrines. The city’s secular 
magistrates played a conciliatory role, promoting the new faith while seeking to temper the more 
radical elements in the city, which sought immediate and uncompromising reform. The main 
threat to Zwingli’s gradualism was the Anabaptist sect led by Conrad Grebel. The Anabaptists 
protested the Zwinglian idea of the church as a civil community coextensive with the city itself. 
This doctrine of the Christian city led Zwingli to retain the Catholic practices of infant baptism 
and mandatory tithing, transforming them from Catholic rites to the rituals of a civil religion. For 
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the Anabaptists, these mandatory rituals were incompatible with their view of the visible church 
as a voluntary community of conscientious believers. The church could co-exist with the city, but 
the two were distinct entities with divergent purposes. Zwingli blurred this distinction between 
church and city. He fully acknowledged that infant baptism and tithing were not supported by 
Scripture, but he endorsed them as valuable civil measures, which were matters of human law 
alone, not divine law.152 When the Anabaptist movement (which had allied with aggrieved rural 
peasants) threatened to upend the uniformity of Zurich, Zwingli urged the city magistrates to 
respond harshly. The movement’s leaders were imprisoned and tortured, and anyone found guilty 
of attending an Anabaptist service was punished by drowning.153 
In those countries in which reform took a Calvinist turn, Catholic dualism was 
transformed into a Presbyterian dualism in which clergy and lay elders formed a semi-
autonomous ecclesiastical authority. Such was the case in the city of Geneva and the Dutch 
Republic, which overthrew their Savoyard and Spanish rulers, respectively, and replaced their 
Catholic bishops with Presbyterian church governments.154 Presbyterian ideas were also carried 
into England by the Protestant clergy who had fled to the Calvinist cities of Germany and 
Switzerland during the reign of the Catholic Queen Mary.155 Wherever it spread, Presbyterian 
church government posed a threat to the Erastian settlements and was thus vigorously refuted. 
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Civil authorities in England and Holland called on skilled polemicists such as Richard Hooker 
and Hugo Grotius to defend the rights of civil magistrates in ecclesiastical affairs.156 Drawing 
inspiration from the Anglican Erastians, Grotius argued that the Dutch Reformed Church should 
be brought completely under the control of the civil government.157 He viewed the Calvinist 
system as “creating a commonwealth within a commonwealth” (in republica aliam rempublicam 
facere).158 These thinkers refuted two central Calvinist doctrines: (1) that civil magistrates may not 
impose any forms of worship that are not explicitly commanded by God in Scripture; and (2) that 
the Church exercises independent jurisdictional power over its members through the right of 
excommunication.  
Several political themes appear repeatedly throughout the Erastian arguments of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. One of these is the idea of legal monism: instead of two 
powers—temporal and spiritual—that ruled over human communities, Erastians argued that 
there was only the temporal sword.159 In language similar to that of Marsilius, Luther argued 
consistently for the singularity of legal and political authority. He denied the existence of 
autonomous ecclesiastical powers: the clergy did not possess potestas ordinis or potestas 
iurisdictionis. Like Marsilius, Luther replaced the hierarchical structure of the Church with an 
egalitarian community of the faithful who received God’s grace directly and freely, not mediated 
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by a priesthood.160 All coercive political and legal power was held by the civil sovereign, who is 
appointed by God to punish the wicked and protect the innocent. Citing Paul’s letter to the 
Romans, Luther argued that all Christians have a moral and spiritual duty to obey the political 
authorities placed over them by God. For many of Luther’s followers, especially Philip 
Melanchthon, the consolidation of political power under the civil magistrate meant that the 
magistrate was now took control of the spiritual government that once belonged to the pope.161 
The princes must take the lead in imposing the Reformation from above, exercising the so-called 
ius reformandi. Luther consistently resisted this Erastian trend in his followers, arguing to the 
end of his life that princes are appointed by God solely for punishing temporal crimes.162 He 
argued that princes ought never to impose faith on their people, because true faith and salvation 
come from the Word of God alone, never from human law and punishment.163 However, by the 
1530s, Melanchthon’s view had won the day, and other reformers concluded that their movement 
could never succeed on the basis of transcendent religion and the Word of God alone.164 
This Erastian argument for the spiritual authority of the civil magistrate was supported by 
the idea of the church as a civil community coextensive with the secular commonwealth. We saw 
this above in the case of Zwingli, who wrote, “the Christian is nothing else than the faithful and 
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good citizen, and the Christian city is nothing other than the Christian Church.”165 This civil 
notion of the church was also at the heart of English Erastianism from Thomas Cromwell to 
Thomas Hobbes. Under Cromwell’s influence, Stephen Gardiner defended Henry’s divorce from 
Catherine by arguing in The Oration of True Obedience that the King of England is by definition 
the head of the national church. He repeats Luther’s argument that the Church is not comprised 
of a special class of clerics but merely of the congregatio fidelium—all individuals who claim 
Christ as their savior. Under this broad definition, the Church of England is made up of the same 
exact people as the kingdom of England, and these two things are one and the same.166  
The chief apologist of the Elizabethan settlement, Richard Hooker, came to the same 
conclusion by a different route. Refuting the Puritan dualism of Thomas Cartwright, Hooker 
takes as axiomatic the principle that every political society is characterized by “care of religion.” 
Some societies embrace false, pagan religions, but those societies that embrace Christianity are 
called “churches.” He thus defines a church, in direct opposition to Luther, as a self-contained 
political entity, not a universal or spiritual body of the faithful. Hooker concludes that because 
every English subject is a Christian, England is both a commonwealth and a church at the same 
time. Hooker thus finds it ridiculous to argue, as the Puritans do, that the commonwealth of 
England must be completely divorced from the Church of England, even though they are 
composed of exactly the same members.167 
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Writing fifty years later, in a passage that sounds remarkably like Hooker, Thomas 
Hobbes defines the Church as a lawful assembly that is called into being (thus the Greek 
ecclesia) by its sovereign. Such a church can act as a single person, issuing laws in the same way 
as the commonwealth. Once again, on this definition, there can be no universal church that 
transcends the commonwealth because there is no sovereign authority to call such a church. 
Hobbes concludes: “And therefore a Church… is the same thing with a Civil Common-wealth, 
consisting of Christian men; and is called a Civill State, for that the subjects of it are Men; and a 
Church, for that the subjects thereof are Christian. Temporall and Spirituall Government, are but 
two words brought into the world, to make men see double, and mistake their Lawfull 
Sovereign.”168  
 
1.5 Theocracy and the Possibility of Secularism 
As we saw above (1.2), the distinction between the temporal and spiritual powers dates 
back to the earliest years of the Western Church. Medieval dualists like Hugh of St. Victor and 
Bernard of Clairvaux had clear reasons for keeping these two spheres separate. They worried that 
if the Church sought to possess temporal power and wealth, it would cease to embody the 
poverty and humility of Christ and the apostles. They believed that temporal and spiritual power 
had distinct purposes. The temporal sword was only used by princes and soldiers to fight external 
enemies and defend the physical lives of their people. The only weapon at the disposal of the 
priesthood was the spiritual sword, which was the Word of God. A spiritual aim such as 
conversion or redemption can only be achieved through spiritual means. Dualists also worried 
                                               




about the corrupting influence of secular politics on the Church. Although the emperor is 
supreme in all secular affairs, he must not exercise power over the faith. The priesthood was 
instituted by Christ and must be led by Christ alone. Throughout the medieval and early modern 
eras, this separation of powers was undermined by hierocratic and caesaropapist ideas. Despite 
their important differences, and their mutual animosity, these two views both sought to unite 
temporal and spiritual powers under a single head. This unity had the effect of both sacralizing 
politics and politicizing religion.  
In medieval and early modern Europe, these two competing political doctrines often 
collapsed into one another, resulting in a “theocratic” view of politics. In its original meaning, as 
coined by the Roman Jewish historian Josephus, theocracy is a form of government unique to the 
ancient Hebrews and thus not conforming to the three classical Hellenistic types: monarchy, 
aristocracy, and polity. Under the guidance of Moses, the Israelites had decided to allow God to 
govern their nation as their sole sovereign.169 This was made possible in practice by God’s direct 
revelation of the laws by which the Israelites were to be governed. While the three classical types 
of government relied on human legislators, Hebrew theocracy relied solely on divine positive 
law. Lacking the clear advantage of a set of detailed and explicit laws handed down by God, 
Christian theocracy took as its fundamental laws the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, 
which were used to justify all political authority and legislation.  
The fundamental principle of the Christian theocratic view, which distinguishes it from 
political secularism, is that political rule can only be understood through divinely revealed truth, 
not through human reason alone. For example, the legitimacy of a government is not determined 
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on the basis of popular consent, historical precedent, customs, or philosophy, but solely on its 
concurrence with Scripture. The entire papal hierocratic philosophy rests on the presumption that 
Christ directly bestowed on Peter the keys to loose and bind. For theological forms of hierocracy, 
political legitimacy is only possible if the dominus has been reconciled with God through faith in 
Christ. Philosophy and history are used by hierocrats to explain and support this revealed truth, 
but they have no independent explanatory power.  
According to Weber, caesaropapist rulers possess their own political legitimacy without 
relying on theology or sanctification by priestly authorities. However, as Weber acknowledges, 
wherever a systematic theology has taken hold, caesaropapist rulers must justify their rule 
according to these systems, and political legitimacy collapses into religious legitimacy.170 This 
explains why Cromwell enlisted the leading canonists (Gardiner, Foxe, and Sampson) to justify 
Henry VIII’s sovereignty over the Church of England on the basis of Scripture. As Skinner 
points out, all the polemics in defense of the king’s ecclesiastical supremacy “begin by stressing 
that the only proper source for an understanding of political authority is the scriptures.”171 The 
common lawyers would be of no use in this project and in fact opposed Henry’s supremacy on 
the grounds of Parliament’s traditional role in sovereignty. 
One reason that caesaropapist rule must be justified in theocratic terms is because it 
claims authority to govern its citizens’ spiritual lives. The king cannot rule over religion unless 
he is a priestly authority. For a Christian people to accept such a king, they must be convinced 
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that he is at the very least a faithful Christian. Thus, Hooker argues that it was only when the 
Roman emperors converted to Christianity that they were granted authority to rule over the 
Church. Prior to Constantine, the Church and empire were separate.172 In the same vein, Thomas 
Erastus concludes that the religious status of the civil ruler is of crucial importance for 
determining the extent of his powers: 
And therefore in whatever Nation the Civil Magistrate is Christian, Pious, and Orthodox, 
there is no need of other persons, who under another name or title should set a governing us, 
and call us to account, or punish us for our misdeeds, as if there were no difference betwixt a 
Believing and Infidel Prince… ‘Tis a most pernicious Errour, and big with dangerous 
Consequence, that so many think no better of a Christian Magistracy, than of an Heathen one, 
whose power is to be allowed of no farther than meer Temporals.173  
 
Erastus goes on to say that Christians living “under a Profane Government (as in the Dominions 
of Turks and Papists)” must not allow these ecclesiastical powers to be exercised by the 
magistrate but must set up their own system of church government and discipline.174 In the above 
passage, Erastus attacks the dualist view that the right to rule and the extent of one’s jurisdiction 
are not dependent on religious criteria. On this view, because civil power is only concerned with 
“meer Temporals,” it can be legitimately and wisely wielded by Christians, heretics, and infidels 
alike; all civil government is “profane” by nature even when placed in the hands of the pious and 
Godly prince. Giles of Rome likewise attacks the idea that pagan kings of the Old Testament 
held legitimate power under natural law. The only legitimate kings of this era were either godly 
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priests, like Melchizedek, or those kings appointed by godly priests, as was Saul was appointed 
by Samuel.175 
This view of civil government, which would allow heretics, infidels, and pagans to 
exercise rule over true Christians, is the political secularism that I describe in the remaining 
chapters. It is diametrically opposed to the theocratic view in three ways. First, it contends that 
legitimate civil power arises naturally in all human societies as product of innate human reason. 
It is thus indifferent to the religious commitments and spiritual status of the civil sovereign. 
Secondly, it argues that civil governments are created through human action and creativity and 
not directly by God. Civil sovereigns are thus constrained by human law and accountable to the 
communities that install them. Thirdly, it argues that political power can only be used to pursue 
temporal ends and not spiritual ends. As Giles indicates in his critique, on this alternative view, 
civil government is founded on the idea of a natural law that preceded the law of the Gospel. The 
above principles have no necessary connection to the idea of natural law, but in the context of 
early modern Europe, natural law theory was the vehicle through which they were defended.  
In one sense, this separation of temporal and spiritual life is a break from Weber’s 
typology, which insisted that secular rule must always be justified according to the sacred and 
supernatural. In another sense, however, the fact that the autonomy of secular government was so 
often justified according to natural law simply confirms Weber’s view that political power must 
be reconciled with citizens’ religious views in order to be accepted as legitimate. Natural law 
theory achieves this reconciliation by dividing the divine order into two halves—natural and 
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supernatural—while maintaining an overarching unity. The two worlds operate independently 































The development of political secularism relied heavily on a distinction that was absent 
from the theocratic theories described in the previous chapter: the distinction between the natural 
and the supernatural. As we saw in the political theories of Giles of Rome and John Wycliffe, 
hierocracy is centrally preoccupied with the sharp distinction between the invisible spiritual 
world and the visible corporeal world. Because all the phenomena that manifest in the physical 
world should reflect the purposes of the spiritual world, political activity is only justified when it 
is ordered toward spiritual purposes. This view was challenged by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). 
Aquinas also viewed all visible phenomena as reflections of an invisible reality, but he replaced 
the singular concept of the “spiritual” realm with a two-fold invisible realm consisting of natural 
and supernatural parts. This division made it possible to separate the natural foundations of civil 
authority from the supernatural foundations of religious authority, both of which are directly 
ordained by God for distinct purposes. 
Aquinas’s natural law philosophy was made possible by Europe’s discovery of 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics in the thirteenth century. Although ideas about 
natural law were available through other ancient sources such Plato, Cicero, and Saint Paul, 
Aristotle greatly surpassed these other thinkers in his systematic treatment of ethics, politics, the 
human soul, and the natural world. Prior to the recovery of Aristotle, Western Christian political 
thought was largely inspired by Augustine, whose City of God introduced them to ancient Greek 
and Roman ideas while arguing for the superiority and sufficiency of Christian doctrine. 
Aquinas’s embrace of “the Philosopher” transformed European political thought in two ways. 
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First, it introduced a systematic philosophical method for investigating all questions, including 
the meaning of Scripture, God’s invisible activities, and observable reality. Secondly, it gave rise 
to a teleological view of the universe that remained highly influential into the modern era. 
Aristotelian philosophy demonstrates that all phenomena are the result of natural processes that 
are divinely ordered toward an ultimate end. Both of these developments were instrumental in 
the rise of Aquinas’s systematic natural law philosophy. 
 
2.2 The Natural and the Supernatural 
In his Summa Theologiae, Aquinas reconciles Aristotelian and Christian ethics by 
distinguishing between the natural and supernatural aspects of the good life. Citing Aristotle, 
Aquinas explains that everything possesses a nature that tends toward a particular end. Rational 
creatures like humans direct themselves toward their natural ends by use of their natural reason, 
which directs their will and actions.176 These operations depend in some sense on God, who is the 
“First Mover” (I-II, 109.1), but once set in motion a person can “on his natural power, do 
the good natural to him without the addition of any gratuitous gift” (I-II, 109.3). However, in 
addition to their natural ends, humans are created to achieve an end that surpasses their natural 
powers. This is Aquinas’s definition of the supernatural: that which cannot be achieved through 
one’s nature and requires the added power of God: 
Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the incorruptibility of the primitive state. 
Now this incorruptibility was man’s, not by nature, but by a supernatural gift of God. 
Therefore that this might be attributed to God, and not to human nature, God made man 
                                               
176 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Prima secundae, from The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas 
Aquinas, Second Edition, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: Burns, 
Oates, and Washbourne, 1920). Question 1, Article 2, Hereafter, I-II. 
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outside of paradise, and afterwards placed him there to live there during the whole of his 
animal life; and, having attained to the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven.177 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, some hierocratic authors argued that these natural powers of 
reason and will are destroyed by sin and that only the redeemed in Christ can make use of their 
original natures. Against this view, Aquinas argues that mortal sinners are still largely capable of 
pursuing their natural ends:  
because human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to be shorn of 
every natural good, even in the state of corrupted nature it can, by virtue of 
its natural endowments, work some particular good, as to build dwellings, plant 
vineyards, and the like; yet it cannot do all the good natural to it. (I-II, 109.2) 
 
This argument will prove to be tremendously important in early modern theories defending the 
civil rights of non-Christians and the sovereignty of non-Christian rulers.  
Robert Bartlett points out that Aquinas’s ideas of the natural and the supernatural were 
inspired by Peter Lombard’s description of “seminal causes” in his Sentences (a work on which 
Aquinas wrote extensive commentary). According to Lombard, God acts in the universe in two 
ways: indirectly by implanting seminal causes in things and directly by intervening or overriding 
these causes. The use of the word “seminal” is quite literal in Lombard’s example of the 
generation of animals through sexual reproduction. The archetypical example of supernatural 
generation comes from the Book of Genesis in which God creates Eve out of Adam’s rib.178 
Aquinas commented on this idea in his discussion of miracles as “things caused directly by 
                                               
177 Summa theologiae, Prima pars, from The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas, Second Edition, 
translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: Burns, Oates, and Washbourne, 
1920), Question 102, Article 4. 




God’s power… in a way different from that exhibited by the order of natural causes…”179 An 
example of this is the process of transubstantiation in the Eucharist: “this change is not 
like natural changes, but is entirely supernatural, and effected by God’s power alone.”180 
 
2.3 The Treatise on Law 
This natural-supernatural distinction pervades Aquinas’s theology, particularly his 
discussions of law. Aquinas describes legal knowledge and obligation as belonging to intellect 
and natural reason and thus accessible to all rational humans regardless of their state of grace. By 
defining law as “an order of reason,” Aquinas contributed to the “intellectualist” view of legal 
obligation, which was historically opposed to the “voluntarist” view (I-II, 90.4). For Aquinas, 
legal obligation is imposed on intellect through the mind’s perception of the goodness or evil of 
certain actions. The voluntarist position, defended some years later by John Duns Scotus, focuses 
on the will as the site of legal obligation. The will is not moved by the qualities inherent in things 
but by a superior will. Thus, nothing is required or forbidden except by God’s command. This 
debate had important consequences for the history of political secularism. For the voluntarists, 
moral and legal obligation depends on an awareness of God and His will. For the intellectualists, 
moral and legal obligation requires only an awareness that what is commanded is reasonable.181 
Those who deny the existence of God may still have enough natural reason to perceive what is 
                                               
179 Aquinas, Scripta super libros sententiarum, II, Dist. 18, Question 1, Article 3, cited in Bartlett, The 
Natural and the Supernatural, 7-8. 
180 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Tertia pars, Question 75, Article 4. 
181 Anthony J. Lisska and Brian Tierney, “Philosophy of Law in the Later Middle Ages,” in Fred D. Miller 
Jr. and Carrie-Ann Biondi, eds., A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, Volume 
6: A History of the Philosophy of Law from the Ancient Greeks to the Scholastics, Second Edition 
(Springer, 2015), 312-4. 
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good and evil, what ought to be done and avoided. This basic natural reason allows them to 
understand and obey laws. Thus, even pagans and atheists are capable of understanding and 
obeying the natural law and human laws. The point is underscored by Aquinas’s assertion that 
while the precepts of natural law are self-evident, the existence of God is not (I-II, 2.1).182 
Aquinas describes the relationship between four types of law: eternal law, natural law, 
human law, and divine law. The eternal law is a rule of reason like other laws, but it is largely 
unknown to human minds because it is God’s eternal plan for his creation. We only know and 
participate in the eternal law indirectly, through our understanding of the laws that flow from it 
(I-II, 93.1-3). Unlike the eternal law, the natural law is immediately intelligible to rational human 
beings through reason. Unlike several modern theorists of natural law, Aquinas insists that the 
natural law is not those innate dispositions (habitus) that drive human conduct but rather a set of 
self-evident principles of practical reason, which serve as rules for human behavior. These 
principles are not self-evident in that they are immediately obviously to all reasonable humans, 
but rather in the sense that they are the most basic principles of practical reason and therefore 
cannot be proven. They are thus analogous to “the first indemonstrable principles of thought” in 
“theoretical science” (I-II, 94.2) Some self-evident principles are not obvious to unaided reason, 
while other self-evident principles are only known to the wise (I-II, 94.2). The principle of self-
preservation, however, is obvious to all because it is revealed in our innate drive for survival. It 
is worth restating, however, that natural law is not derived from these instincts or inclinations but 
from the precepts of right reason that give rise to moral obligations.183 For this reason, those who 
                                               
182 This point is made by John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd edition (Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 32. 
183 This point is made exceedingly clear by Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 33-6. 
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do not have proper use of moral reasoning, such as children and the insane, do not have access to 
the natural law.184  
Aquinas identifies natural law with natural inclination in another sense: the rational will 
of human beings naturally inclines towards the good ends ordained by God (I-II, 1.2). These 
basic goods are in accordance with human nature, which Aquinas describes as containing three 
aspects: one that humans share with all substances, one that humans share with other animals, 
and one that is unique to humans as rational creatures. The nature we share with all substances 
inclines toward the end of self-preservation. The nature we share with all animals inclines toward 
the sexual union of male and female and the rearing of children. The rational nature that is 
specific to humans inclines toward knowledge (specifically “to know the truth concerning God”) 
and living in societies (I-II, 94.2). In the following article, Aquinas adds that it belongs to human 
reason to seek to act virtuously. Thus, all virtues are included within the natural law (I-II, 94.3). 
Next, Aquinas defines human laws as commands derived from the self-evident precepts 
of natural law. Any human commands that are not in accordance with natural law are not 
precepts of reason and therefore are not laws. In promulgating laws for the good of the 
community, the human legislator derives specific precepts from the general precepts of natural 
law. The legislator also applies the precepts of natural law to the specific historical and political 
circumstances in which he lives. For example, says Aquinas, the legislator must devise 
appropriate punishments for each crime. Punishments are not determined by natural law but are 
necessary for the effective enforcement of natural law in human communities. Aquinas’s concept 
of “human law” here refers only to civil laws promulgated by secular authorities, not to 
                                               
184 Annabel Brett, Changes of State: Nature and the Limits of the City in Early Modern Natural Law 
(Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 41. Brett finds the same argument in Vitoria’s lecture “On that 
to which man is obliged…” 
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ecclesiastical laws. This is only made clear in his discussion of the Law of Moses, in which he 
states, “For the end of human law is the temporal tranquillity of the state, which end law effects 
by directing external actions, as regards those evils which might disturb the peaceful condition of 
the state. On the other hand, the end of the Divine law is to bring man to that end which is 
everlasting happiness.” (I-II, 98.1) Finally, Aquinas asserts that just human laws are not only 
legitimate but also “binding in conscience” (I-II, 95.2). Aquinas returns to the idea of the eternal 
law to argue that all human laws have a divine quality that morally obliges the subject in the 
same way as a direct divine command. As we will see in Vitoria’s argument, this last idea was 
crucial for elevating human law to equal status with ecclesiastical law. 
Divine law occupies the final place in Aquinas’s typology. Aquinas acknowledges that 
the typology appears complete with these first three types: law, being a precept of reason, 
descends from heaven (eternal law), is rendered intelligible through human reason (natural law), 
and is implemented in communities (human law). However, he argues, natural law only 
comprehends humans’ natural ends, and another law is necessary to direct human beings to their 
supernatural ends. These supernatural ends cannot be understood through human reason but only 
through a supernatural revelation (I-II, 91.4-5). In the Old Testament, the divine law was 
revealed to Moses in order to repress the sinfulness of the Hebrews, but it did not lead them to 
their supernatural good, which is only possible through Christ (I-II, 98.1). The “New Law” of the 
Gospel serves this purpose by leading its adherents to supernatural grace (I-II, 106.2). 
Based on this distinction between our natural and supernatural ends, Aquinas argues that 
mortal sinners are still capable of understanding and acting according to natural law and thus 
participating in the eternal law: 
… mortal sin takes away sanctifying grace but does not wholly corrupt the good of 
nature. Since, therefore, unbelief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are without grace indeed, yet 
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some good of nature remains in them. Consequently it is evident that unbelievers cannot 
do those good works which proceed from grace, viz. meritorious works; yet they can, to a 
certain extent, do those good works for which the good of nature suffices. (II-II, 10.4) 
 
This understanding of human nature runs contrary to the theories “grace-founded dominium,” 
which would come to prominence in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Giles of Rome and 
John Wycliffe would argue that mortal sinners could possess no legitimate dominium over 
property or kingdoms. Aquinas, however, not only argues that “unbelievers” can possess 
dominium but also that Christians are bound in conscience to obey the laws of their non-
Christian rulers, as long as these laws are just:  
 
… we must observe that dominion and authority are institutions of human law, while the 
distinction between faithful and unbelievers arises from the Divine law. Now the Divine 
law, which is the law of grace, does not do away with human law, which is the law of 
natural reason. Wherefore the distinction between faithful and unbelievers, considered in 
itself, does not do away with dominion and authority of unbelievers over the faithful. (II-
II, 10.10) 
 
2.4 Civil and Ecclesiastical Powers 
When he considers the relationship between civil and ecclesiastical powers, Aquinas does 
not discuss them in terms of natural or divine law. One reason for this is that Aquinas views law 
and power as occupying two distinct spheres. While natural law gives rise to human laws, it does 
not give rise to the civil powers that create those laws. In his commentary on Lombard’s 
Sentences, Aquinas rejects the hierocratic view that the civil power is derived from or delegated 
by the ecclesiastical power. He writes that civil and ecclesiastical powers are each appointed 
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directly by God for distinct ends. Rather than one being superior to the other, each is superior in 
its own sphere.185  
However, when he describes the ideal polis, Aquinas moves adopts a more hierocratic 
position. In his De regimine principum, Aquinas states that civil and ecclesiastical government 
exist to pursue humans’ natural and supernatural ends, respectively. Although the civil 
government is sufficient to lead us toward natural virtue, the priestly government of the pope is 
necessary to care for our supernatural end.186 In this sense, the ends pursued by civil law are 
merely intermediate ends, while those pursued by ecclesiastical powers are ultimate ends. 
Therefore, virtuous life is the end for which men gather together. The evidence for this 
lies in the fact that only those who render mutual assistance to one another in living well 
form a genuine part of an assembled multitude… Yet through virtuous living man is 
further ordained to a higher end, which consists in the enjoyment of God, as we have said 
above. Consequently, since society must have the same end as the individual man, it is 
not the ultimate end of an assembled multitude to live virtuously, but through virtuous 
living to attain to the possession of God.187 
 
Aquinas goes on to argue that because ecclesiastical powers direct their community to this 
ultimate end, they must have authority over the civil powers: “For those who are responsible for 
intermediate ends should be subject to one who is responsible for the ultimate end, and be 
directed by his command.”188 In these passages, Aquinas’s argument is nearly indistinguishable 
from the papalist view of Giles of Rome. 
                                               
185 Aquinas, Scripta super libros sententiarum II, Dist. 44, Question 3, Article 4, in R.W. Dyson, ed., 
Political Writings, 277-8. 
186 Aquinas, De regimine principum, Book I, Chapter 16, in Dyson, ed., Political Writings, p. 41. 
187 Ibid, I, 15; See also Scripta super libros sententiarum II, Dist. 44 Question, 3, Article 4, in Dyson, ed. 
Political Writings, 277-278. 




2.5 Conclusions  
Aquinas’s incorporation of Aristotle into Christian theology facilitated the description of 
a natural ethical and legal order operating independently of God’s direct action. This theoretical 
innovation made it possible for Christian political thinkers to distinguish between political and 
religious affairs, resulting in increased autonomy of the political and legal order from the 
authority of the Church. Aquinas himself clearly did not see the co-autonomy of natural law and 
divine law as implying the complete autonomy of secular authority, but he did see law and 
politics as natural phenomena that existed outside of divine grace. Over the next four centuries, 
his legal philosophy and his general distinction between the natural and the supernatural were 























Francisco de Vitoria on Secular and Ecclesiastical Powers 
 
3.1 Introduction  
From the early sixteenth century to the late seventeenth century, Thomist philosophy 
flourished in the Catholic academy, beginning at the University of Paris and the University of 
Salamanca. This revival of natural law coincided nearly exactly with the start of Martin Luther’s 
calls for reform and the rapid spread of the new Protestant religion. Lutheran theology attacked 
both the spiritual authority of the Church and the Aristotelian political philosophy of Aquinas. 
Working in this context, Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546), directed his intellectual energies 
toward defending both the natural authority of the state and the supernatural authority of the 
Church. In his university lectures on civil and ecclesiastical power, Vitoria uses Aquinas’s 
natural law philosophy to defend two positions. First, he argues for the autonomy of civil power 
from both the ecclesiastical power of the Church and from theological controversies. Second, in 
order to protect the Church from political influences, Vitoria argues against allowing secular 
powers to govern spiritual affairs. He combines these two positions into a dualist system in 
which natural law and divine positive law serve to justify secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, 
respectively. According to this dualist theory, secular and ecclesiastical powers are each ordained 
directly by God and thus not dependent on each other. Through this separation of powers, Vitoria 
seeks to avoid two extremes of medieval political thought—the supremacy of the Church over 
secular powers (papal hierocracy) and the absorption of religious authority into secular authority 
(caesaropapism). However, he ultimately fails to maintain this middle position. Although Vitoria 
consistently rejects the extreme hierocratism of earlier papalists like Augustinus Triumphus and 
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Giles of Rome, his dualism ultimately collapses into a softer form of hierocratism based on a 
more subtle subordination of temporal ends to spiritual ends. The failure of Vitoria’s dualist 
project points to the possibility that the natural law philosophy he has constructed is 
fundamentally incompatible with the orthodox understanding of the Church as a self-sufficient 
kingdom. It therefore demands not only the autonomy of secular power but a fundamental 
transformation of the concept of the Church. 
Two contemporary issues are in the foreground of Vitoria’s thought: the Lutheran 
rebellion from the Roman Church and the Spanish conquest of Native Americans.189 Vitoria 
viewed both of these developments through the lenses of natural law and secular-ecclesiastical 
power, and he developed his theory of government as a response to these problems. These two 
issues also exist in two distinct political universes: the Christian principalities of Europe, which 
are under the spiritual authority of the pope, and the pagan societies of the New World, which 
are outside the Church. This distinction leads Vitoria to adopt two separate approaches to 
secular-ecclesiastical relations. For the Christian-European world, Vitoria adopts a dualist 
approach in which political authority is shared by secular and ecclesiastical powers pursuing 
separate ends; each power is supreme in its proper sphere. In the New World, however, the 
political life of the barbarians is ordered solely toward their natural ends and is mostly untouched 
by the supernatural authority of the Church. 
 
3.2 Ius Naturale et Divinum 
                                               
189 Vitoria cites these two issues in discussing the governments of non-Christians in “On Civil Power,” 1.6, 
in Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance, eds., Vitoria: Political Writings (Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 17-8. He also uses the example of Lutheran principalities in discussing the political 
rights of the Indians in De indis, 1.3, Political Writings, 246 
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Throughout his lectures, Vitoria repeatedly argues for the autonomy of the many civil 
powers of the world from the ecclesiastical power of the Church. His principal argument in favor 
of this position is that civil powers are directly ordained by God for the fulfillment of the 
universal and natural purposes of human beings. Relying on Aquinas’s theory of natural law, 
while adding a voluntarist element, Vitoria defends the idea that the power of the prince arises 
out of natural causes and can thus be legitimately wielded by Christians and pagans alike. In this 
section, I describe Vitoria’s notion of “natural and divine law” (ius naturale et divinum) as the 
foundation of his theory of civil power and the key theoretical construct with which he argues for 
the autonomy of civil power from ecclesiastical authority. 
In his lecture “On Civil Power” (1528), Vitoria argues that the civil powers of the world 
are not only legitimate but ordained by God for the fulfillment of His purposes and therefore not 
subject to either ecclesiastical authority or popular resistance.190 The purpose of the lecture is to 
defend the legitimacy of ruling powers rather than discuss the idea of a political community or 
commonwealth (civitas) per se. These latter concepts are only useful as intermediate steps in the 
justification of ruling powers. The argument was of course not a new one, and he begins his 
lectures by drawing on the authority of St. Paul’s epistle to the Romans and Peter Lombard’s 
Sentences. However, recent events had brought the issue to the fore. The authority of Charles I 
had been threatened by the Spanish comuneros, who rose up in bloody revolt in 1520-1, and their 
republican sympathizers.191 And civil authority more generally was under attack by Lutherans, 
who denied that individuals were obligated in conscience to obey human laws—either civil or 
                                               
190 Francisco de Vitoria, “On Civil Power” (De potestate civili) in Pagden and Lawrance, eds., Political 
Writings, 1-44. 
191 Ibid, 19n42. 
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ecclesiastical.192 The question of civil power was also raised by the discovery of the Americas and 
the subsequent claim by certain Spanish authorities that the indigenous peoples had no legitimate 
government of their own.193 Vitoria argued unequivocally that Christian and pagan rulers alike 
held legitimate authority over their realms and were not dependent on the pope for their power. 
Vitoria begins his argument in “Civil Power” with the proposition that civil power arises 
not through chance or mere human invention but out of natural necessity, in order to fulfill the 
natural ends of all human beings, including self-preservation, virtue, and society.194 These ends 
correspond to the fundamental precepts of natural law as described by Aquinas. The first of these 
natural ends is self-preservation, which is a particularly challenging task for human beings. 
Unlike other animals, humans are born without any special physical endowments to aid them in 
survival: coats for warmth, weapons to defend against attackers, flight or speed to escape danger. 
Humans are born naked and defenseless, with only their inner endowments of reason and virtue. 
For this reason, humans are forced to abandon the solitary life of most other animals and form 
cooperative partnerships with each other (societates). Unlike smaller associations like 
households, properly political societies can be called self-sufficient because they are able to 
defend against attack and ensure the safety and survival of their members. In this way, the 
                                               
192 Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance, “Introduction” in Vitoria: Political Writings, xvi-xvii. As Brett 
notes, the Lutheran argument was directed more against ecclesiastical law (canon law) than against civil 
law, but Luther still denied the power of human law to bind ad cuplam. Annabel Brett, “Later Scholastic 
Philosophy of Law" in Fred D. Miller Jr. and Carrie-Ann Biondi, eds., A Treatise of Legal Philosophy 
and General Jurisprudence, Volume 6: A History of the Philosophy of Law from the Ancient Greeks to the 
Scholastics, Second Edition (Springer, 2015), 357-8. 
193 Vitoria alludes to the legitimate sovereignty of the Indians in On Civil Power, 1.6, in Pagden and 
Lawrance, p. 17-8. 
194 Vitoria’s main sources for this idea are Aristotle’s Politics, Book I, 1252b; Lactantius’s De opificio dei, 
2.2-4, 3.1-2, 4.20-1; and Aquinas’s De regimine principum, I.1. 
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commonwealth (civitas) is not a human invention but “a device implanted by Nature in man for 
his own safety and survival.”195 Besides self-preservation, political society gives its members the 
opportunity to achieve the ends necessary for a good life. Some of these ends are classified as 
virtues. The intellectual virtues of wisdom and understanding can only be attained through 
education and experience, which require large societies in which wisdom is accumulated and 
passed down through generations. While animals attain the full extent of their knowledge 
individually, humans accumulate wisdom through intercourse and language, which are 
impossible apart from society.196 Moral virtues such as justice and friendship also require political 
society. Finally, Vitoria argues that political society is a good in itself, in addition to being an 
instrumental good through which other ends are achieved.197  
In defining the civitas, Vitoria leans heavily on Aquinas’s idea of natural law, which 
provides a moral and epistemic foundation for the exercise of civil power. Unlike Aquinas, 
however, Vitoria explicitly connects natural law to the autonomous legitimacy of secular powers. 
He does this in at least three of his lectures—the lecture “On Civil Power,” the second lecture 
“On the Power of the Church,” and the lecture “On the Indians.”198 Following Aquinas, Vitoria 
emphasizes that the secular power of the civitas arises out of the moral principles found out by 
natural reason and available to all rational human beings, regardless of their state of grace. 
                                               
195 Vitoria, “On Civil Power,” 1.1-2, p. 4-10. 
196 “On Civil Power” §4, 7-8. Here Vitoria closely follows Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 1103a4-
1103b5. 
197 This follows closely from Aristotle’s view of humans as political animals and the idea of “immanent 
impulse in all men towards an association.” See The Politics of Aristotle, translated and edited by 
Ernest Baker (Oxford University Press), I. ii. 15. 




Vitoria uses natural law to establish the moral obligations imposed by these natural ends, 
independent of their relationship to supernatural ends. Unlike Aquinas, he explicitly rejects the 
idea that the temporal ends pursued by civil powers are merely intermediary goods. 
Having established the natural purposes for which the commonwealth exists, Vitoria 
moves to his primary objective: explaining the rights of the public powers that govern the civitas. 
The civitas cannot realize any of its natural ends unless it has some power to rule over its 
members.199 A political community does not spontaneously move toward its ends; there must be a 
unified power (preferably in the hands of a monarch) that directs the multitude toward its ends. 
This is the potestas civili in the title of the lecture. The theoretical move that Vitoria makes from 
natural ends to civil power can be understood through the relationship between natural right and 
natural law. Vitoria’s understanding of right (ius) is influenced by the thought of Jean Gerson, 
Conrad Summenhart, and Jacques Almain. For Gerson and Summenhart, rights (iura) are the 
natural powers possessed by all created things in accordance with right reason: all animals have 
the right to use other living things for their sustenance, and the sun has the right to shed its light 
on the earth.200 Some of these rights are merely permitted by right reason because they do not 
contravene natural law. Other rights, however, are required by natural law because a being 
cannot achieve its proper ends without them. Similarly, Almain defines ius as the power given to 
each person by God to pursue his or her proper ends, as defined by natural law. God bestows on 
                                               
199 “On Civil Power,” 1.2 §5, 9-10. 
200 Brett, Liberty, Right, and Nature, 36-7, 76-85. Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on 
Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law: 1150-1625 (Grand Rapids, MI: William. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Co., 2001), 260-2. This notion of rights is found in Gerson’s De vita spirituali animae, 
which Vitoria cites throughout his lectures. Vitoria rejects Summenhart’s idea that these rights are the 
same as “legal rights” or dominia, because animals and stars do not suffer legal injury (iniuria) when 
prevented from exercising these rights. See “De Indis,” 247.  
  
 80 
beings not only the reason to perceive these ends but the capacity to achieve them. These ideas 
are all based on Aristotle’s well-known principle that “nature does nothing in vain.” Following 
Aquinas, all three thinkers highlight self-preservation as the most basic end for all beings. 
Toward this end, humans are endowed with ius conservandi: the right to defend themselves 
against internal and external threats to their lives.201 Once constituted, the commonwealth acquires 
moral personhood and thus acquires the same rights over its members. Borrowing an analogy 
from Aquinas, Almain argues that the individual has the right to cut off an infected limb to 
preserve her life.202 By the same logic, the commonwealth has the right to kill or expel any citizen 
who threatens the safety of the body politic. For the commonwealth to abolish its public power 
would be as unthinkable as an individual relinquishing his powers of self-preservation.203 Thus, 
once a monarch is granted power over the commonwealth, the people may not depose him 
without violating natural law. 
For the purposes of establishing the autonomy of secular powers vis-à-vis ecclesiastical 
powers, the crucial step in this argument is the linking of these natural rights of civil power with 
divine right. Vitoria does this by adding the voluntarist element of “God’s ordinance” to 
Aquinas’s intellectualist notion of natural law, resulting in a hybrid concept of “natural and 
divine law” (ius naturale et divinum). Like Aquinas, Vitoria states that the “natural necessity,” 
which is the final cause of the civitas, is the natural law (ius naturale). But he places greater 
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emphasis than Aquinas on God’s authorship of the natural law and thus of civil power.204 
Although the holder of public power is elected through the authority (auctoritas) of the 
commonwealth as a whole, the public power descends from God rather than ascending from the 
people. Because God commands that all human beings fulfill their natural ends, he must bestow 
on them the rights and powers to fulfill those ends. Vitoria stresses that civil powers rule not only 
because of natural necessity but also by “natural and divine law” (iure naturali et divino).205 
Vitoria seeks to demonstrate that civil power descends directly from God by explaining 
the difference between public power and private power. According to the principle of ius 
conservandi, the public power of the commonwealth includes the right to carry out capital 
punishment against citizens who threaten the health of the civic body. This right to kill is what 
sets public power apart from private power: private individuals have the right to defend 
themselves, but they do not have the right to kill those who commit crimes against them. It 
follows that the commonwealth’s right to kill cannot arise from the contracting of private parties 
to give up their individual rights to a sovereign representative. This public right to kill can only 
come from “natural and divine law.”206 Just as a person receives all the powers she needs to fulfill 
her ends at the moment of her birth, at the moment of the commonwealth’s birth, it receives all 
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of the powers necessary to preserve itself. The danger that Vitoria attempts to stave off is a 
purely contractual view of civil power in which the sovereign only possesses the powers granted 
to it by the people. Such an association would be merely an aggregation of human wills. It may 
possess the power to coerce, but it would have no power to “bind in conscience.”207 
Vitoria uses the concept of “natural and divine law” to reinforce the moral obligation on 
the part of citizens to obey the civil powers. As discussed above, Aquinas defends an 
“intellectualist” view of natural law in terms of teleological practical reason and “reasons for 
action.” Vitoria recognizes that Aquinas’ theory of natural law as natural predispositions does 
not carry the full weight of moral obligation. He thus moves from practical reason to moral 
obligation by inserting the idea of the divine legislator into the idea of natural law.208 For Vitoria 
(and later for Suárez), Aquinas’s strictly intellectualist account of natural law can show why 
human law is necessary and legitimate, but it cannot prove that the human legislator can obligate 
subjects to obey.209 The rights of the civil powers to govern and punish their subjects are derived 
from the natural necessity of civil power. However, Luther had argued that this only gives civil 
powers the right to bind subjects through punishment (ad poenam). In other words, a subject who 
disobeyed his prince would be liable to suffer temporal punishment but not spiritual guilt. As 
Luther argued, princes had power over their subjects’ bodies and property, not their souls. For 
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this reason, Luther argues that citizens have the right of passive disobedience when civil law 
contradicts the commands of their consciences, so long as they suffer punishment and do not 
actively resist civil power.210 Against this position, Vitoria argues that the laws of the secular ruler 
also have the power to bind with respect to guilt (ad culpam) and in the court of conscience (in 
foro conscientiae). Like divine positive law, human law has the power to transform matters that 
are naturally indifferent into matters of mortal sin. This is because the laws of the secular ruler 
are actually indirectly divine law: “divine laws mean not only those which God himself has 
instituted, but also those which men have carried by the authority of God.”211 This also follows 
from the right of rulers to inflict capital punishment, which is only allowed in instances of mortal 
sin.212 In making this claim, Vitoria also argues against Gerson and Almain, who had argued that 
only the ecclesiastical laws issued by the Church had the power to bind in mortal sin. Vitoria 
acknowledges the Catholic argument for the separation of ecclesiastical and secular law: because 
only ecclesiastical authorities have the power of absolution, they alone should hold the 
complementary power to bind in sin. Nevertheless, he rejects Almain’s distinction between 
secular and ecclesiastical law on this point: “civil law is equally divine in origin.”213 
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By granting monarchs the moral power to bind the individual soul, Vitoria elevates 
secular authority to a status equal to that of ecclesiastical authority. This is a significant break 
from the late medieval view of secular power, one that made the strongest case yet for the 
autonomy of civil powers from the Church.214 By claiming that secular authorities possessed a 
natural and divine right over their subjects, Vitoria gave secular princes license to resist papal 
encroachment into their temporal jurisdiction and demand absolute obedience from their 
subjects. We can now assess Ian Hunter’s claim that the theological understanding of 
“scholastic” natural law allowed the Church to maintain its political dominance over the state.215 
On the contrary, by linking natural law to divine law, Vitoria radically undermines the Church’s 
authority over temporal rulers. This “natural and divine” theory of secular power presents an 
especially potent argument for the political autonomy of the American Indians in the face of 
Spanish claims of dominion on behalf of the Church. Because the Indians have the faculties of 
natural reason, they have access to the natural part of God’s law, even if they are not aware of 
God’s existence.216 Thus, the political societies they create on the basis of natural reason are not 
only legitimate but also possess divine authority equal to that possessed by ecclesiastical 
authorities.  
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3.3 Vitoria’s Via Media 
We have so far only discussed Vitoria’s theory of natural law as it pertains to the 
legitimacy and rights of civil powers. In order to understand his theory of civil-ecclesiastical 
relations, we need to understand the relationship between “natural and divine law” and divine 
positive law. These two sets of laws belong to two larger theological categories: the natural and 
the supernatural. Vitoria defends a dualist position by maintaining the independence of these two 
spheres.217 In his first lecture “On the Power of the Church,” he states that his aim is to steer a 
middle course between two extreme positions: the papal-hierocratic idea that “all temporal power 
derives from the pope in Rome” and the extreme statist idea that “all cases, even spiritual ones, 
should be brought before the civil courts.” Both of these extreme solutions are essentially 
attempts to unite temporal and spiritual powers under one head—either civil or ecclesiastical—
thus greatly reducing the potential for conflict. Vitoria’s approach to the problem can be 
described as dualist because he maintains a distinction between the natural ends of secular 
powers and the supernatural ends of the Church and thus to preserve the autonomy of each. The 
result is an argument against both the universal dominium of the pope and the unlimited power 
of princes.  
Vitoria repeatedly rejects the pure hierocratic position that had begun to take hold by the 
thirteenth century.218 He specifically names Augustinus Triumphus, Silvestro Mazzolini da 
Prierio, Antonino of Florence, Pope Innocent IV, and Hostiensis as the main thinkers who hold 
                                               
217 “(I) On the Power of the Church,” Question 5, §1, p. 83. 
218 Joseph Canning, Ideas of Power in the Late Middle Ages, 1296-1417 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 12. 
  
 86 
this view.219 Vitoria also rejects the extreme statist position, which was most forcefully and 
influentially articulated by Marsilius of Padua in his Defensor Pacis.220 Against both of these 
views, Vitoria argues for a clear distinction between temporal and spiritual matters on the basis 
of the distinction between the natural and the supernatural. In his two lectures “On the Power of 
the Church,” Vitoria distinguishes between the secular power of the prince and the spiritual 
power of the Church on the basis of their different ends. As already described in the lecture “On 
Civil Power,” secular power exists for the purely natural ends of survival, virtue, and society. 
These ends are natural in the sense that they are understood through natural reason and achieved 
through the natural faculties with which all human beings are equipped. The Church pursues 
only supernatural ends: “the remission of sins, the conferral of grace, and the consecration of the 
eucharist.” Because this supernatural purpose “exceeds all human capability,” these powers 
cannot be vested in all human beings, or in all Christians, but only in those to whom Christ has 
conferred this authority.221  
… civil power, as its name implies, does not extend to any end or effect other than purely 
natural ones, and hence this power is given by nature to the whole community, since all 
natural gifts are in the first instance common to the whole species or community (for 
instance, all men are mortal). Ecclesiastical power, on the other hand, is supernatural, and 
given by God for higher ends… whereas with regard to natural things the community is 
superior and the individual is subject or inferior, with regard to the power we are 
discussing here, everything depends on the will and institution of Christ, who is the first 
author of ecclesiastical power.222 
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Christ bestowed this power on Peter by giving him keys to loose and bind the sins of 
humankind.223 These powers were passed down through the supernatural process of ordination to 
all the members of the priesthood from Peter to the present. Vitoria emphasizes that the process 
through which sins are forgiven relies entirely on the power of the priests to bind and loose. It is 
not enough for the sinner to repent and refrain from future sin.224  
This rejection of a natural path to our ultimate end also rests on the distinction between 
natural law and divine positive law. In his lectures “On the Power of the Church,” Vitoria’s 
distinction between these two laws closely follows Aquinas’ distinction between natural law and 
divine law in the Prima secundae and De regimine principum. For Aquinas, natural law is the 
“the light of natural reason whereby we discern good and evil” and is available to all rational 
creatures to some extent.225 However, practical reasoning through deduction from the precepts of 
natural law can only lead us to the good in this life and is not sufficient to lead us to our 
supernatural end of eternal felicity.226 For this, we need both supernatural knowledge (divine 
revelation) and supernatural power (the priestly power to remit sins). Divine law in this sense is 
the revelation of some secret knowledge to a chosen few. Vitoria distinguishes this from natural 
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law by calling it “divine positive law.”227 Vitoria thus summarizes the differences between secular 
and spiritual authority on this basis: 
The difference between civil power and ecclesiastical power lies in the fact that civil 
power is grounded in the commonwealth, because it serves the natural purpose of the 
commonwealth, as I have discussed elsewhere (On Civil Power 1.4); ecclesiastical 
power, on the other hand, exceeds not only the private authority of individuals, but that of 
the whole world. And in the same way natural law, although it is a divine law, does not 
extend beyond the limits of nature, and so cannot extend as far as the limit and end of this 
spiritual power. And this is confirmed by the fact that natural apprehension (cognitio) 
does not extend to the effects of this power, and therefore neither can natural law or 
natural power.228 
 
Because the main purpose of divine law is the salvation that is made possible through Christ, for 
both Aquinas and Vitoria, divine positive law tends to refer more to the New Law of the Gospel 
than to the Old Law of the Hebrews.229 
In order to avoid both hierocracy and caesaropapism, Vitoria divides divine law in half: 
the natural part of divine law is placed in the hands of the civil powers, while the supernatural 
remains in the hands of the Church.230 He refutes the caesaropapist idea that civil rulers can 
govern their subjects’ spiritual lives: the bestowal of grace is a supernatural effect and is only 
possible through the spiritual power of the priesthood.231 Vitoria also explicitly refutes the 
hierocratic doctrine of grace-founded dominium advanced by Wycliffe and FitzRalph and 
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condemned at the Council of Constance (1414-1418). He finds it necessary to refute their views 
in order to defend the dominium of the Indians.232 Like Aquinas, Vitoria insists that God’s laws 
will always operate through rational human beings and their social and political institutions, even 
if they are unbelievers, mortal sinners, or enemies of the Church. This bifurcation of divine law 
would remain a persistent underlying theme in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century debates about 
secular powers, especially in the thought of Suárez and Bellarmine. 
Vitoria brings all of this to bear in his arguments against the papal hierocratic position. In 
short, secular power arises out of the purely natural sphere of divine law and is thus legitimately 
wielded by heretics, unbelievers, and pagans without the permission or interference of the 
Church. In the fifth question of the first lecture “On the Power of the Church,” Vitoria takes 
more specific aim against his hierocratic opponents.233 Quoting at length from Bernard of 
Clairvaux, Vitoria argues that the pope was granted only spiritual powers by Christ and thus has 
no direct claim to temporal power. Christ never possessed temporal power and thus could never 
grant temporal power to his apostles. Moreover, the pope’s spiritual authority extends only to the 
Church and so does not touch the infidels and pagans, who possess legitimate governments of 
their own.234 
Vitoria also rejects a widely used Aristotelian argument for papal supremacy. It was often 
argued by hierocrats that the relationship between the secular and ecclesiastical powers was like 
that between a lesser craft and a higher craft. The analogy comes from the Nicomachean Ethics:  
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But where such arts fall under a single capacity—as bridle-making and the other arts 
concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every 
military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others—in all of 
these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for 
the sake of the former that the latter are pursued.235 
 
Hierocrats like Giles of Rome and James of Viterbo had used Aristotle’s analogy to argue that 
secular power was a subordinate art that existed only for the sake of spiritual ends and thus that 
he who has authority in spiritual matters must also have authority over secular matters. Just as 
bridle-makers prepare material for war, the secular powers prepare material for the spiritual 
powers: they secure temporal safety, health, and prosperity, so that their citizens can seek eternal 
felicity through the Church.236 These temporal goods are only intermediary goods, not ends in 
themselves. When the pursuit of these temporal goods hinders the pursuit of spiritual goods, the 
spiritual power must intervene.237 Against this view, Vitoria argues for the autonomy and self-
sufficiency of civil power: 
The proof runs as follows: civil power is not exclusively ordered for spiritual, as a craft is 
exclusively ordered for its superior, and therefore the analogy is not at all exact… Even if 
there existed no spiritual power, nor any supernatural felicity, there would still be some 
kind of order in the temporal commonwealth, and some kind of power, as there is in 
natural things, even irrational ones… We are not to suppose that the one type of power 
depends on the other, or exists exclusively because of it, as a sort of instrument or part of 
it.238 
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The most striking difference between Vitoria and his hierocratic opponents is that Vitoria was 
willing to imagine a purely natural world ordered solely toward natural and rational ends. For 
this reason, he saw no problem with the complete autonomy of the government of the Indians 
from the spiritual authority of the pope.  
Vitoria also employs this distinction between natural and supernatural power to refute the 
caesaropapist position defended by both Marsilius and contemporary Protestants. Because civil 
power can legitimately be wielded by Christians and non-Christians alike, princes cannot have 
any authority over religious matters. If this were allowed, then Muslim or pagan rulers could 
legislate on questions of Christian doctrine and worship. Like dualist authors before him, Vitoria 
argues that each sphere has its own special expertise and should thus be led by different classes 
of people. However, his concern appears to be more with protecting the sacraments from the 
interference of secular powers than with defending the civil sphere from clerical intrusion.239 
Vitoria refutes the claim that civil power established on the basis of natural law is sufficient to 
guide citizens toward the good, both in this world and the next. The Greeks may have possessed 
great moral and civic virtue, but this is not sufficient to avoid eternal damnation.240 It is in this 
refutation of Marsilius’s position that we can begin to see problems for Vitoria’s dualist solution. 
In order to protect the Church from the errors of non-Christian or heretical princes, Vitoria is 
willing to sacrifice some of the civil powers’ hard-fought autonomy. 
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3.4 Vitoria’s Hierocratism 
Based on Vitoria’s theory of natural-civil power and the supernatural-spiritual power, we 
should expect Vitoria to endorse a strong dualist position, and this is exactly what he claims to 
do in his first lecture “On the Power of the Church.” However, the model of civil-ecclesiastical 
relations that emerges by the end of this lecture is something much closer to hierocratism. Over 
the course of this lecture, we witness the collapse of his dualist protestations into something like 
a soft hierocratism in which the pope’s spiritual authority leads to a rather aggressive indirect 
temporal authority. This puzzling outcome can be explained by the presence of two forces from 
outside the natural law framework. The first is Vitoria’s political ecclesiology—his theory of the 
Church and its powers over its members. The second is the need for a sovereign. Despite his 
attempt to distance himself from hierocratism, Vitoria faces a persistent challenge in attempting 
to reconcile his dualism with the supreme spiritual authority of the pope. In order to maintain the 
purity of the Church and steer clear of a caesaropapist position, Vitoria must ensure that secular 
power can never interfere with the spiritual ends of the Church. This overriding concern to 
maintain the complete authority of the Church over all spiritual matters results in a softer type of 
hierocratism, at least in Christian principalities. 
Vitoria’s simultaneous endorsement of dualism and hierocratism is partially explained by 
the different notions of the Church (ecclesia) that Vitoria employs. At the beginning of the first 
lecture “On the Power of the Church,” Vitoria defines the Church as the community of all 
believers (congregatio fidelium).241 However, when describing the supernatural power of the 
Church to confer grace on these believers, Vitoria’s understanding of Church narrows to those 
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members of the clerical class who are bestowed with the sacramental and jurisdictional powers.242 
As William McCready and Joseph Canning have observed, these were the two competing 
notions of the Church in medieval debates between royalists and papalists. The notion of the 
Church as a congregatio fidelium is based on an Augustinian worldview in which the entire 
world is “spiritualized,” thereby absorbing the natural purposes of the civitas into the 
supernatural purposes of the Church.243 Hugh of St. Victor uses this idea in his De sacramentis 
Christianae fidei, which Vitoria often cites: the Church is composed of all the members of the 
faithful and is divided into two parts: the inferior laity and the superior clergy.244 The second 
notion of the Church as a separate clerical class arose later during the Gregorian reforms and the 
investiture conflict as a way to maintain the autonomy of the Church from secular authorities. 
This separation not only protected the Church from lay investiture but also insulated secular 
powers from clerical encroachment.245 Canning argues that medieval dualist arguments inevitably 
faltered when they accepted the premise of the Church as the community of all Christians. To 
argue against hierocrats from this premise was to face the enemy on his own turf. A more 
effective strategy would be to posit a clear separation of civitas and ecclesia, or as McCready 
puts it, a “neutral” world divided into natural and supernatural realms.246 
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However, the idea of the congregatio fidelium does not in itself lead to hierocratic 
conclusions. Indeed, two of the greatest enemies of papal power—Marsilius and Luther—
adopted this very same notion to undermine all ecclesiastical authority. The crucial element that 
Vitoria adopts is the Church as the “civitas Christiana.”247 This transforms the Church from a 
congregation into a political association and thus a thing to be ruled. Just as the civil 
commonwealth needs a public power to preserve itself (ius conservandi), the Church must also 
possess the power to coerce its members for the sake of its preservation and self-sufficiency.248 
According to the orthodox view that Vitoria adopts, one of the primary threats to the life of the 
Church is heresy. Aquinas’s position on this question was authoritative: Christian princes who 
betray their faith and “soweth discord” within the Church pose a threat to the health of the body 
of Christ and must be excised.249 Quoting Jerome, Aquinas writes, “Arius was but one spark in 
Alexandria, but as that spark was not at once put out, the whole earth was laid waste by its 
flame.”250 Vitoria affirms this position without comment, stating that heretical princes must be 
deposed by the pope for the protection of the Church and “defence and propagation of the Faith 
and Christian religion.”251  
The second problem is that of sovereignty. This arises wherever there is a conflict 
between the ends pursued by the civil power and the ends pursued by the Church. Vitoria could 
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not abide such a conflict and sought to resolve it by subordinating one power to the other. If 
either civil or spiritual must prevail in instances of conflict, surely it must be the spiritual 
because spiritual ends are of greater value than temporal ends. Vitoria makes this crucial turn 
from pure dualism toward hierarchical dualism in the latter half of the fifth question: “if some 
civil policy were detrimental to the spiritual ministry, the king or ruler would be bound to change 
such a policy… even though it were otherwise fitted to the proper ends of civil power. Hence 
civil power is subject in some way to spiritual power.”252 Vitoria further rejects the idea—which 
one might infer from his dualist arguments—that civil and ecclesiastical powers are like two 
independent commonwealths. If this were so, he says, the civil power would not be obligated to 
defer to the purposes of the ecclesiastical power in instances of conflict. In reality, the two are 
hierarchically ordered, as the parts of the body must be united under a single head. Individual 
principalities and the ecclesiastical power are all part of a single ecclesia—the body of Christ.253 
Vitoria thus adopts Hugh of St. Victor’s hierarchical dualism: laity and clergy form two halves of 
the Church. The clergy are superior “in honor and in dignity,” but temporal powers and temporal 
dominion retain some legal autonomy from the pope.254  
For Vitoria, the pope’s temporal power is always exercised indirectly, by virtue of his 
spiritual authority over the entire Church. Brian Tierney has argued that medieval dualists 
generally accepted the principle that the pope could exercise indirect temporal power in cases in 
which temporal and spiritual matters overlapped. When spiritual goods were at stake, the pope 
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could use issue temporal judgments by virtue of his spiritual authority. For example, in many 
civil criminal cases, such as murder, the act to be judged is both a civil crime and a mortal sin. 
Thus, the pope could claim jurisdiction over these cases “for reason of sin” (ratione peccati) 
without violating the basic autonomy of secular power. What was not compatible with dualism, 
says Tierney, was the direct exercise of papal temporal power in special cases to be determined 
by the pope (in certis causis), as was argued by Innocent III and Giles of Rome.255 Although this 
distinction is significant, the pope’s indirect temporal power ratione peccati could easily slide 
into a rather extreme form of hierocratism. The most revealing example is the case in which a 
Christian commonwealth elects an unbelieving prince… 
… of whom it might justly be feared that he would lead the people from the Faith, this 
prince, considered solely in light of divine law, would be a true ruler. Nevertheless, it 
would be the pope’s duty to exhort, or indeed to order, the people to depose such a 
prince. If the people refused, or was unable to do so, the pope would then be empowered 
to depose the prince on his own authority.”256 
 
 
Vitoria emphasizes that the pope is only acting on his spiritual authority, not any temporal 
authority. Vitoria attempts to maintain the legitimacy of all secular power “iure naturali et 
divino,” but the prince’s authority proves to be meaningless as soon as the pope determines that 
the prince poses a spiritual threat to his people. Undoubtedly there will be “doubts and 
controversies” between prince and pope whenever the pope seeks to intervene, but the 
adjudication of such disputes must always be left to the pope.257 What ultimately dooms Vitoria’s 
dualist project is the need for a sovereign authority to decide controversies between secular and 
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ecclesiastical power. As Michael Wilks puts it, the doctrine of sovereignty requires one of two 
extremes—caesaropapism or hierocracy—in either case, an erasure of the distinction between 
temporal and spiritual powers.258 
Vitoria’s dualist project fared somewhat better in the New World. Because the pope’s 
indirect temporal power rests on his spiritual authority over the Church, the pope has no 
authority over secular rulers who have never received the faith. Vitoria thus grants much greater 
autonomy to infidel and pagan princes than he does to Christian princes. However, even after 
denouncing those who claim papal temporal power over the pagan kingdoms, Vitoria ultimately 
leaves the door open to papal supremacy in the New World. One of his “just titles” to Spanish 
conquest is the need to protect the Christian faith should it take root among the American 
Indians. If a significant number of Indians should convert to Christianity, their pagan ruler would 
suddenly find himself in the same position as a heretical prince—someone “of whom it might 
justly be feared that he would lead the people from the Faith.”259 The pope, now possessing 
spiritual authority over these new Christians, should depose the pagan prince and replace him 
with a Christian prince.260  
 
3.5 Conclusions 
Vitoria’s defense of the autonomy of secular powers ultimately collapses under the 
weight of the civitas Christiana. The same logic of self-preservation that was used to defend the 
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divine authority of secular princes was used to justify papal sovereignty over the secular affairs 
of Christian Europe and the New World. However, even in Vitoria’s impossible struggle to 
reconcile secular autonomy with the defense of the faith, we can clearly see the radically 
secularizing force of his natural law theory. By bringing the power of divine law onto the side of 
the purely natural sphere of life, Vitoria advances a powerful argument for secular government: a 
government that is independent of religious authority and limited to natural purposes that all 
human beings can affirm. Whether secular and ecclesiastical powers can ever arrive at a 
genuinely dualist compromise—as Weber argues—remains an open question.261  
In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Jesuit philosophers such as 
Bellarmine and Suárez defended and elaborated on Vitoria’s dualist position. As we will see in 
Chapter 5, an alternative form of dualism arose in Calvinist thought, which inspired the 
Presbyterian theory of co-autonomous state and church. On the whole, however, natural law 
thinkers increasingly embraced the modern doctrine of sovereignty. For some Protestant 
Erastians, such as Selden, Hobbes, and Grotius, this meant liberating the natural law theory of 
the Salamanca School from its Catholic trappings and using it to revive Marsilian caesaropapism. 
Crucially, however, these thinkers retained the Thomist idea that natural law was only binding 
because it was commanded by God. For this understanding of natural law, they were indebted to 
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Jesuit Natural Law: 




We saw in the previous chapter that natural law was used by Vitoria to defend the 
autonomy of civil power against two doctrines: papal-hierocratic imperialism and the Lutheran 
idea that civil laws are not binding in conscience. In defending the civil sovereign’s power to 
compel his subjects, Vitoria argued that civil power descends directly from God and is not 
delegated by the whole commonwealth to the sovereign. However, by the late sixteenth century, 
Vitoria’s Jesuit successors were faced with a new political problem: millions of Catholics living 
under Protestant monarchs, most unhappily in England and France. This new generation of 
Catholic jurists thus felt compelled to place constitutional limits on civil authority, allowing 
Catholic citizens legal recourse against tyrannical and heretical monarchs. In Vitoria’s dualist 
theory, the only check against civil power is the spiritual authority of Church, which can 
determine whether the monarch’s commands contravene divine law. To this the Jesuits added 
secular constitutional limits built into civil power, based on the idea of an original contract 
between the commonwealth and its sovereign representative. The Jesuits developed these 
constitutional ideas in direct opposition to the “divine right” theories used to defend the absolute 
authority of the kings and queens of Europe. In so doing, they did not so much contravene 
Vitoria’s theory of civil power as draw out the implications of Vitoria’s distinction between 
natural civil power and supernatural ecclesiastical power. If civil power arises out of natural law, 
they reasoned, then it must be inherently democratic and could never be monopolized by a single 
individual, dynasty, or social order. The result was an argument for constitutional monarchy and 
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mixed government, against the doctrine of absolute dynastic kingship articulated by French 
politiques and certain Jacobean royalists.  
The doctrine known as the “divine right of kings” has been traced as far back as the 
fourth century,262 but it gained new life and urgency during the Reformation when European 
monarchs sought secular and ecclesiastical autonomy from the Roman Church.263 Contrary to 
dualist ecclesio-political theories embraced by Catholics and some Calvinists, divine right 
theorists argued that monarchs held supreme authority over both secular and ecclesiastical affairs 
within their territories, including the right to appoint bishops. Their primary targets were thus the 
Catholic theory of the pope’s temporal power, Presbyterian arguments for the autonomy of the 
church from the crown, and Calvinist-Huguenot resistance theories based on ancient 
constitutional rights.264 John Figgis identifies the four fundamental tenets of this theory: (1) that 
“monarchy is a divinely ordained institution” over and above other forms of government; (2) that 
the hereditary rights of the royal lineage are divinely ordained at cannot be challenged; (3) that 
“kings are accountable to God alone” and not bound by human laws or political institutions; (4) 
that citizens are never to actively resist their sovereign, even if the sovereign commands what is 
contrary to natural or divine law.265  
                                               
262 A.J. Carlyle, A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West, Volume I: The Second Century to the 
Ninth (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1970), 149-150. 
263 John Neville Figgis, Divine Right of Kings (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1914), 199-
201. 
264 Johann Sommerville, Royalists and Patriots: Politics and Ideology in England, 1603-1640 (New York: 
Longman, 1999), 10; J.H.M. Salmon, “Catholic Resistance Theory, Ultramontanism, and the Royalist 
Response, 1580-1620” in J. H. Burns, ed., The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450–1700 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 219-253; J. W. Allen, A History of Political Thought 
in the Sixteenth Century (1928), 368; Figgis, Divine Right of Kings, 186-194. 
265 Figgis, Divine Right of Kings, 5-7. 
  
 101 
The principal Jesuit political thinkers of this age—Luis de Molina, Juan de Mariana, 
Robert Bellarmine, Francisco Suárez, and Robert Persons—devoted considerable time and ink to 
refuting these four positions. They argued: (1) that any regime type chosen by the entire 
commonwealth held legitimate authority; (2) that kings are placed on their thrones by the consent 
of the entire commonwealth, not directly or supernaturally by God; (3) that each commonwealth, 
when constituting a particular regime, sets certain legal limits for that regime, that the extent of 
the king’s power is set by the people, not by God; and (4) that all human beings have access to 
the natural law and can therefore stand judge against rulers who violate that law. All of these 
conclusions are derived from two core principles. First, because all human beings possess equal 
moral worth, political power can only be exercised by the consent of the governed. Secondly, 
although all political authority is ordained by God, individual civil regimes are immediately 
created by human hands and are subject to the control of the communities that they govern.  
While the Jesuits’ political aim was to elevate the power of the Church relative to secular 
princes, they ended up articulating a profoundly secular theory of the state that had implications 
far beyond its historical context. These constitutional arguments marked an important move 
toward the modern secular conception of the state. In rejecting the notion of divine right 
kingship, the Jesuits sought to strip away the religious and supernatural elements of civil 
government, rendering it a product of secular reasoning and human engineering. The Jesuits’ 
ideological opponents—divine right absolutists—sought to sacralize kingship by imbuing it with 
religious elements and granting kings supreme authority over both secular and ecclesiastical 
affairs. By arguing for the secular character of civil government, the Jesuits sought to maintain a 
separation between civil government and ecclesiastical government, which was under the 
authority of the pope. At the same time, they maintained the idea that civil government was 
  
 102 
ordained by God and that civil law bound the citizens in ties of moral obligation. The philosophy 
of natural law allowed them to achieve these two goals: bringing civil government under popular 
control while maintaining its binding character.  
By focusing on Jesuit civil philosophy, I mostly set aside the Jesuit treatment of the 
pope’s indirect temporal authority. For the most part, the Jesuits inherited and reinforced 
Vitoria’s dualist approach to ecclesiastical authority, with all of its contradictions.266 Their 
constitutional theory was certainly tied to their political commitment to the papacy’s ongoing 
struggle against Protestant monarchs. By opening up the possibility of popular resistance to 
monarchical power, the Jesuits secured a key element of papal indirect power—the authority of 
citizens to resist a heretical monarch on the pope’s command. Although the result, as in Vitoria’s 
thought, is an unstable marriage of civil autonomy and papal-hierocratism, the Jesuits developed 
a philosophically coherent argument for a secular state that would have a lasting impact on 
European constitutionalism. 
 
4.2 Ambiguities in Vitoria’s Concept of Civil Power 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Vitoria sought to defeat the Lutheran idea that 
citizens are not morally obligated in foro conscientiae to obey civil laws. He thus argues that 
civil power descends directly from God and that civil legislation is as morally binding as divine 
positive law. He makes the point especially emphatically when arguing against a contractarian 
view in his lecture, “On Civil Power”: “It is apparent that even though sovereigns are set up by 
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the commonwealth, royal power derives immediately from God.”267 It is crucial for Vitoria’s 
theory that civil power can neither be created by human beings nor transferred from one person 
to another. If either of these were possible, civil power could be abrogated or taken away from 
the sovereign by the citizens of the commonwealth.268  
The principal point of contention, in both Almain’s time and in the following century, 
was whether this power belonged to the entire body (the people) or resided in the head (the 
monarch). Almain argues that the entire commonwealth always retained the right to preserve 
itself against threats from its members (including the monarch), though it could delegate this 
power to a single individual or group. Almain also stresses the ambiguity of his theory without 
resolving it: although the power of the monarch does not come from God directly because it is 
delegated by the people, all legitimate power comes from God in the sense that it is derived from 
right reason.269 
Vitoria maintains that civil power rests originally in the entire commonwealth but that it 
must be vested in an individual or group in order to be effectively exercised: 
Though the commonwealth has power by divine law over the individual members of the 
commonwealth…it is nevertheless quite im-[possible] for this power to be administered 
by the commonwealth itself, that is to say, by the multitude. Therefore it is necessary that 
the government and administration of affairs be entrusted to certain men who take upon 
themselves the responsibilities of the commonwealth and look after the common good.270 
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Vitoria’s fine distinction between electing a sovereign representative and transferring sovereign 
power rests on the distinction between potestas and auctoritas: “the commonwealth does not 
transfer to the sovereign its power (potestas), but simply its own authority (auctoritas).”271 As we 
saw in the previous chapter, Vitoria’s understanding of potestas is closely related to ius, 
signifying a moral and legal power to command in accordance with natural law. God instills this 
ius in all things, giving them the power to carry out their natural functions in accordance with 
their ends. Similarly, God must grant the civitas a civil power by which it can compel all its 
members to fulfill the ends of the civil community. When the whole commonwealth chooses a 
monarch to exercise that power, it exercises its auctoritas to elect the power-holder, but the 
power itself must come from God. Thus, although Pagden and Lawrance translate auctoritas as 
“authority,” it might be more accurately translated as “authorization” or “authorship,” both of 
which come from the same Latin root.272 The commonwealth has the power to choose who will 
hold power, but they do not grant the power themselves. As I argue below, Vitoria’s less-than-
compelling formulation would be reconstructed with greater clarity and coherence by Francisco 
Suárez. 
Although it is clear that civil power must be from God, there is an ambiguity here about 
the way in which God bestows this power, which leaves Vitoria’s argument open to divergent 
interpretations by later thinkers. There are two basic ways to read Vitoria’s argument: 
supernatural divine causation and natural divine causation. The first reading is that Vitoria 
regards civil powers as absolute, indivisible, and above human law because they are directly 
instituted by God supernaturally and are thus beyond human control. On this reading, Vitoria 
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views civil power as similar to ecclesiastical power in that both are directly instituted by God. 
Vitoria seems to confirm this interpretation in “On Civil Power.” Immediately before the passage 
distinguishing potestas and auctoritas, he writes, “For example, the pope is elected and crowned 
by the Church, but nevertheless papal power does not come from the Church, but from God 
himself. In the same way, the power of the sovereign clearly comes immediately from God 
himself, even though kings are created by the commonwealth.”273 By drawing this close 
comparison between the secular power of the monarch and the spiritual power of the pope, 
Vitoria suggests that civil power arises through a supernatural process that is beyond the 
comprehension and control of the citizens of the commonwealth.  
However, we can also see in Vitoria’s thought the idea of civil power through natural 
divine causation, as bestowed by God via natural law, which operates through human reason. 
This idea is most clearly articulated in his second lecture “On the Power of the Church,” in 
which he distinguishes between civil and ecclesiastical power on the basis of the distinction 
between natural and supernatural powers. As we saw in the previous chapter, Vitoria argues that 
civil power naturally resides in the entire community because “all natural gifts are in the first 
instance common to the whole species or community.”274 Vitoria describes civil power as arising 
out of natural law and thus naturally coming to reside in the entire community of rational adults. 
Here Vitoria is arguing against the idea that the power of the Church naturally resides in the 
entire Church, as the congregatio fidelium. In doing so, Vitoria argues that the commonwealth, 
unlike the Church, can dispose of its power however it wishes, contradicting his earlier claim 
that sovereignty cannot be limited or divided: 
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[The Church] would be able to do this if it had sovereignty, just as the commonwealth 
may either keep the administration of civil affairs in its own control, or alternatively may 
appoint consuls or tribunes, even setting them above the monarch like the Spartan ephors 
or the Venetian senators whose jurisdiction in higher than that of the Doge. But the 
Church cannot act in this way, as I shall show below. Furthermore, power cannot be 
committed to any community in which the majority of members are not fitted to the 
exercise of that power; but there are many in the Church who are not fitted to the exercise 
of ecclesiastical power; therefore this power is not immediately vested in Church.275 
 
 
The implication here is that because all citizens are equally qualified to wield political power, 
there is no reason why this power cannot inherently reside in the entire community. 
Katherine van Liere has argued that the discontinuity between these two ideas of civil 
power is the result of Vitoria’s reading of Tommaso Cajetan’s conciliar thought.276 When 
discussing civil power in isolation in “On Civil Power,” Vitoria makes no distinction between 
the natural and supernatural aspects of divine law. However, when comparing civil and 
ecclesiastical power, Vitoria emphasizes the democratic and malleable qualities of civil power. It 
is certainly true that Vitoria’s engagement with Cajetan compels him to sharpen his theory of 
natural and supernatural powers. However, we can already see Vitoria’s idea of natural divine 
causation prior to his engagement with conciliarism. In “On Civil Power,” Vitoria argues that 
civil power is ordained by God indirectly through natural law: because civil power is 
necessitated by natural law, and because God is the author of natural law, civil power exists by 
God’s command, and the commands of the civil sovereign are indirect divine law. God does not 
directly institute civil law but is rather the “first mover” who sets in motion the natural 
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mechanisms in human beings that gives rise to cities and governments.277 God does not directly 
institute political hierarchies and offices because these powers are rooted in natural law, which is 
equally accessible to all. Such a natural mechanism cannot give rise to ecclesiastical power, 
which is “above the whole of nature” and thus directly instituted by God.278 
This democratic understanding of Vitoria’s natural law theory reveals an important 
tension between Vitoria’s absolutist view of civil power and his commitment to the natural law 
origins of civil power.279 Despite his ideas about original equality, in many ways Vitoria 
anticipates the principal arguments for divine right absolutism in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries.280 His distinction between potestas and auctoritas undermined the idea of a contract or 
constitution that limited the powers of the king or placed the king at the mercy of the popular 
will. By foreclosing the possibility that civil power can be simply transferred or delegated by its 
original holder, Vitoria seeks to avoid two constitutionalist ideas. First, Vitoria worries about a 
sovereign who is placed under legal limits, i.e. a constitution: “it is evident that public power is 
from God, and cannot be over-ridden by conditions imposed by men or by any positive law” 
(DPC 1.3, §6). Second, he worries that civil power will be partially transferred to a sovereign 
while the commonwealth retains some of it, resulting in divided power or mixed government: 
“there is no question of two separate powers, one belonging to the sovereign and the other to the 
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community” (DPC 1.5, §8). The Jesuits broke with Vitoria by defending both of these ideas 
while retaining his basic natural law framework. They explicitly rejected the absolutist elements 
of Vitoria’s thought and argued that civil power must be constitutional, while ecclesiastical 
power remains unitary and monarchical. In so doing, the Jesuits sought to continue to uphold the 
status of civil powers as ordained by God and thus binding on the consciences of citizens.  
 
4.3 Political Equality and Popular Consent 
Scholars have long recognized the central role of patriarchalist ideas to the ideology of 
divine right absolutism in France and England.281 Although patriarchalism is most commonly 
associated with Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha, the idea was ubiquitous in royalist and anti-Jesuit 
discourse in the century preceding Filmer’s treatise.282 The central idea behind patriarchal theories 
of civil government is that the political power exercised by the king resembles the patriarchal 
power exercised by the father over his household. The advantage of this theory is that it mostly 
avoids theological and metaphysical controversy by defining political power in relation to the 
natural powers that exist in all households. Like the Thomist idea of natural law, patriarchal 
theory seeks to identify universal and natural foundations for civil authority that both precede the 
arrival of ecclesiastical authority and transcend theological controversy. However, patriarchalism 
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is also a form of divine right theory because it endows kings with a sacred authority that dates 
back to the creation of humankind.  
Against patriarchalism, the Jesuits defended the fundamental political equality of all 
members of the commonwealth, even after the institution of a king. Although human beings were 
certainly not equal in all respects, on civil (secular) matters, all rational individuals had equal 
claim to exercise authority because they had equal access to natural law. This led many Jesuits to 
argue that all political associations are originally democratic and retain some democratic 
qualities after transferring power to kings. Most importantly, the latent democratic character of 
all commonwealths gives the people a permanent right to judge and possibly resist the sovereign 
powers.  
 One of the earliest and most influential patriarchal arguments can be found in Jean 
Bodin’s Six Books of the Republic (1576). Bodin’s description of the relationship between the 
family and the commonwealth served as an inspiration for later patriarchalists, especially 
Filmer.283 Bodin begins the Republic by refuting Aristotle’s view that the polis is the only perfect 
(i.e. self-sufficient) association. Aristotle argues that all the associations within the polis are 
imperfect and that the polis fulfills the ends of all these lesser associations.284 Bodin reverses this 
relationship by arguing that the well-governed household is self-sufficient and that the existence 
of the polis depends on these households. Bodin writes, “Aristotle following Xenophon, seemeth 
to me without any probable cause, to have divided the Oeconomical government from the 
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Politicall, and a Citie from a Familie: which can no other wise be done than if wee should pull 
the members from the body; or go about to build a Citie without houses.”285 Here, Bodin is 
referring to the idea of “oeconomics”—the science of household government—as discussed in 
both Aristotle’s Politics and the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomica (which at the time was partially 
attributed to Aristotle).286 He argues that oeconomics is logically prior to politics because a well-
governed commonwealth requires well-governed households. In these passages of the Republic, 
Bodin is responding to commentaries by contemporary Aristotelian humanists. Louis Le Roy, for 
example, argues that the household is dependent for its purpose on the commonwealth, just as 
the parts of the human body cease to have any purpose or function once the person is deceased.287  
Having established that the commonwealth is dependent on the household, Bodin argues 
that the rule of the commonwealth cannot be different in kind from the rule of the household, as 
Aristotle had stated. For Bodin, the authority of the sovereign is an extension and reflection of 
the father’s authority over his household.288 These patriarchal underpinnings of the sovereign’s 
authority over his subjects are particularly apparent in Bodin’s discussion of tyranny and the 
question of whether it is lawful for subjects to resist tyrants: 
I cannot use a better example than of the dutie of a sonne towards his father: the law of 
God saith, That he which speaketh evill of his father or mother, shall be put to death. 
Now if the father shall be a theefe, a murtherer, a traytor to his countrey, as an incestuous 
person, a manqueller, a blasphemer, an atheist, or what so you will else; I confesse that 
all the punishments that can bee devised are not sufficient to punish him: yet I say, it is 
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not for the sonne to put his hand thereunto… no impietie can be so great, no offence so 
hainous, as to be revenged with the killing of ones father.289 
 
The picture of political rule that emerges from this argument is of a permanent and natural 
inequality between sovereign and subject that can only be described with reference to that other 
relationship of natural subjection: the father and his children. A king may be judged wicked, 
cruel, or unjust from the external perspective of natural and divine law, but his subjects have no 
standing to judge their sovereign, because they are placed in permanent subordination to him, a 
subordination that does not depend on the right conduct of the sovereign. The patriarchal analogy 
allows Bodin to argue that citizens possess a natural duty to passively submit to their sovereigns. 
Late sixteenth-century absolutists in France and England adopted Bodin’s patriarchal 
analogy to refute the Jesuit and Huguenot arguments that popular resistance was permissible 
when kings lapsed into tyranny. Pierre Belloy, the fiercest Catholic defender of the Protestant 
King Henri of Navarre, argues in De l’Autorité du Roi (1587): 
it is parricide to do any harm against their [kings’] Estate, person, or Majesty, to malign 
their counsel, and generally refuse the honour and subjection that is their due, even more 
so considering that, if the obedience and the honour to each father individually are 
recommended so highly, then the father of the nation [patrie], who is the King, 
embodying in his Person all earthly charity, should hold us to having so much greater 
reverence.290  
 
In England, Bishop Thomas Bilson offered a similar defense of Queen Elizabeth’s royal powers 
in his The True Difference between Christian Subjection and Unnatural Rebellion (1586): “And 
if it bee a monster in nature and policie to suffer the children to chastise the father, and the 
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servants to punish the Master, what a barbarous and impious devise of yours is this to give the 
Subjectes power of life and death over their Princes?”291 Belloy and Bilson aimed these arguments 
at Jesuit thinkers, especially William Allen and Robert Bellarmine, who argued that royal power 
was set up by the commonwealth and was thus the product of human ordinance, not divine 
command.  
King James VI/I adopted this patriarchal metaphor in order to re-appropriate the language 
of natural law in defense of absolute monarchical power. In The Trew Law of Free Monarchies 
(1598), James uses this patriarchal idea of natural law to describe both the duty of the king to 
care for his subjects and the duty of subjects to passively submit to the king. At the beginning of 
the treatise, he writes, “By the Law of Nature the King becomes a naturall Father to all his 
Lieges at his Coronation: And as the Father of his fatherly duty is bound to care for the 
nourishing, education, and vertuous government of his children; even so is the king bound to 
care for all his subjects.”292 At the end of the treatise, he turns again to the patriarchal metaphor to 
argue that the king is always above the law and can never be judged by his subjects. He states 
that it is “monstrous and unnaturall to his sons, to rise up against him, to control him at their 
appetite, and when they thinke good to sley him, or cut him off. Even when a father attempts to 
take the life of his children, the children have no right to kill him but only to flee his wrath.”293 
James—like Bodin, Belloy, and Bilson—relies almost entirely on metaphor and tautology, 
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appealing to his readers’ intuitive understanding of the sanctity of paternal authority and the 
“unnaturalness” of patricide.  
These patriarchal arguments mostly evaded the question of the origins of political 
authority. While theorists of constitutions and resistance analyzed these origins—both historical 
and hypothetical—to the point of fetishization, their royalist counterparts argued that regardless 
of how particular regimes came about, their existence was required by divine and natural law and 
thus demanded passive obedience. As the English royalist Robert Bolton writes, “The question is 
not, by what meanes, whether by hereditary succession, or election, or any other humane forme, 
a Prince comes into his Kingdome, but whether by the ordinance of GOD we ought to obey him, 
when he is established.”294 Hadrian Saravia, one of the principal defenders of the Elizabethan 
settlement, argued that regardless of how kingdoms were established, their de facto authority was 
determined by divine providence. Most kingdoms, including England, were established by 
conquest and did not require the consent of their citizens to establish sovereignty.295 
When they did address the question of origins, patriarchalists sought the origins of the 
institution of kingship in the first human communities. They employed a historical argument 
according to which kingship evolved from Adam’s authority over his descendants.296 This is what 
Gordon Schochet refers to as the “genetic” argument for patriarchalism.297 Belloy draws on 
Bodin’s notion that political power is paternal power writ large: “the Royall & Monarchic 
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principality originates in the paternal scheme of things, after which, suddenly, it appears that 
indeed in Enoch’s town […] there was, from that time on, a form of Monarchy & arising from 
this event, Kings were considered as fathers of nations.”298 The same idea was used by Hadrian 
Saravia: men are not born free and equal, he writes, because they are born into subjection to their 
fathers. The first fathers were also the first kings.299 This was the same trope that Filmer would 
employ in his argument against Suárez and the Jesuits in Patriarcha, written about twenty years 
after these earlier royalist-Jesuit debates. 
 In all of these patriarchal arguments, the idea of natural and divine law is turned against 
the papalists and monarchomachs to argue for the permanent and absolute subordination of 
subjects to their sovereigns. By tying political rule to the rule of fathers and the natural order 
within the family, patriarchalists sought to place political authority beyond the reach of human 
judgment and power. The Calvinist Jean Bédé de la Gourmandière summarizes this aim 
succinctly in his anti-Jesuit tract, Droit des Roys (1611): “to demolish the opinions of the 
Doctors of Lying who falsely maintain that royal power is hardly absolute and that it is a human 
invention.”300 The patriarchalists reject the idea that political authority may be constructed, 
reformed, and resisted by ordinary citizens through the use of collective reasoning and popular 
power; like paternal authority, it is a permanent condition into which all human beings are born.  
Although they rejected the patriarchal defense of kingship, the Jesuits mostly believed 
that monarchy was the best form of government. As students of Aristotle, the Jesuits held that the 
civitas could take three basic forms—monarchy, aristocracy, and polity—and their three 
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corrupted counterparts. Citing Aquinas and Vitoria, Luis de Molina argued that the rule of the 
one over the many was the best because it resembled the natural order of the universe and the 
rule of God over creation.301 Robert Persons repeated Molina’s arguments while adding that 
monarchies have fewer of the inconveniences and dangers of the democratic and aristocratic 
forms, which are prone to unrest, dissent, and faction. A monarchy is also able to act more 
quickly and decisively in defense of the commonwealth.302 Juan de Mariana was more ambivalent 
on the question of the best form of government, but, like Aquinas, he held that kingship more 
closely resembled the natural order.303  
While they praised the just rule of wise kings, the Jesuits rejected the patriarchal idea that 
kings were directly appointed by God and thus not subject to judgment or resistance by the 
people. They drew a sharp distinction between the family and the civitas and thus between 
paternal and civil authority.304 Molina describes the difference between these two basic types of 
power: the power of the father over his children arises naturally at birth, while civil power only 
exists through voluntary subjection. Although the first human beings—such as Noah’s family 
after the flood—no doubt combined patriarchal and political power, after the world became fully 
populated, civil leaders were chosen by all.305 Francisco Suárez also acknowledges that ancient 
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forms of kingship may have emerged gradually from the paternal authority of Adam and 
Abraham, but he argues that the transition from patriarch to king always requires the consent of 
the people.306 This is because the domestic power of parents is fundamentally different from the 
political power of kings. Fathers only possess power over their children until they are adults, at 
which point parents and children stand as equals. Adam’s adult descendants may have submitted 
to him as their king, but they had to freely consent to his rule.307 Similarly, the Jesuits rejected 
Bodin’s idea that the civitas is simply a corporation composed of families and thus retaining the 
essential structure of the family. Molina takes up this question and determines that the civitas is 
composed of individuals—not families—who unite to form a self-sufficient political association 
whose ends are fundamentally different from those of the family.308 
Suárez does employ one important familial metaphor in his civil philosophy: marriage. A 
comparison of the husband-wife relationship and the parent-child relationship illustrates the 
essential differences between royalist and Jesuit thought. Like a marriage, the civitas is a 
voluntary association of naturally free and equal individuals. As with much of Jesuit thought, this 
idea can be traced to Aristotle, who used household relationships to describe different forms of 
political rule. Aristotle writes that the man’s rule over his wife is like the rule of a statesman over 
his fellow citizens. In the polity, all citizens are fundamentally equal and therefore take turns 
ruling and being ruled. Rulers hold only a temporary superiority over the ruled. Aristotle 
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compares the father’s rule over his children to kingship because kings must be naturally superior 
to their subjects.309 Although the husband’s rule over his wife is according to nature, it does not 
arise unless a woman freely consents to the relationship.310 As Harro Höpfl has shown, the Jesuits 
on the whole believed that women were by nature equal to men and shared in their husbands’ 
rule over the household. It was only because there must be one supreme head of each household 
that men were given authority over their wives.311 As in the Aristotelian polity, inequality and 
hierarchy must be established for the sake of order but do not arise from the nature of things. 
The Jesuit belief in the fundamental political equality of all human beings was rooted in a 
tradition of natural law going back to the Latin fathers of the Church. The earliest and most 
influential statement of pre-political equality was Augustine’s assertion that God originally 
intended for humans to only hold dominium over irrational animals and not over other rational 
human beings. Augustine equated political rule with interpersonal dominium, the enslavement 
and use of another person for one’s own purposes. This enslavement does not arise from natural 
law but is permitted by God as punishment for human sinfulness.312 This idea was picked up by 
Pope Gregory I who interpreted Augustine as saying that humans are all equal under natural law: 
“For all of us men are equal by nature, but it has been added by a distributive arrangement, that 
we should appear as set over particular persons…For as we have before said, nature has begotten 
all of us men equals, but, the order of merits varying, the secret appointment sets some above 
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others.”313 Augustine and Gregory were enormously influential in the thought of Aquinas, who 
sought to assimilate them to Aristotle. Aquinas argued that there was a type of political rule that 
respected the natural equality of persons and that would have existed even if humans had never 
fallen. He called this natural political rule “directive” rule and distinguished it from the 
“coercive” rule described by Augustine and Gregory. Adopting Aristotle’s distinction between 
freemen and slaves, Aquinas stated that directive rule was carried out for the good of the ruled 
while despotic rule was only for the good of the master.314 This dichotomy—between the directive 
rule among equals and the coercive rule of despots and slave masters—was a core conceptual 
framework in Jesuit political thought. 
These medieval ideas about natural equality influenced Almain and Vitoria who, as 
discussed above, both described civil power as residing originally in the entire commonwealth 
and not granted by God to any one person or group. The Jesuits adopted and expanded on this 
idea by arguing that any form of government—the elevation of some citizens to positions of 
power—requires the consent of all. Robert Bellarmine, in his treatise on civil power, De laicis, 
argues this point by distinguishing between natural law (ius naturale) and the law of nations (ius 
gentium). Natural law dictates that civil power is necessary to govern and protect the civitas and 
to guide its citizens toward their natural ends. However, natural law is silent about the particular 
forms of government through which civil power is exercised:  
Second, note that this authority immediately resides in the entire multitude as its subject 
because this authority is of divine law. But divine law did not give this authority to any 
particular man; therefore it gave it to all. Moreover, once we remove the positive law, 
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there is no good reason why among many equals one rather than another should rule. 
Therefore this authority belongs to the entire multitude.315 
 
Bellarmine argues that the configuration of political power through the creation of governments 
is determined by ius gentium, which is not laid down by God but established by the consent of 
the commonwealth.316 He writes that the establishment of relationships of ruler and ruled is 
necessary for the protection of the civitas, but the transfer of power from the commonwealth to 
the ruler cannot occur without the consent of the multitude.317  
The centrality of consent in Jesuit thought emerges in Bellarmine’s dispute with Pierre 
Belloy over the succession of the Protestant Henry of Navarre. In his written attack on the 
Catholic League, Belloy argues that the power of the French king and his successors is granted 
directly by God and does not depend on the consent of the people. Even unjust and tyrannical 
rulers—like the cruel Gentile kings who ruled over the Israelites—are given to the people by 
God, who commands that we only obey and not question the justice or injustice of our rulers.318 
Bellarmine responds to Belloy by attempting to demystify the right of kings and asserting the 
role of human choice in the creation of political regimes. He argues that these tyrannical rulers 
gained power not through a direct gift from God or natural law but through their own volition. 
While royalists like Belloy often attributed the rule of specific kings and royal dynasties to the 
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mysteries of divine providence, Bellarmine accused them of attributing injustice to God. There is 
only one thing, he writes, that can render usurpers and tyrants legitimate rulers—the eventual and 
begrudging consent of their subjects. But this act of human consent and ius gentium must not be 
confused with natural law or divine mandate.319 Here Bellarmine draws on and extends the ideas 
of the early Christian fathers. Augustine and Gregory had argued that all humans were equal by 
nature in order to emphasize the injustice of political despotism and the lust for power. The 
royalists recognized these injustices but argued that they were God-given punishments or tests to 
which one must submit. The Jesuits sought to eliminate or minimize these injustices by showing 
how a commonwealth could establish non-dominating governments through the consent of the 
people. 
These Jesuit arguments for political equality also flowed from the secular nature of civil 
power. While the Jesuits sought to separate the civil power of kings from the ecclesiastical power 
of the pope, the royalists, especially in England, sought to unite secular and ecclesiastical 
authority under the monarch. In comparing the civil power with the ecclesiastical power, Suárez, 
Bellarmine, and Molina emphasize that ecclesiastical power does not originally reside in the 
entire body of the (spiritual) commonwealth. This is because it is ordered toward supernatural 
ends, which depend on God’s grace. The supernatural powers of bestowing grace and remitting 
sins belonged originally to Christ, who granted them only to the apostle Peter and not to the 
entire body of the faithful. Because each pope, as Peter’s successor, is endowed with 
supernatural powers that are not common to mankind, the political organization of the Church is 
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necessarily monarchical.320 Moreover, the ecclesiastical laws promulgated by the Church are 
derived from divine positive law, which is revealed only to a select few and not universally 
accessible through reason. These comparisons shed light on the Jesuit view of civil power. 
Because civil power arises out of natural law and exists to carry out the ends ordained by that 
law, all rational human beings have equal claim to wield civil power. When the commonwealth 
delegates this power to a king, the people still have knowledge of natural law and can perceive 
whether the king is acting according to natural law or not. Does this give them a permanent right 
to pass judgment on the king and possibly resist him? Molina and Mariana answer in the 
affirmative: even under a true monarchy, in which all power resides in one person, the people 
always retain a latent claim to exercise civil power.321 On this reading, the secular and natural 
character of civil power directly contradicts the basic tenets of divine right absolutism. 
 
4.4 The Construction of Civil Government 
In his influential discussion of the “divine right of kings,” Johann Sommerville uses the 
term “designation theory” to describe a strand of Stuart absolutist thought that is distinct from 
patriarchalism.322 The term was originally employed by twentieth-century Catholic political 
theorists to describe a transformation in Catholic political theology in the eighteenth century. The 
phrase first appears in Heinrich Rommen’s The State in Catholic Thought (1935), in which 
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Rommen distinguishes between two Catholic theories of legitimate power: “translation theory” 
and “designation theory.” He defines translation theory as the idea that political authority is 
originally granted by God to the community as a whole and can then be transferred by the 
community to an individual or group. Rommen attributes this idea to a long tradition of Catholic 
political thinkers including Jean Gerson, Thomas Cajetan, Vitoria, and, most importantly, 
Suárez.323 Rommen writes that Catholic designation theory arose around 1800 as a conservative 
reaction to the French Revolution. In order to ward off popular resistance and political 
instability, designation theorists argued that the commonwealth as a whole could never possess 
power over itself. The formation of a political society requires the setting up of a power over the 
community; in other words, the commonwealth cannot exist without a prior inequality of power 
between ruler and ruled. Because this power is never possessed by the commonwealth as a 
whole, it must be granted directly by God to the sovereign. This does not mean that God chooses 
the person or persons who exercise sovereignty; that right still belongs to the community. 
However, in designating their sovereign, the people are not granting him power; they are only 
granting him a title.324 As historians have recognized, Rommen’s description of designation theory 
exactly matches the anti-Jesuit absolutist arguments of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  
Although Vitoria is often numbered among the translation theorists, he actually puts 
forward an early argument for designation theory in his lecture On Civil Power. Recall that 
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Vitoria argues that the people transfer auctoritas, while God alone grants potestas.325 Vitoria’s 
argument here is borrowed from earlier theories of papal power. It was commonly argued, in 
defense of the pope’s absolute authority over the Church in spiritual matters, that although he 
was elected by the cardinals, the pope’s power did not come from the cardinals but directly from 
God.326 What was new about designation theory was the application of this distinction between 
title and power to secular kingship, thus imbuing civil power with spiritual elements. When he 
uses the idea of designation theory to describe the landscape of early Stuart absolutism, 
Sommerville acknowledges the Catholic origins of the idea, citing early seventeenth-century 
arguments by Robert Bolton, John Buckeridge, and William Barrett, all of whom drew on the 
analogy of papal power to defend the divine right of kings.327 Bolton (1572-1631) cites the 
Catholic argument that the pope has his authority directly from God, even though he is elected 
by the cardinals. On this basis, he argues that regardless of how a king is selected, the people are 
obligated by divine law to obey.328 As with the patriarchalists, these thinkers focus on the morally 
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binding nature of civil power in the abstract in order to dismiss the question of whether particular 
regimes are just. 
These arguments for an absolute obligation to obey civil power rely on an objective 
concept of natural law (ius naturale) found in the works of Aquinas, Almain, Cajetan, and 
Vitoria. For absolutists, natural law served as a useful foundation for civil power because it 
bound the conscience of the citizen and demanded obedience to civil law. Natural law dictated 
the rational ends of human life, which all human beings were morally obligated to fulfill, and 
human law translated those precepts into specific legal obligations.329 The Jesuits, especially 
Suárez, broke from these absolutist tendencies of their predecessors by positing a subjective 
concept of ius that denoted a realm of human freedom rather than obligation. These two senses 
of ius are described by Suárez in his exhaustive exposition of legal concepts in Book I of De 
legibus. He surmises that the objective meaning of ius is derived from the verb iubere (to 
command) and is therefore synonymous with lex (law). The subjective meaning is derived from 
iustitia (justice) and therefore refers to what is just or equitable.330 Suárez defined the subjective 
concept of ius as  
a certain moral power, which every man has, either over his own property or with respect 
to that which is due to him. For it is thus that the owner of a thing is said to have a right 
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in that thing, and the labourer is said to have that right (ius) to his wages by reason of 
which he is declared worthy of his hire.331  
 
As this definition demonstrates, ius was often linked with the idea of property and thus with the 
concept of dominium—the right to control and dispose of persons or things.332 Suárez also 
maintains that this subjective right is limited by objective natural law. Turning to Aquinas’s 
Secunda secundae, he argues that what is fair and just (iustum) is prescribed by law (lex).333   
Employing this subjective concept of ius, the Jesuits described the construction of 
political regimes in contractual terms.334 Suárez states that when separate individuals come 
together to form a self-sufficient commonwealth, they become a single body that naturally 
possesses rights over itself. This body has the freedom to either retain its rights completely as a 
democracy or to transfer all or some of its rights to a ruler.335 Molina and Suárez both assert that at 
the time of the original contract, the commonwealth has the right to determine the extent of the 
ruler’s powers and to specify conditions upon which the people may revoke this power. Thus, the 
people always retain a latent power to resist and resume their original power.336 Suárez sees 
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evidence of this freedom to contract in contemporary Europe. He cites the kingdom of Aragon as 
an example of an especially limited monarchy due to the conditional nature of its original 
contract. Other kingdoms are more absolutist in nature because their commonwealths have given 
away their power unconditionally, resulting in a type of political servitude.337 The Jesuits thus 
allowed for the possibility of absolutism when the people consented to it.  
This contractual idea was also a prominent feature of the political thought of the English 
Catholics of the early seventeenth century, particularly Matthew Kellison and Robert Persons.338 
Persons accepted Suárez’s theoretical arguments and spelled out the radically democratic 
consequences for contemporary politics: the commonwealth had the legal power to alter 
succession, unseat current monarchs, and abolish monarchical systems completely.339 Persons 
argues that the commonwealth grants the king conditional power (potestas vicaria or potestas 
delegata), “which is given with such restrictions cautels and conditions, yea, with such plain 
exceptions, promises, and oaths of both parties… as if the same be not kept, but willfully broken, 
on either part, then is the other not bound to observe his promise neither.”340 Whereas Suárez 
sought to emphasize the stability of monarchy under contractual agreement, Persons spelled out 
the radically subversive implications of Catholic contract theory. Matthew Kellison’s political 
theory followed closely in the Jesuit tradition, viewing political society as a community of equals 
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instituted by natural necessity and possessing a natural power of self-government.341 Like other 
Jesuits, Kellison maintained that the power wielded by kings was divine in nature because God 
has willed that the commonwealth achieve its proper ends, but this divine power does not 
descend directly from God but rather indirectly from both the “designation” and “donation” of 
the people.342 Kellison, like Suárez, treats political liberty as the property of the people and uses 
the analogy of selling oneself into slavery to describe the granting of power to the king.343  
What sets the Jesuits apart from later social contract theorists is that they did not view 
these contracts as hypothetical but literal and historical. They saw all existing monarchical 
governments as the products of previous legal transactions and therefore limited in nature. 
Persons and Kellison both point to the fact that all monarchs are compelled to swear oaths to the 
people upon their succession to the throne. The people also swear oaths of allegiance to their 
monarchs, but these are conditional upon the monarchs’ observance of the law. These oaths are 
legally binding mutual promises that, if violated, give the people the legal right to resist royal 
power and, for Persons, a duty to depose the tyrannical monarch.344 The consistent use of 
coronation oaths thus demonstrates that the source of monarchical legitimacy is not succession 
alone but popular consent. Kellison also argued based on the empirically observable fact that 
some monarchs possessed great power, while others ruled precariously. This difference in power, 
                                               
341 Matthew Kellison, The Right and Jurisdiction of the Prelate and the Prince (Menston, UK: Scolar 
Press, 1974), pp. 39-43, cited by Sommerville, “From Suárez to Filmer,” 529. 
342 Kellison, Right and Jurisdiction, 50, 54-6. 
343 Kellison, Right and Jurisdiction, 51-2. 
344 Persons, Conference, 78-9; Kellison, Right and Jurisdiction, 53-4. 
  
 128 
he argued, was not due to kings’ self-restraint—a political impossibility—but rather to different 
degrees to which peoples and their parliaments have conceded power to their kings.345 
These contractualist arguments prompted royalist critiques that attempted to turn Thomist 
natural law against the Jesuits. The two thinkers who did this most effectively were King James 
VI/I (1566-1625) and Marco Antonio de Dominis (1560-1624), both of whom had been trained 
in academic natural law.346 These thinkers leveled two critiques against the Jesuits. First, they 
argued that the Jesuit account privileged democracy over other forms of government thus 
undermining obedience to kings. Secondly, they argued that the fundamental precept of natural 
law—self-preservation—required that political societies be hierarchical from the beginning, thus 
making truly democratic government impossible.  
The first critique seizes on the Jesuit idea that all power naturally resides in the people 
and attempts to show that this is incompatible with any but a purely democratic government. De 
Dominis writes: 
If the multitude holds such ruling power in itself, by the law of nature itself, as our 
[opponents] contend, then by the divine law of nature itself every commonwealth is 
democratic; and not one is aristocratic or monarchical, except by positive human law, and 
from the free will of the multitude. 
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If the Jesuits are correct, he says, “God instituted among men, and established by the law of 
nature, the worst of all forms of government, and the most imperfect; which is not true.”347 Robert 
Filmer would later adopt this same argument in his attack on Suárez, writing that the 
commonwealth’s act of handing over authority to a king was a violation of God’s will.348 A 
closely related objection, voiced by King James, was that if all civil power—except pure 
democracy—was the product of human law and not directly from God, the basis for political 
obligation would be lost. In other words, they viewed the secularization of law as the 
deracination of law from the source of legal obligation.349  
The second critique was articulated by King James in The Trew Law of Free Monarchies 
(1598). James reiterates the Almainian idea that the body politic, like the human body, must have 
power over its members in order to defend itself against external and internal threats. However, 
he shifts the locus of power from the body as a whole to the head:  
The King towards his people is rightly compared to a father of children, and to a head of 
a body composed of divers members… For from the head, being the seate of Judgement, 
proceedeth the care and foresight of guiding, and preventing all evill that may come to 
the body of any part thereof… As the discourse and direction flowes from the head, and 
the execution according thereunto belongs to the rest of the members, every one 
according to their office: so is it betwixt a wise Prince, and his people. As the judgement 
comming from the head may not onely imploy the members… but likewise in case any of 
them be affected with any infirmitie must care and provide for their remedy, in-case it be 
curable, and if otherwise, gar cut them off for feare of infecting of the rest…350 
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For James, the civil power and ius conservandi is never in the people as a whole but only in the 
sovereign head. A commonwealth could no more remove its king than a person could waive his 
right to self-defense.351 
De Dominis expands on this idea, drawing on the leading lights of Thomist natural law. 
Almain and Vitoria had suggested that the civil power resides originally in the commonwealth 
but that it cannot be effectively wielded by the commonwealth as a whole. Although the 
commonwealth has the right to this power, its administration must be delegated away to a more 
effective body, preferably a monarch (DPC 1.5). De Dominis pushes the logic of this argument 
one step further and argues that if it is impossible for the commonwealth to effectively govern, 
then civil power never descends directly to the commonwealth as a whole but only directly to the 
effective ruler. Prior to the installation of the ruler, the people do not possess any power over 
themselves but are merely an anarchic and formless multitude: 
 
Therefore when a disordered and headless people is drawn by its own nature 
towards imposing one or several rulers upon itself, it does not follow from this that 
the people retains in its own hands the same liberty [… ] or has the power of 
deposing the rulers it has adopted; any more than dominion is given to matter over 
the form it has acquired.352 
 
De Dominis thus redefines political power as the power of the ruling part over the ruled part. It is 
the rule of the head over the body, not the body over itself.  
In Book III of the Defensio fidei, Suárez composes a response to both of these critiques 
that serves as a succinct and elegant summary of the entire Jesuit constitutional argument. Suárez 
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demonstrates why secular political power resides in the people and why secular, human laws are 
binding on the conscience. His argument is directed primarily against King James, but he also 
anticipates the critiques of de Dominis and Filmer. Suárez first responds to James’s argument 
that royal power is bestowed directly on the king and not delegated by the people. He begins by 
distinguishing between two basic ways in which God can bestow a power or right on something. 
The first way is through the nature of the thing itself. Because the essence and nature of the 
civitas is the power of preservation, it cannot exist apart from this power; God’s gift of civil 
power to the civitas is thus “connatural.” The second way is by adding something non-essential 
onto a thing through a voluntary gift outside of nature. For example, Christ bestowed on Peter a 
jurisdictional power to “bind and loose.” This is not a part of human nature and is thus a 
“supernatural” gift. The key difference between these two is that connatural gifts occur 
automatically through natural processes while supernatural gifts require an act of divine 
intervention that interrupts or alters natural processes. These two types of gifts clearly 
correspond to the civil and ecclesiastical powers; the former belongs to all individuals in every 
commonwealth, and the latter belongs only to the pope as a successor of Peter.353 
Suárez then explains why secular power must fall on the entire commonwealth equally. 
He fully acknowledges that a unitary ruling power is necessary to preserve and maintain the 
commonwealth, “whether it exists in one natural person, or in one council, or in a congregation 
of several.”354 However, from the necessity of delegating power to a single head, it does not 
follow that God must bestow the ruling power on this one head. Because the gift of civil power is 
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connatural, it is bestowed only according to the nature of the commonwealth. The essence of the 
commonwealth is a body of naturally equal individuals requiring some form of government. To 
bestow civil power on one person would contradict the nature of the commonwealth in two ways. 
It would elevate one person above the rest, which is contrary to the natural equality of all. And it 
would establish a monarchy, which is not natural or essential, as even de Dominis would admit.355  
This conclusion leads to the second royalist complaint, which Suárez anticipates. If God 
cannot connaturally bestow civil power in any particular form, why do the Jesuits argue that the 
civil power is bestowed on the entire commonwealth? This implies that God and nature have 
established democracies in every commonwealth and that other regimes are somehow less 
legitimate.356 Suárez concedes that democracy arises as a “quasi natural institution” in that it can 
come about without any further action on the part of the commonwealth. But this does not make 
democracy necessary or even preferred.357 On the contrary, Suárez, like all Jesuits found 
monarchy to be the best regime.358 The flaw in the objection, says Suárez, is to think of this 
original gift of civil power as a necessity (objective right) rather than a freedom (subjective 
right). The right of the commonwealth to rule itself is “of natural law negatively, not positively, 
or rather of concessive not of absolutely prescriptive natural law.”359 This sphere of open-ended 
possibilities remains morally indifferent with respect to divine and natural law.360 As a subjective 
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right, it is the moral power of the commonwealth to dispose of itself in a variety of possible 
ways. Analogously, all individuals are born free and equal, “but the law of nature does not 
prescribe that every man always remain free, or (what is the same) it does not absolutely prohibit 
man being put into slavery, but only that it not be done either without the free consent of the 
individual, or without lawful title and power.”361 Like individuals, commonwealths cannot be 
subjected to servitude (i.e. absolute kingship) without their consent. Even though monarchy is 
the best form of government, it requires the creation of inequalities of power that are not rooted 
in nature. In order to be just, it must arise through a voluntary transfer of power from the 
commonwealth to the king. All of this helps explain why the Jesuits ultimately rejected Vitoria’s 
idea that the commonwealth only grants title (auctoritas) and not power (potestas). Because the 
commonwealth has ownership over its power by natural right, only the commonwealth, not God, 
can grant power to the king. 
For the absolutists, this final point rendered civil law powerless to bind the citizens of the 
commonwealth in conscience. The king must have his power directly from God in order for his 
law to be binding. De Dominis is especially dismissive of this secular theory of civil law and 
argues that each new government and each change of government requires divine positive 
institution: 
[God] regulates with his own judgement, and assigns with hidden power, elections, 
hereditary successions, conquests, and other ways of this sort, by which kings acquire 
kingdoms, not only by means of his permissive will, and as a first and remote cause— of 
which there is no doubt— but also by his absolute will, and as a proximate cause.362 
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The acknowledgement of God’s “permissive will” is a nod to Suárez’s argument, but de Dominis 
feels the need to add God’s “absolute will” to the equation, thus removing human agency and the 
indeterminacy of natural law.  
Suárez argues that such divine positive intervention in every change of political form is 
unnecessary and goes against the essence of civil power, which is natural and secular, not 
supernatural or spiritual. Through the construction of political power and positive laws, humans 
can construct new moral boundaries by commanding and prohibiting certain actions that are 
indifferent with respect to natural and divine law. Suárez demonstrates this using the analogy of 
property and economic exchange: “For God did not immediately give (in the ordinary way of 
speaking) to any man property in and peculiar dominion over anything, but He immediately 
made everything common and private dominion was introduced partly by the law of nations, 
partly by civil law”.363 As we saw above, Suárez connects private property to political power 
through the institution of slavery. Although it cannot arise naturally, slavery entered into through 
mutual consent is as morally binding as the natural state of freedom.364 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
In the foregoing discussion, we have seen that the idea of divine right kingship took on a 
wide variety of meanings in early modern Europe. While the notion of divine right seems 
contrary to the spirit of political secularism, I have endeavored to show that the Jesuits carved 
out a secular theory of civil government while retaining the idea that all political authority is 
ordained by God. This theory contained two basic arguments: the inherent equality of all 
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individuals under natural law and the natural right of human communities to shape the political 
institutions that governed them. This Jesuit view stands in stark contrast to the royalist approach. 
In order to bolster the idea of civil sovereignty, royalists sought to sacralize the idea of political 
authority by opposing the idea of human agency in constituting governments. 
In this particular debate, natural law philosophy served as an important tool of political 
secularization and democratization. Jesuit civil philosophy relied on a sharp distinction between 
civil and ecclesiastical authority, with the former being established solely for the pursuit of 
natural ends. Because civil authority was a product of natural law, it belonged equally to all 
rational human beings. By shifting toward a possessive and subjective understanding of natural 
right, the Jesuits granted each community the freedom to create a variety of possible political 
regimes, from pure democracy to absolute monarchy. The importance placed on consent and 
contractual relationships in creating new political obligations made this a remarkably secular 















The Lutheran Dilemma: 
Liberty of Conscience and Secular Authority 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The last two chapters have focused on Catholic arguments for political secularism 
directed against both Protestants and Catholics. Chapter 3 discussed Vitoria’s response to papal 
hierocracy and Luther’s attack on civil law. In Chapter 4, we examined Jesuit responses to 
Catholic and Protestant arguments for divine right absolutism. However, it would be impossible 
to describe the rise of political secularism in early modern Europe without acknowledging the 
contributions of Luther and his successors. Like the Thomists, Luther argued for the separation 
of the secular and religious spheres of life and thus opposed the two extremes of caesaropapism 
and clericalism.365 Unlike the dualism of the Thomists, who viewed state and Church as two 
independent earthly kingdoms, Luther’s philosophy distinguishes the earthly kingdom of the 
state from the spiritual kingdom of the Church. This alternate dichotomy is built on two 
principles: (1) the civil ruler’s monopoly on legal and political authority and (2) the liberty of the 
Christian conscience. The spread of these Lutheran ideas undermined the idea of the Church as 
an independent earthly kingdom and made religion an interior phenomenon that could not be 
governed. By liberating the soul from the political powers of both church and state, Luther gave 
rise to the conflict between secular sovereignty and religious liberty that shaped the course of 
Protestant political theology for the next two centuries. It was out of these debates that the 
Protestant theory of the secular state—most famously defended by John Locke—emerged.  
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5.2 Luther on Secular and Ecclesiastical Authority 
The view of secular authority defended by Luther represents a direct refutation of the 
long-standing view of secular-ecclesiastical relations represented by the “two swords” analogy. 
Both hierocrats and dualists had held that there were two distinct legal jurisdictions that 
governed all Christians, that both secular kingdoms and the Church possessed legal jurisdiction 
over their members. As we saw in Vitoria’s thought, this dualism rested on the idea of the 
Church as a self-sufficient regnum that could create laws, render judgments, and punish its 
members in pursuit of its spiritual ends. Against this dualism, Luther advances a monist position 
built on two propositions. First, he rejects the hierarchical, governmental concept of the Church 
as an earthly kingdom and replaces it with the egalitarian, spiritual concept of the Church as the 
universal priesthood of all Christians.366 Second, Luther argues that all Christians must passively 
submit to the authority of their secular rulers. 
The governmental model of the priesthood is replaced in Luther’s thought by a universal 
priesthood of all believers in Christ.367 Luther writes: “Injustice is done those words ‘priest,’ 
‘cleric,’ ‘spiritual,’ ‘ecclesiastical’ when they are transferred from all Christians to those few 
who are now by a mischievous usage called ‘ecclesiastics.’”368 Luther envisions a non-political 
church in which power is completely absent: “Among Christians, there shall and can be no 
                                               
366 This idea of the Church as congregatio fidelium was also championed by Marsilius of Padua in 
Defensor Pacis, II, 2, 3. Early anti-papalists like Marsilius of Padua pushed back against the idea of a 
coercive Church, but it was not until Luther that the idea of the Church as regnum was widely rejected.   
367 Martin Luther, “Freedom of a Christian,” in John Dillenberger, ed., Martin Luther: Selections from His 
Writings (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1961), 63.   
368 Ibid, 65. 
  
 138 
authority; but all are alike subject to one another… There is no superior among Christians but 
Christ himself and Christ alone.”369 The church still requires a special order of priests, but their 
office consists solely of serving the church through preaching the Word of God. Luther accuses 
the clergy of usurping temporal power while abandoning their pastoral duties: “the pope and the 
bishops should be bishops and preach God’s Word; this they leave undone and are become 
temporal princes, and govern with laws which concern only life and property.”370 Luther thus 
seeks to strip away all the political, legal, and financial powers of the Roman Church, leaving 
these powers to secular rulers. 
Luther’s monism led him to attack the canon law principle—central to medieval 
hierocratic thought—that the priesthood was not subject to secular jurisdiction. He argued that 
these immunities rested on the idea that clergy occupied a special station that was distinct from 
the secular station of the laity. Although Luther recognized the necessity of the priestly order, he 
rejected the traditional distinction between sacred and secular persons, insisting that all 
Christians were equally spiritual and sacred, regardless of their social position. Secular 
authorities were also “spiritual in status” and exercised jurisdiction over all individuals in the 
commonwealth, regardless of their occupation or station in life. These rulers are called on to 
mete out earthly justice without being hindered by the pretenses of the clergy, just as all other 
offices and trades in society serve clergy and non-clergy alike. In this way, Luther defends the 
rights of princes while placing them on the same level as “tailors, shoemakers, stonemasons, 
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carpenters, cooks, menservants, farmers, and all secular craftsmen.”371 This simultaneous 
elevating and denigrating of the civil magistrate is indicative of Luther’s ambivalent attitude 
toward political power and sets him apart from both the Thomists and the divine right absolutists. 
Luther’s understanding of the secular and spiritual powers borrows from Augustine’s 
description of the two kingdoms in City of God.372 Like Augustine, Luther saw the true church as 
a spiritual community of true believers distinct from the visible church on earth. All humanity is 
divided into two kingdoms: “the kingdom of God,” consisting of “true believers in Christ,” and 
“the kingdom of the world,” made up of the unredeemed. The temporal powers have been set up 
by God only to restrain the wickedness of these unbelievers, because true Christians have no 
need of the law to guide their actions.373 Citing St. Paul’s well-worn passage in Romans 13, 
Luther argues that these temporal powers are ordained by God and given power of life and death 
over their members “for the punishment of the wicked and protection of the upright.”374 Because 
true believers make up such a small minority (for nearly all nominal Christians lack true faith), 
they must live in the kingdom of the world while they pass through this life.375 True Christians 
must thus live under two kingdoms, with their souls subject to Christ’s spiritual rule and their 
bodies subject to the rule of the prince.  
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Luther’s most consistent argument in his political theology is that all secular rulers must 
be obeyed regardless of the injustices that they inflict. Because all authorities, even the worst 
tyrants, are placed on their thrones by God, they must be quietly suffered and never resisted.376 
For Luther, rapacious rulers are not political ills to be corrected but divine punishments to be 
endured. When we are oppressed by tyrants, we ought not focus on the sins of the tyrant but 
rather on our own sins, which brought on the tyrant.377 Moreover, even if one is perfectly 
innocent, as Christ was, one must never seek justice by resisting political oppression. In his letter 
to the Swabian peasants, Luther argues that they have no right to revolt against the nobles. As 
Christians, they must heed Christ’s command to “not resist one who is evil.” Christian subjects 
must take up the cross by accepting undeserved punishment at the hands of their superiors.378 
They may pray to God for deliverance from evil, but they may never deliver themselves with 
their own hands.379 Here Luther rejects the principle (defended by the Thomists) that civil powers 
may be judged according to universal standards of natural law and natural rights: “For no matter 
how right you are, it is not right for a Christian to appeal to law, or to fight, but rather to suffer 
wrong and endure evil”.380 Luther acknowledges cases in which a king is clearly acting unjustly, 
as when he violates his agreements with his people. However, victims can never be judges in 
                                               
376 Skinner, Foundations II, 19; Luther, “Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved,” in Robert C. Schultz, ed., 
Luther’s Works, Volume 46 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), 112, 126. 
377 Ibid, 109. 
378 Luther, “Admonition to Peace,” in Schultz, ed., Luther’s Works 46, 28-9. 
379 Ibid, 34. 
380 Ibid, 31. The principle is articulated in Aquinas, Scripta super libros sententiarum II, 44, Question 2, 
Article 2. Aquinas identifies cases in which authority is acquired unjustly or used unjustly, going so 
far as to condone tyrannicide, citing the assassination of Julius Caesar. 
  
 141 
their own cases; they must wait for justice to be handed down by the proper authorities.381 This 
radically passivist political philosophy was in many ways a precursor to the arguments for 
“divine right” absolutism examined in the previous chapter.382 Luther himself was conscious of 
the absolutist implications of his theology, declaring that no one had done as much as he to 
advance the power of kings.383 
Luther’s belief in the Christian duty of political submission is supported by his 
understanding of the relationship between the body and the soul. One of the central tenets of 
Luther’s theology is that the good works performed externally by the body have no effect on the 
goodness of the soul. Only internal actions—faith, love, hearing the Word—can affect the soul. 
Likewise, regardless of the evils done to the body and suffered by the body, the faithful 
Christian’s soul remains unaffected. A Christian has no need of physical comfort or freedom 
because his spirit is always free.384 He can therefore fully submit his body and property to the 
secular authorities while his faith remains unchanged. Secular authorities may attempt to 
overreach by commanding subjects to believe one thing and not another, but this is impossible 
because belief cannot be compelled.385 In this same spirit, Luther condemns the Swabian peasants, 
who justified their revolt against the nobles by arguing that Christ had liberated slaves from their 
masters. Luther accuses the peasants of believing that their spiritual redemption translated into 
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worldly power, thus “making Christian freedom a completely physical matter.” For Luther, the 
Gospel has nothing to say about political equality or worldly justice; slaves who use the Gospel 
to demand freedom from their masters are perverting Christ’s teaching by confusing spiritual 
freedom, which comes from an inner transformation, and political freedom, which requires 
power and violence.386 Having found their spiritual freedom through faith, Christians must 
surrender their bodies and possessions to those who hold power over them. This internal-external 
distinction explains how Luther could condemn the enforcement of religious beliefs while 
allowing the enforcement of religious worship. 
 
5.3 The Liberty of the Conscience 
In Luther’s writings, these admonitions to political passivity are constantly paired with 
reminders of the spiritual freedom promised by the Gospel. The theological breakthrough that 
gave birth to this freedom was Luther’s re-imagining of the conscience. His theology of the 
conscience grew out of his dissatisfaction with the Thomist idea of the conscience as something 
that is inescapably bound by the law. Aquinas and his early modern heirs argued that individuals 
were obligated by their consciences to obey all laws—divine, natural, and human—to which they 
were subject. The Thomist conscience is not a private moral space—as in the modern 
understanding—but rather the seat of moral judgment and practical reason, which directs the will 
of the individual toward correct actions. Luther generally accepted Aquinas’s view of conscience 
as the seat of judgment but argued that Christian faith liberated the conscience from all legal 
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obligations. This theory gave rise to the Protestant notion of “liberty of conscience,” which has 
since superseded the Thomist notion in modern political discourse. 
Both Aquinas’s and Luther’s understandings of conscience can be traced to St. Paul’s use 
of the Greek concept of syneidesis, which Jerome translated into Latin as conscientia. The pre-
Christian concept of syneidesis denoted a feeling of personal shame caused by awareness of 
one’s wrongdoing. In Paul’s use of the term, the wrongdoing is a violation of divine law, which 
brings both personal shame and the wrath and judgment of God.387 By rendering Paul’s syneidesis 
as conscientia, Jerome gave the concept a more intellectual, objective, and legal meaning. 
Conscientia literally means to “know with” someone and thus implies shared knowledge between 
the individual and God. The conscience makes one aware of the discrepancy between one’s 
actions and God’s laws.388 One’s interior remorse is amplified by awareness of God’s judgment. 
 This idea is further developed by Augustine, who encountered God as the “judge of my 
conscience,” whose presence allows the sinner to look inward and feel shame.389 Before he knew 
God, Augustine felt no remorse or shame for his selfish and lustful behavior. It is only when he 
becomes aware of God’s constant presence and gaze that Augustine can see himself honestly and 
objectively for what he is: “you turned my attention back to myself. You took me up from behind 
my own back where I had placed myself because I did not wish to observe myself (Ps. 20: 13), 
and you set me before my face (Ps. 49: 21) so that I should see how vile I was…”390 Conscience 
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thus reveals to each individual the divine standard of conduct and thus demonstrates how far 
short he falls of that standard. We can see ourselves truthfully and objectively, from God’s 
perspective. 
 Building on these patristic foundations, Aquinas further elaborated on the concept of 
conscience by applying it not only to divine laws but also to human laws. Human laws are those 
rules of right reason by which legislators direct their citizens toward their earthly good.391 Insofar 
as they meet these criteria, these human laws are part of God’s eternal law and thus “bind a man 
in the court of conscience” (in foro conscientiae).392 Thus, the laws of earthly rulers have “the 
power to coerce not only temporally but also spiritually, in conscience, as the Apostle says at 
Romans 13:5, because the order of authority descends from God, as the Apostle intimates in the 
same place.”393 However, secular law only binds the conscience when it descends from God, and 
Aquinas describes two instances in which secular authority is not from God: when it is usurped 
illegally and when it commands what is contrary to reason.394 The question of when the 
conscience is bound is thus an objective legal question that can be answered through examination 
of political and legal facts, not through the introspective reflection of each individual.  
Like Augustine, Luther saw clearly that the conscience created a profound awareness of 
one’s failure to obey God’s laws. The more one was aware of these laws, the more one became 
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weighed down by guilt and shame. Later in life, Luther recalled the intense suffering he 
experienced as a young Augustinian friar: “Although I lived as a monk without reproach, I felt 
myself to be a sinner before God with a most unquiet conscience. I was not able to believe that 
He was pleased by my satisfaction.”395 He concluded that this guilt could never be overcome by 
simply following all of God’s commandments, because man’s inherent sinfulness made this 
impossible. Luther saw Aquinas’s legalistic view as presenting a false picture of man’s moral 
and spiritual capabilities. He accused Aquinas and other Aristotelian rationalists of the heresy of 
Pelagianism for believing that individuals could attain righteousness through merely acting 
according to divine law.396  
Luther’s solution, born of his own spiritual torment, was to liberate the conscience from 
this constant fear through God’s gift of grace. Obsessive focus on the letter of the law led only to 
a more profound awareness of one’s unrighteousness in front of God. This indeed is the purpose 
of the law, according to Luther: to reveal our inveterate unworthiness. By rejecting Aquinas and 
turning to St. Paul and Augustine, Luther realized that the way out of this prison is to stop 
seeking righteousness in good works and to seek forgiveness and grace through believing in 
Christ.397 Through this act of faith, the sinner becomes one with Christ and receives all of Christ’s 
righteousness as his own.398 The law and the conscience remain, but the “bad conscience” is 
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transformed into a peaceful, “quiet conscience.”399 The conscience continues to remind the sinner 
of his unworthiness, but it ceases to convey God’s wrath and condemnation. The constrained 
conscience of necessity is replaced by a free conscience that continually assures the faithful of 
God’s grace and their own righteousness.  
This leads Luther to the radical political conclusion that those who are redeemed by faith 
are no longer bound in conscience to obey the law: “It is clear, then, that a Christian has all he 
needs in faith and needs no works to justify him; and if he has no need of works, he has no need 
of the law; and if he has no need of the law, surely he is free from the law. It is true that ‘the law 
is not laid down for the just’ [1 Timothy 1:9].”400 Luther not only argued that the legally bound 
conscience is unnecessary but that this tendency of the conscience to feel legally obligated is 
incompatible with the Christian faith and must therefore be uprooted: “Either Christ must live 
and the Law perish, or the Law remains and Christ must perish; Christ and the Law cannot dwell 
side by side in the conscience. It is either grace or law. To muddle the two is to eliminate the 
Gospel of Christ entirely.”401  
When making these sweeping claims, Luther tends to not differentiate between different 
types of law: divine, natural, civil, or ecclesiastical. One possible interpretation is that Luther is 
referring exclusively to religious laws such as the Mosaic Law, obedience to which once justified 
sinners in front of God. However, Luther saw all law as operating in the same manner on the 
human conscience. Luther saw the conscience as a step in practical reasoning, whereby humans 
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perceive what is to be done and avoided and judge themselves accordingly. Thus, following 
Aquinas, Luther believed that insofar as the human conscience is aware of the natural law, it is 
bound to obey it as well as the human laws that are in accord with it. In this way, all law is 
coercive, even when not backed by the threat of force or punishment.402 In one of Luther’s 
favorite passages, 1 Timothy 1:9-10, quoted above, Saint Paul uses “the law” (ho nomos) as a 
general term to cover a variety of acts prohibited by both divine and human law: murder, 
prostitution, theft, and perjury.403 In “On Secular Authority,” Luther explicitly applies this passage 
to civil law, arguing that civil laws exist only to punish and restrain the evil of non-Christians 
and have no effect on Christians.404 Luther’s theory of conscience thus promises the total 
liberation of the human mind from the necessity of bringing one’s will and actions into 
conformity with externally imposed standards. 
Luther’s theory of the free conscience represents a radical reversal in the political uses of 
the concept of conscience. As we saw in Chapter 2, the idea of conscience was a central feature 
of Vitoria’s argument for secular autonomy: civil law is indirect divine law and thus binds the 
wills of all subjects. Because Luther’s theory undermines this crucial support for civil authority 
and invites anarchy, it was vigorously opposed by the Thomists. Another way in which the will 
can be bound by the conscience is through social pressure. The Thomist concept of conscience 
made it possible in theory for one’s righteousness to be judged by other people on the basis of 
one’s actions. For Luther, the free conscience evades public scrutiny because it is independent of 
                                               
402 Randall C. Zachman, The Assurance of Faith: Conscience in the Theology of Martin Luther and John 
Calvin (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 24-7. 
403 Jerome D. Quinn and William C. Wacker, The First and Second Letters to Timothy: A New Translation 
with Notes and Commentary (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2000), 83. 
404 Luther, “On Secular Authority,” Dillenberger, 373. 
  
 148 
action, revealing God’s grace privately to each individual. The private testimony of the 
conscience gives every person the courage to stand his ground against the scorn and persecution 
of others: “Let them cry ‘heretic, seditionist, apostate, deceiver,’ and the like, as long as it is not 
true, as long as your conscience does not agree.”405 Once consciences are freed in this way, the 
faithful are empowered to act spontaneously out of their own love for God rather than out of fear 
and necessity.406 Through a direct relationship with God, Christians can act on a morality that 
transcends the law and can freely choose to obey or disobey the law as this higher morality 
demands.407 
 
5.4 Conflicting Implications  
Luther’s simultaneous call for physical submission and spiritual liberation gave rise to a 
fundamental ambivalence in Protestant attitudes toward civil power. We can understand the 
relationship between these two ideas by comparing the Lutheran view and the Thomist view, 
which are rooted in the Augustinian and Aristotelian views, respectively. While Luther often 
seems to elevate and defend the secular state, he also undermines it at every turn. The Lutheran 
prince is at once tremendously powerful and pitifully impotent. Luther gives the prince absolute 
power over our bodies and possessions, but this power is only a corporeal force stripped of any 
moral or spiritual authority. Although he is appointed by God, his role is limited to punishing and 
protecting. For this reason, he is only entrusted with the tools of physical violence. Because the 
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prince has no role in securing the goods of the soul, Luther withdraws the Christian soul from the 
political world.  
The Aristotelian view of Vitoria and Suárez integrates the soul into the political by giving 
the state a divine mandate to instill virtues in Christians and non-Christians alike. The Christian 
citizen is bound in conscience to obey the secular authority because it commands based on 
natural reason rather than mere violence. While Luther embraces the Augustinian idea of power 
as domination and enslavement, the Thomists embrace Aquinas’s understanding of political 
power as “directive” and educational.408 The extent of Luther’s disdain for this Aristotelian-
Thomist view is clearest in his rejection of the positive value of law:  
The Law enforces good behavior, at least outwardly. We obey the Law because if we 
don’t we will be punished. Our obedience is inspired by fear. We obey under duress and 
we do it resentfully. Now what kind of righteousness is this when we refrain from evil 
out of fear of punishment? Hence, the righteousness of the Law is at bottom nothing but 
love of sin and hatred of righteousness.409 
 
Despite Luther’s abhorrence of the Anabaptist political program, we can clearly see in this 
statement the roots of the Anabaptist rejection of and withdrawal from all social and political 
institutions. 
Despite the coherence of Luther’s view, these two pillars of Luther’s thought gave birth 
to two incompatible strands of Protestant political thought: absolutism and antinomianism. This 
divergence arose in response to two questions. First, are civil sovereigns authorized to govern the 
religious lives of their citizens? Secondly, what recourse do citizens have when secular laws 
contradict their religious convictions? On the one hand, Luther’s Augustinian passivism raises no 
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objections to the absolute sovereign who governs all aspects of citizens’ lives, including religious 
worship. At the same time, Luther’s theory of conscience gives Christians license to disobey, if 
not resist, these sovereigns. That Luther’s thought pulls constantly in these two directions—
neither of which Luther seems to have intended—is demonstrated by his contested and 
complicated political legacy. While some scholars see Luther as “helping to legitimate the 
emerging absolutist monarchies of northern Europe,”410 others see him as the reason “why 
Erastianism never came fully to dominate the Protestant world.”411  
One answer that Luther offers to the question of secular control over religion is that it is 
simply impossible. In his essay “On Secular Authority,” he argues that the secular power can 
only judge and punish external actions, not inner belief.412 Even if the sovereign could compel 
citizens to perform external profession and worship, true faith is only an internal matter and not 
dependent on external words or actions.413 For a prince to attempt to impose his beliefs on his 
subjects is as foolish as his commanding the moon to shine.414 Yet in this same essay, Luther 
argues that secular powers can indeed affect the soul, at least in a destructive way: 
Therefore, where temporal power presumes to prescribe laws for the soul, it encroaches 
upon God’s government and only misleads and destroys souls. We desire to make this so 
clear that everyone shall grasp it, and that our junkers, the princes and bishops, may see 
what fools they are when they seek to coerce the people with their laws and 
commandments into believing one thing or another. When a man-made law is imposed 
upon the soul, in order to make it believe this or that, as that man prescribes, there is 
certainly no word of God for it… Nay, we are sure that it does not please Him, for He 
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desires that our faith be grounded, simply and entirely on His divine word… It follows 
from this that the secular power forces souls to eternal death with such an outrageous law, 
for it compels them to believe as right and certainly pleasing to God, what is nevertheless 
uncertain, nay, what is certainly displeasing to Him, since there is no clear word of God 
for it.415 
 
There is certainly a contradiction here, but the upshot is that nothing good can come of imposing 
belief through secular power. Luther summarizes this point with Augustine’s famous dictum: 
“No one can or ought to be constrained to believe.”416 Both the empirical and normative 
conclusions follow from the doctrine of the free conscience: all laws that impose religious 
obligations can only fill the conscience with fear and anxiety. Laws that prescribe the correct 
beliefs and actions fill the soul with guilt and shame. Laws that prescribe false religion “compel 
weak consciences to lie” and burden them with false obligations.417  
 But true Christians are not burdened by these impositions and lies, because they have 
liberated their consciences; they know that they are justified in front of God regardless of their 
obedience to secular law. Luther restates that these Christians have no need of the law, but he 
urges them to submit for the sole reason that civil government is necessary for those who are not 
liberated Christians.418 This provides a general reason, albeit a weak one, for obedience to secular 
laws, but this duty of obedience is annulled when the sovereign attempts to impose false beliefs. 
In these cases, Christians must passively obey but not actively resist.419 Luther thus imagines each 
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kingdom as consisting of two classes of citizens. The first consists of those who need the law to 
restrain them and whose consciences are thus laden with obligation. The second consists of those 
who are not strictly obligated to obey and can thus choose when to obey for the sake of the 
wicked and when to disobey in order to honor God.420 
 Despite Luther’s careful balance between inner freedom and external submission, these 
discussions were interpreted and used in radically different ways in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. The extreme libertine view was inspired by Luther’s earliest writings, especially his 
Commentary on Galatians, in which he emphasizes that the Gospel and the Law cannot coexist 
in the Christian conscience.421 The so-called “Antinomians” took this to mean that those whose 
consciences have been freed by the Gospel may freely disobey all moral and civil laws, including 
the Ten Commandments. Against this extreme interpretation, Luther argued for a more subtle 
and prudential approach to balancing the demands of law and grace. He explained that he had 
emphasized God’s grace in earlier era, when Christians were overburdened by too many laws: 
In those days we were terrorized… But now our softly singing Antinomians paying no 
attention to the change in times, make men secure who are of themselves already so 
secure that they fall away from grace… Our view has hitherto been and ought to be this 
salutary one—If you see the afflicted and contrite, preach Christ, preach grace as much as 
you can. But not to the secure, the slothful, the harlots, adulterers, and blasphemers.422 
 
                                               
420 Ibid, 368-71. 
421 Luther, Commentary on Galatians, 1:7. 
422 James MacKinnon, Luther and the Reformation (London: Longmans, Green, 1925-1930), Volume IV, 
167-70, quoted in J. Wayne Baker, “Sola Fide, Sola Gratia: The Battle for Luther in Seventeenth-
Century England,” The Sixteenth Century Journal, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring, 1985), 117. 
  
 153 
Despite Luther’s attempts to re-instill the old insecurity in these men, the Antinomian spirit 
persisted among certain high Calvinists and Baptists into the seventeenth century.423 
 The radically opposite interpretation of Luther’s teachings was embraced by the so-called 
Erastians, whom we have discussed in Chapter 1. These thinkers seized on the idea of passive 
submission and on Luther’s sharp distinction between body and soul. Because the spiritual 
freedom of the Christian is an inner quality that cannot be affected by anything done to the body, 
the civil magistrate may demand all manner of external acts so long as he does not compel 
subjects to believe. Thomas Erastus and Richard Hooker, for example, argued that the Christian 
ruler could impose a public religion and public form of worship on the commonwealth while 
tolerating differences in private beliefs. Like most Erastians, they argued for public forms of 
religion for the purposes of civil unity and order, in addition to spiritual purposes.424 Like the 
Antinomians, these thinkers embraced one aspect of Luther’s thought to arrive at conclusions 
that Luther would have rejected outright. Luther consistently argued against the idea of the 
Church as a political kingdom. From Luther’s perspective, Erastian civil religion with mandatory 
forms of worship was simply popery in secular garb. 
 
5.5 Reconciling Sovereignty and Conscience  
Over the next two centuries, Protestant thinkers proposed various solutions in an attempt to find 
a middle way between these two extremes of oppressive ceasaropapism and anarchist 
antinomianism. The need to find a via media between these extremes is a constant theme running 
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through the literature.425 These solutions fall into three categories. The first type of solution was 
proposed by moderate Erastians who sought to reconcile the civil imposition of worship with the 
liberty of conscience. They argued that sovereigns may only impose those aspects of religion that 
are indifferent (adiaphora) with respect to divine law. The second solution was proposed by 
Calvinists who rejected these Erastian arguments for civil control over external religion. They 
tended to follow Calvin’s proposal for an alternative dualism in which secular affairs were 
governed by the state and spiritual matters were governed by an independent ecclesiastical 
government. Thirdly, Thomas Hobbes stands in a category of his own. Hobbes accepted the 
radical implications of Luther’s theory of conscience and argued that a commonwealth can only 
exist when individuals voluntarily surrender their liberty of conscience to the sovereign. 
 
5.5.1 Erastian Adiaphorism 
While some Erastians embraced an absolutist view of the civil magistrate’s power over 
spiritual affairs, most accepted the more moderate view that sought to give greater space for the 
liberty of conscience in both inner belief and external worship. Both of these views made use of 
the well-known legal concept of “indifferent things” (adiaphora).426 While scholars disagreed on 
the legal status of adiaphora, they agreed on its basic meaning: those actions that are neither 
commanded nor prohibited by divine or natural law. This concept was crucial for understanding 
the legitimacy of human laws, which belonged to one of three categories with respect to divine 
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or natural law. They either (1) commanded that which was commanded by divine or natural law; 
(2) commanded that which was prohibited by divine or natural law; or (3) commanded 
adiaphora. Laws of the first type are binding in conscience. Laws of the second type are both 
unjust and not binding in conscience. Laws of the third type are just, but they may or may not be 
binding in conscience. The concept of adiaphora was crucial for discussions of public religion, 
because nearly all of the religious activities commanded by Erastian governments were neither 
commanded nor prohibited by Scripture.  
The extreme Erastian view of these religious laws is that once the sovereign commands 
his subjects to perform or refrain from these indifferent actions, they are no longer indifferent. 
For example, the action of fasting at certain times during Lent remains indifferent in itself. 
However, once the magistrate issues a law commanding the fast, it is no longer indifferent for the 
subjects of the realm. Subjects are bound in conscience to refrain from eating at the appointed 
times in the same way that they are bound in conscience to refrain from adultery. This extreme 
view was articulated by the Henrician apologist Thomas Starkey in his Exhortation to the People: 
Things indifferent I call all such things which by Gods word are neither prohibited nor 
commanded, but left to worldly policy, whereof they take their full authority… Though 
of themselves, they be neither good nor ill, nor to them we own none obedience, yet 
when they be set out with authority, by them which bear whole rule in any kind of policy 
… then the people are to them bound, yea by virtue of Gods own word, who commandeth 
expressly his disciples to be obedient to common policy.427 
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Such a view of public religion made no legal distinction between the sacraments—those 
ceremonies commanded by Scripture, such as the Eucharist and baptism—and ceremonies 
imposed by human authority alone.428 
The moderate Erastian view sought to reconcile the rights of civil magistrates to regulate 
external actions with the liberty of the conscience in spiritual matters. Luther’s close friend and 
disciple, Philip Melanchthon, was an early proponent of this approach. In his Loci Communes, 
Melanchthon distinguished between the sacraments commanded by Scripture and those 
indifferent ceremonies imposed by human authorities: “not eating meat, wearing a long or short 
dress”, fasting, and drinking wine.429 He argued that although indifferent ceremonies and rules 
could be imposed on the congregation “for discipline, for teaching, for guiding, and for 
introducing virtue, we should be careful about how high we esteem them.” Melanchthon worried 
about individuals who would wrongly believe that performance of these indifferent things, such 
as “distinctions about food and clothes,” was necessary for their spiritual justification. He thus 
sought to balance the lawful authority of the magistrate with the liberty of the conscience from 
undue burdens. Melanchthon concluded that the imposition of adiaphora is permissible but 
should never be regarded as legally binding on pain of mortal sin. To do so would be to commit 
the errors of the papacy and to “Judaize Christianity.”430  
 A third view on adiaphora was defended by the extreme anti-Erastian, Matthias Flacius 
Illyricus. Flacius argued that to obey civil laws concerning indifferent aspects of worship as if 
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they were commanded by God was a sin and thus prohibited. Although certain “popish” 
ceremonies and vestments were not prohibited by Scripture, if they were incorporated into 
worship, the ignorant members of the church would come to view them as necessary and falsely 
feel bound in conscience to perform them.431 For this reason, the introduction of these adiaphora 
was contrary to divine law, and laws commanding such things should be regarding as unjust.  
 
5.5.2 Calvinism 
Jean Calvin embraced the Lutheran theory of conscience but recognized a crucial 
shortcoming in Luther’s ecclesiology: the lack of an independent ecclesiastical government. 
Calvin sought to amend this problem by replacing Luther’s dichotomy of political state and 
spiritual church with a dichotomy of political state and political church. 
Although the idea of the liberty of conscience is almost entirely the invention of Luther, it 
owed much of its early modern currency to the work of John Calvin and his followers. The same 
spirit of Luther’s idea of the conscience can be seen in Calvin’s letter to Cardinal Sadoleto. 
Calvin condemns the practice of auricular confession by which priests pretended to exercise 
power over individual consciences: “that pious consciences, which formerly boiled with 
perpetual anxiety, have at length begun, after being freed from that dire torment, to rest with 
confidence in that divine favor”.432 Calvin goes on to accuse the Roman Church of encouraging 
Christians to rely on human authority rather than one’s direct relationship with God: 
So true it is that Christian faith must not be founded on human testimony, not propped up 
by doubtful opinion, not reclined on human authority, but engraven on our hearts by the 
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finger of the living God, so as not to be obliterated by any coloring of error. There is 
nothing of Christ, then, in him who does not hold the elementary principle, that it is God 
alone who enlightens our minds to perceive his truth, who by his Spirit seals it on our 
hearts, and by his sure attestation to it confirms our conscience.”433 
 
Calvin drew out the political implications of this concept of conscience in his Institutes of the 
Christian Religion, arguing that civil and ecclesiastical authorities could never lay any new 
obligations on the conscience.434 This idea was central to Reformed theology in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. It found official expression in the 1648 Westminster Confession, 
following the “Puritan” revolution: “God alone is Lord of the conscience, and hath left it free 
from the doctrines and commandments of men, which are, in any thing, contrary to His Word; or 
beside it, in matters of faith, or worship.”435  
 Like Luther, Calvin saw secular authority through an Augustinian lens, as primarily 
necessary for the repression of the wicked. The Fall had utterly destroyed man’s original 
goodness replacing it with a sinful nature that seeks to dominate others and strains against all 
subjection.436 When Calvin writes of “natural man,” he means sinful man prior to receiving divine 
grace. When “natural man” acts according to virtue, he does not do so by his nature but by 
“special gifts of God.”437 Such people are incapable of constructing just societies; they depend 
entirely on God’s grace to grant them kings who rule over them and restrain their wickedness. 
                                               
433 Ibid, 73. 
434 John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge (Edinburgh: Calvin 
Translation Society, 1846), Book IV, chapter 10, section 5. 
435 Westminster Confession of Faith (1648), XX.II. 
436 Walzer, Revolution of the Saints, 30-4. Calvin, Institutes, II, 2, 27; II, 3, 3. 
437 Ibid, II, 3, 4. 
  
 159 
God often places tyrants over His people in order to punish them. Although kings have a duty to 
act justly toward their subjects, their failure to do so can never justify resistance. The ruler has no 
power to lay new obligations on the conscience, but all subjects are obligated in conscience to 
obey the ruler.438 The only recourse that the godly have against an ungodly prince is to disobey 
those laws that are contrary to Divine Law.439  
 Calvin dramatically altered the history of church-state relations through his dualist theory 
of civil and ecclesiastical government. Like Luther, Calvin places all coercive authority in the 
hands of the secular ruler, but he rejects Luther’s view of church and state as divorced entities 
occupying entirely different realms—the temporal and spiritual. This view strips the Church of 
its governmental power, which was ordained by Christ from the beginning. The Church is not to 
be a merely spiritual community of the faithful but a temporal organization with power over its 
members.440 While Luther focused on the preaching of the Word as the primary mission of the 
Church, Calvin sought to recover a second power of the Church as originally intended by Christ 
himself—the power to discipline its members through public admonition and 
excommunication.441 At the same time, Calvin rejects the Erastian system of using secular power 
to enforce both temporal and spiritual ends. For Calvin, these are fundamentally different ends 
that cannot be achieved using the same tools. Moreover, the Church is ruled directly by Christ 
and must never be controlled by political power. The central Calvinist idea that came to 
dominate Puritan and Presbyterian politics for the next two centuries was the notion that all the 
                                               
438 Ibid, IV, 10, 5. 
439 Ibid, IV, 20, 24-26. 
440 Ibid, IV, 11, 4. 
441 Ibid, IV, 11, 1-2. 
  
 160 
external forms of church government and religious worship have been directly revealed by God 
through Scripture and must never be under the control of the secular authorities. He rejects the 
Melanchthonian idea that indifferent actions can be innocently introduced by secular authorities 
without imposing with the conscience. For Calvin, all such interference compels weak 
consciences to worship in a manner other than that commanded by God.442 
Calvin imagines an ideal Christian society in which church and state are two 
complementary powers governing a single society in different ways. The civil power possesses 
the tools of force, which are necessary to restrain the wicked and protect the innocent. But, as 
Luther already pointed out, these means have no power to transform the soul. Through the 
execution of civil justice, “satisfaction will be given to the laws, the magistrate, and the external 
tribunal. But the consequence will be that the offender will give no signs of repentance, but will 
rather fret and murmur.”443 What is missing from the Lutheran and Erastian states is a system of 
moral censure by the community such as that described by Christ: “If he shall neglect to hear 
them, tell it unto the Church: but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as a 
heathen and the publican” (Matt 18:17).444 While the magistrate can punish offenses against the 
community, the Church can reduce the number of offenses by purifying morals.445 
For Calvin, this system solves Luther’s conflict between the liberty of conscience and 
civil sovereignty. While Calvin seeks to maintain the ultimate freedom of the conscience from 
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human imposition, he recognizes that Luther does not harness the power of the conscience as a 
driver of human morality. Luther liberates the conscience from the king while leaving it 
untethered and susceptible to falling into Antinomianism. Instead of constantly vacillating 
between law and Gospel, as Luther seems to do, Calvin seeks to place the conscience under the 
non-coercive government of the ecclesia, a system he attempted to create through the consistory. 
Such a system recognizes that the conscience operates best when it is called to account in front 
the community and brought to genuine confession and repentance. Thus, for Calvin, “the object 
in view is not to punish the sinner against his will, but to obtain a profession of penitence by 
voluntary chastisement.”446 If such a system can be brought into cooperation with a civil 
government, the magistrate will have no need to bind the conscience; the healthy conscience will 
voluntarily submit to those laws that are just and freely disobey those that are not. Thus, Calvin’s 




More than any other thinker of this period, Thomas Hobbes recognized the danger of 
Luther’s doctrine of liberty of conscience. However, unlike his contemporaries who sought to 
discredit the idea of the unfettered conscience—men such as Samuel Rutherford and Samuel 
Parker—Hobbes accepted it and sought to reconcile it with his theory of the commonwealth. 
Like Luther, Hobbes sought to liberate the conscience from the teachings of false prophets, 
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Aristotelian philosophy, and the “Schoole-Divines”.447 He also saw Scripture as the central tool 
for reining in these false teachings that led consciences astray.448 
Unlike Luther or Calvin, however, Hobbes did not view the conscience as the part of the 
soul that perceives one’s failure to fulfill God’s commandments. He took the word conscientia to 
mean knowledge with other people rather than knowledge with God, thus unmooring the concept 
from any eternal truths. The psychological phenomenon of conscience is the product of two or 
more people who share the same opinion.449 The danger of Luther’s doctrine is that people 
inevitably attribute these shared human opinions to the workings of God in their hearts: “that 
whatsoever a man does against his Conscience is Sinne.”450 By the mid-seventeenth century, the 
political dangers of this doctrine had become manifest in the proliferation of Antinomian sects, 
usually identified as Anabaptists and Quakers.451 
Hobbes’s solution to this danger lies in his understanding of the commonwealth as the 
product of the complete surrender of individual judgment to a sovereign representative. While 
those who live in the state of nature are free to follow their private judgments, “yet it is not so 
with him that lives in a Common-wealth; because the Law is the publique Conscience, by which 
he hath already undertaken to be guided.”452 At the same time, Hobbes accepted the Lutheran 
dichotomy of inner belief and external action, acknowledging that the sovereign cannot 
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command his subjects to believe or not believe. It is only over external actions that sovereigns 
have been granted power. The concept of conscience that Hobbes is concerned with is that which 
has practical implications for action, not for inner faith alone.453 He thus argues for dividing the 
individual’s opinions between faith and practical opinion, leaving the first to the individual and 
the second to the sovereign. This also results in a bifurcation of religion between private and 
public worship.  
 
5.6 Conclusions 
In Luther’s thought, we encounter the first full-throated argument for limiting the 
jurisdiction of civil sovereigns to temporal purposes. Although the Catholic natural law 
philosophers of this period were provoked and motivated by Luther’s ideas, none seemed to see 
the political import of the question raised by Luther’s theory of secular power: can the civil 
sovereign impose legal obligations that contradict citizens’ religious convictions? What sets 
Protestant thinkers like Calvin and Hobbes apart from Vitoria, Bellarmine, and Suárez is that 
they take this Lutheran challenge seriously and attempt to reconcile the liberty of conscience 






                                               






John Locke on Civil Sovereignty and Its Limits 
 
6.1 Introduction 
John Locke’s argument for secular government is a response to a political-theological 
problem born out of Martin Luther’s radical break from medieval theology: the conflict between 
the liberty of the conscience and the obligation to obey secular law. Locke seeks a solution to 
this problem that respects both the claims of individual conscience and the sovereignty of the 
civil magistrate. In doing so, he takes issue with the two non-secular responses to the problem 
that we encountered in the previous chapter: (1) the radical non-conformist argument that the 
spiritual claims of the conscience supersede the secular claims of the state; and (2) the Erastian 
argument that the state has the right to regulate all aspects of religious worship. Locke’s solution 
is a revised form of dualism in which the conscience is divided into two parts: a religious 
conscience that remains unbound by human law and a civil conscience that is surrendered to the 
state. His dualist theory is built on two principles derived from the Thomist natural law 
framework: the principle of indifferency (adiaphora) and the principle of “civil interests.”  
In the first part of the chapter, I describe the first half of Locke’s political secularism: a 
defense of civil sovereignty against the claims of conscience. This argument is primarily 
advanced in the Tracts on Government. Next, I describe the second half of Locke’s political 
secularism: limited religious toleration. In doing so, I demonstrate that Locke’s defense of 
toleration is not in conflict with his earlier attacks on freedom of conscience. Thirdly, I explain 
how the principle of civil interests is rooted in both an epistemological account of natural law 




6.2 Locke on Civil Sovereignty 
In 1967, Philip Abrams produced the first English translation and detailed study of John 
Locke’s earliest political writings, which Abrams titled, Two Tracts on Government.454 Over the 
next three decades, a broad consensus emerged among Locke scholars that these early writings 
were at odds with Locke’s later writings on toleration. The most obvious discontinuity was 
Locke’s attack on religious freedom in the Tracts (1660-1662) and his defense of religious 
freedom in the Essay Concerning Toleration (1667) and the Letter Concerning Toleration (1685). 
James Tully, for example, argues that Locke proposes two incompatible solutions to religious 
pluralism: in the Tracts, Locke argues for absolutist government and religious conformity, while 
in the Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke argues for limited government and religious 
toleration. In the Tracts, Locke argues that the state must have the right to enforce religious 
uniformity, but in his Letter Locke argues that the public good is not served by religious coercion 
and that such coercion is ineffective.455 Tully and others concluded that Locke suddenly changed 
his mind about the relationship between religion and the state at some point between 1662 and 
1667.456 Some authors attributed the sudden change to Locke’s close relationship with Anthony 
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Ashley Cooper, First Earl of Shaftesbury, for whom Locke composed the Essay Concerning 
Toleration in 1667.457 Before meeting Shaftesbury, Locke was “Hobbesian” and “authoritarian”; 
under Shaftesbury’s patronage, he converted to liberalism.458 
Against this widely accepted interpretation, I argue that these two sets of writings—the 
“Tracts” and the writings on toleration—represent the two complementary strands of Locke’s 
political secularism: (1) a defense of civil power against claims of freedom of conscience and (2) 
a defense of religious freedom against caesaropapism. These arguments both rest on Locke’s 
principle of “civil interests”: the civil commonwealth is constituted solely for securing temporal 
ends and not for the pursuit of spiritual, religious, or supernatural ends. Locke applies this 
principle to two distinct political-religious problems. The problem addressed in the Tracts is the 
abuse of the idea of freedom of conscience to claim exemption from civil laws. When applied to 
this problem, the civil interests principle results in an argument for the use of state power to 
suppress freedom of conscience and place limits on toleration. The problem addressed in the 
Essay Concerning Toleration and Letter Concerning Toleration is the government’s use of its 
coercive power to enforce certain beliefs and religious practices. When applied to this problem, 
the civil interests principle results in an argument for greater toleration and respect for freedom 
of conscience. Despite some important changes in Locke’s thinking between 1661 and 1667, his 
view of the place of religion within the state remains mostly fixed during this period. Most of the 
apparent contradictions dissolve once we distinguish between these two political-religious 
conflicts and their respective solutions.  
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The term “civil interests” appears most prominently in Locke’s works on toleration, but 
the concept is central to all of Locke’s major political works, especially the Tracts on 
Government and the Two Treatises of Government. The idea appears as early as his 1659 letter 
to Henry Stubbe regarding Stubbe’s recent work on toleration, Essay in Defence of the Good Old 
Cause. Locke professes his hope that “men of different professions may quietly unite under the 
same government and unanimously carry the same civil interest and hand in hand march to the 
same end of peace and mutual society thought they take different ways towards heaven.”459 Here, 
as with all of Locke’s uses of the term, “civil interests” are defined in contradistinction to 
spiritual, religious, or otherworldly ends. Locke provides a more explicit definition of civil 
interests in his Letter Concerning Toleration:  
The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the 
procuring, preserving, and advancing of their own civil interests. Civil interests I call life, 
liberty, health, and indolency of body; and possession of outward things, such as money, 
lands, houses, furniture, and the like.460 
 
These civil interests are understood by all reasonable human beings and thus beyond theological 
controversy. They are the common ends that bind people of incompatible religious convictions in 
a shared political destiny. The distinction between the civil and the spiritual rests on Locke’s 
natural law philosophy, which distinguishes between moral duties that can be known by all 
reasonable people and religious questions on which there can be no certainty. In both the Tracts 
and the essays on toleration, agreement on civil interests is the key to resolving conflicts between 
religion and the state. The central aim of Locke’s political secularism is to establish political 
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societies that secured the civil interests by force while allowing individuals to pursue their 
spiritual interests freely.   
In the Two Tracts, Locke applies the principle of civil interests to the problem of civil 
disorder and violence caused by religious zealotry and sectarianism. Written between 1660 and 
1662, these early essays bear the marks of Restoration conservatism.461 In the preface to the First 
Tract, Locke recalls with horror the bloodshed of the English Revolution and praises the 
restoration of peace and order under Charles II. Adding an autobiographical note, Locke writes, 
“I no sooner perceived myself in the world but I found myself in a storm, which hath lasted 
almost hitherto, and therefore cannot but entertain the approaches of a calm with the greatest joy 
and satisfaction”.462 Throughout the Tracts, Locke identifies the most common and most 
pernicious cause of civil strife as religious dogmatism and sectarianism, what Locke calls “the 
tyranny of a religious rage.”463 The Tracts are filled with descriptions of dangerous sectarians 
chafing at any suggestion of restraint on their zealotry. Locke’s problem in the Tracts is thus 
similar to that faced by Hobbes when writing his Leviathan a decade earlier: the containment of 
religious freedom in the wake of Luther’s liberation of the conscience. Like Hobbes, Locke’s 
concern is solely for the maintenance of civil peace, public order, and physical security, never 
with religious uniformity for its own sake.  
The First Tract, written while Locke was Censor at Christ Church, Oxford, was a direct 
response to a tract written by Locke’s former classmate, Edward Bagshaw. During the 
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Restoration of the Church of England following the Interregnum (1659-60), Christ Church was 
embroiled in a controversy over the wearing of surplices during worship services at the college. 
Outraged over this popish imposition, Bagshaw wrote The Great Question Concerning Things 
Indifferent in Religious Worship in 1660.464 Bagshaw argued against the principle that “the civil 
magistrate may lawfully impose and determine the use of indifferent things, in reference to 
religious worship”.465 He adopts the traditional definition of indifferent things as those actions that 
may be performed or omitted in public worship without trespassing against the Gospel. Like 
Melanchthon, however, he argued that when certain actions, which are indifferent in themselves, 
are imposed on ignorant worshippers, these actions become objects of superstition that are 
considered necessary to worship. Such imposition, therefore, violates divine law by misleading 
worshippers into believing that certain external ceremonies or forms of dress are necessary for 
their salvation.466 Bagshaw thus rejects the Melanchthonian compromise that certain ceremonies 
may be imposed as long as it is made clear that they do not bind in conscience. 
 Although Locke’s First Tract was prompted by Bagshaw’s tract, Locke’s argument 
extends far beyond the issue of surplices and worship services to the purposes of the state and the 
relationship between civil power and religious freedom. He focuses his argument on the rights 
and duties of the “civil magistrate,” whom he defines as “the supreme legislative power of any 
society not considering the form of government or number of persons wherein it is placed.”467 In 
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the First Tract, he defends the position that “the supreme magistrate of every nation what way so 
ever created, must necessarily have an absolute and arbitrary power over all the indifferent 
actions of his people.”468 Although the policy he defends is clearly an Erastian one, his argument 
is founded on a view of civil interests and indifferency that diverges from the common Erastian 
arguments of the time.  
Despite his use of the terms “absolute” and “arbitrary,” Locke’s magistrate is not the 
unbounded sovereign of Leviathan but is rather constrained by the concept of indifferency. 
Locke’s understanding of indifferency is broader than that used by previous adiaphorists. He 
restates his initial thesis thus: “it is lawful for the magistrate to command whatever it is lawful 
for any subject to do” (emphasis mine).469 The first part of his understanding of indifferency is 
that which is “lawful.” This is the legal understanding used in traditional adiaphorism: actions 
neither commanded nor prohibited by divine or natural law. The second half focuses on the 
subject’s moral agency: actions that rational humans can freely choose to perform or omit. In 
order to be indifferent, an action must not only be legally permissible but voluntary as well. The 
magistrate cannot command what is not within our power to perform. Thus, the magistrate’s 
power does not extend to “matters of religion,” because these are matters that pertain to “the 
understanding and assent (whereof God hath reserved the disposure to himself, and not so much 
as entrusted man with a liberty at pleasure to believe or reject)”. Thus, the civil power can no 
more punish “a Jew or Mahomedan” than a Christian dissenter for their beliefs.470 Locke thus 
arrives at the same conclusion already reached by Luther—that beliefs cannot be governed—by a 
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different route. It is not because they are internal or invisible that beliefs are immune from 
jurisdictional authority but because they are involuntary. While Luther seems to have entertained 
the possibility that feeble consciences could be led astray by civil governments, Locke saw 
religious conviction as impervious to political imposition. In the Tracts as well as the Essay 
Concerning Toleration, Locke continues to rely on this understanding of indifferency in order to 
extend the sphere of toleration beyond beliefs to the realm of religious action. However, in the 
case of the controversy over surplices, Locke concludes that these external actions are within the 
power of all to perform and therefore indifferent.471 It is on this question—to what extent religious 
ceremonies should be considered voluntary—that Locke was to change his mind. 
Having limited civil jurisdiction in this way, Locke contends that, in order to secure civil 
peace, the magistrate must have an “arbitrary” power to command and prohibit indifferent 
actions. The commonwealth entrusts civil government with the responsibility of making prudent 
judgments about which indifferent things are necessary or instrumental to achieve civil peace.472 
Locke’s argument is therefore not directed against Bagshaw’s relatively insignificant attack on 
surplices but rather on Bagshaw’s contention that civil power can “forbid only those very 
necessary things” prohibited by divine and natural law.473 Against this view, Locke takes a 
position similar to Aquinas’s understanding of human law: the legislator must bind subjects on 
certain indifferent matters in order to achieve necessary ends.474 Most actions are indifferent in 
themselves but, in a particular social and political context, may be viewed as necessary to a good 
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end such as civil peace.475 These judgments require the magistrate to understand the particular 
character of the people in order to predict what social effects his laws might have. When 
governing a dispassionate and peaceful people, a magistrate may preserve peace by allowing 
greater freedom and toleration, but Locke believed such a policy to be unwise in the present 
circumstances.476 The English people had proven themselves too quick to religious outrage: “he 
must confess himself a stranger to England that thinks that meats and habits, that places and 
times of worship etc., would not be as sufficient occasion of hatred and quarrels amongst us, as 
leeks and onions and other trifles described in that satire by Juvenal…”477 Locke concludes that 
the policy of imposing certain rules on public worship was a reasonable, though not infallible, 
attempt to tamp down religious zeal that might spill into civil violence.478 A wise magistrate will 
be able to discern those laws necessary to this end without placing undue burdens on his 
subjects. An unwise magistrate may render poor judgments and impose onerous laws that fail to 
achieve good ends. In both cases, the magistrate acts justly as long as he operates within the 
realm of indifferency.479 
Bagshaw’s positive argument hinges on the distinction between civil and spiritual 
matters, which at first glance appears similar to the distinction Locke would make in the Essay 
Concerning Toleration. Bagshaw argues that the magistrate may only legislate on indifferent 
civil matters and not on indifferent spiritual matters. By legislating on spiritual questions, the 
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magistrate places spiritually dangerous burdens on believers, forcing them to worship in ways 
that violate their consciences or deceiving them into thinking that certain indifferent practices are 
spiritually significant. Only by remaining within the bounds of temporal policy can the 
magistrate ensure that his legislation “grieves not the minds of any”.480  
While Locke shares Bagshaw’s concern for over-burdening the conscience, he argues that 
this purely subjective definition of “spiritual concernment” could be expanded to cover nearly 
every external action: “there is no action so indifferent which a scrupulous conscience will not 
fetch in with some consequence from Scripture and make of spiritual concernment”.481 Locke 
rejects the idea that we can divide external actions into those that are of civil importance and 
those that are religious in nature. He restates this in a different way in the Second Tract: in order 
to secure the peace of society, the magistrate must rule over all actions taking place in that 
society, regardless of the spiritual significance with which they are imbued by the doer; civil 
authority does not stop at the door of the church.482 To Locke, Bagshaw’s argument was a demand 
that the magistrate give special consideration to the religious beliefs and feelings of subjects. 
Locke responded that there was no way to do this without giving preferential treatment to one 
particular group over others. The civil duty to guarantee peace demanded indifference to these 
beliefs at the expense of giving offense to some.483 
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To distinguish Locke’s argument in the Tracts from that of his Erastian contemporaries, it 
is helpful to point out the types of arguments that Locke could have made for imposition but did 
not. First, Locke’s argument can be distinguished from the argument that the magistrate has a 
right to impose indifferent things for the simple purpose of maintaining the unity of the Church 
of England and preventing the evil of separation. This was the view of ecclesiastical power 
asserted in Hooker’s Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (completed in 1600 but not fully published 
until 1661484), which was widely acclaimed during the Restoration.485 Hobbes’s Leviathan—as 
widely condemned as Hooker’s Laws was celebrated—had similarly argued that the 
commonwealth of England must also be a church with a public form of worship.486 In Locke’s 
time, this argument was repeated by Samuel Parker in his Discourse of Ecclesiastical Politie 
(1669), which was an attempt to restate and defend Hooker against Restoration non-
conformists.487 Unlike Locke’s Tracts, Parker’s Discourse argues for conformity and unity as 
goods in themselves and sees schism as inherently immoral. Parker thus places the burden of 
justification on the non-conformists who resist the imposition of indifferent things rather than on 
the civil government: 
some men having made an unreasonable Separation from the Church of England, were 
forced to justifie themselves by as unreasonable Pretences. For, what can be more 
incredible, than that things that were before lawful and innocent, should become sinful 
upon no other score than their being commanded.488 
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While some have attributed a similar view to Locke’s Tracts, Locke does not view religious 
unity as having any intrinsic value.489 In his notes on Parker’s Discourse, Locke writes, “That the 
magistrate should restraine seditious doctrines who denys but because he may then has he power 
over all other doctrines to forbid or impose, if he hath not then the argument is short, if he hath 
how far is this short of Mr Hobbs’s doctrine?”490 Throughout his Discourse, Parker attempts to 
distance his views from those of Hobbes’s and align himself with Hooker, but as Locke 
recognizes, Parker’s aims go beyond civil peace to religious uniformity for its own sake. 
Although his comments on Parker were written in the winter of 1669-70, after his 
supposed conversion to toleration, in the Tracts, we can see the same indifference to religious 
uniformity that he expressed in his later writings.491 From the beginning, Locke had set his sights 
rather lower at mutual forbearance and respect, rather than religious agreement and solidarity. In 
the Tracts Locke expressed the modest hope that his fellow countrymen might someday “suffer 
one another to go to heaven every one his own way, and not out of a fond conceit of themselves 
pretend to greater knowledge and care of another’s soul.”492 Locke, as we have seen, is not 
concerned with non-conformism and separation in themselves. He only takes issue with those 
who deny the right of the magistrate to legislate on indifferent things. 
Locke also avoids a second common argument for imposition of indifferent things in 
religious worship: the idea that religious uniformity is necessary for civil peace. Such an 
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argument was made by Richard Perrinchief in his Discourse of Toleration (1668). He saw 
religious disagreement and non-conformity as undermining the necessary trust between the 
government and citizens: “men do not easily and willingly trust those whom they do not think 
faithful to God, and so every Schismatic looks upon his Prince that doth not profess the same 
Opinions with himself.” Perrinchief goes on to conclude that a nation divided in faith is 
politically weak and unable to achieve anything great.493 Samuel Parker held a more dire view of 
religious disunity, arguing that if the civil magistrate allowed freedom in religious matters, “as to 
one half of the concerns of the Common-wealth there must be a perfect Anarchy, and no 
Government at all. And there is no Provision to be made against all those publick mischiefs and 
disturbances that may arise from Errors and Enormities in Religion; the Common-wealth must 
for ever be exposed to the follies of Enthusiasts, and villanies of Impostors.”494 
While some have attributed Parker’s Hobbesian view of civil peace to the Locke of 1660, 
the Tracts make no claim that religious errors or schisms are necessarily politically dangerous.495 
Like Parker, Locke believes that the magistrate must have the right to suppress dangerous ideas 
and activities for the sake of civil peace, but he questions Parker’s assumption that religious 
difference is inherently incompatible with civil peace. Locke clearly acknowledges situations in 
which it is—when a certain group of people is ready to take up arms against those who disagree 
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with them. But in most cases, he insists, religion is a pretense for unrest, not its underlying cause. 
Although Locke makes much of religiously justified violence in the Tracts, he also takes the 
view that religion should not be regarded as a special class of activities or beliefs set apart from 
all other activities and beliefs. Locke’s approach is to identify the causes of unrest and deal with 
them regardless of whether they are civil or religious in nature. This indifference to religion is 
aptly expressed in Locke’s notes on Parker’s obsession with religious uniformity: 
The end of civil government being publique peace tis noe question the supreme power 
must have an uncontroulable right to judg & ordeyne all things that may conduce to it? 
but yet the question will be whether Uniformity established by a law be (as is here 
supposed) a necessary means to it? i.e. whether it be at all dangerous to the magistrate 
that he beleiveing free will, some of his subjects should beleive predestination, or 
whether it be more necessary for his government to make laws for weareing surplices, 
then it is for wearing vests?496 
 
The mention of the surplice and the vest is a wonderfully ironic twist on the controversy that 
began Locke’s career. He questions the necessity of imposing uniformity of worship but in a way 
that also undermines Bagshaw’s obsession with protecting religious activities. All of this 
underscores Locke’s ultimate rejection of the supposed political difference between sacred and 
secular activities. The above comment also recalls a similar observation in the Second Tract: 
“All things which are indifferent are so for the same reason; and in both secular and spiritual 
indifferent matters the logic is the same, and indeed the very same objects are in question, seen 
only from two different points of view. There is no more difference between them than there is 
between the jacket I wear on a weekday and the very same jacket when I wear it to church.”497 
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This also helps to explain one of the more peculiar features of Locke’s Tracts. Despite the 
fierce controversy that prompted their composition, Locke does not offer any defense of the 
surplice policy at Christ Church. Given what Locke says about prudence and avoidance of undue 
burdens, as well as his own unorthodox beliefs, Locke himself may well have opposed the 
surplice policy, but he would only have done so on prudential grounds. Locke’s argument for the 
arbitrary power of the magistrate in all adiaphora is perfectly consistent with Locke’s later 
insistence that the particulars of religious worship have no effect—good or ill—on the civil 
peace of societies. The reason that Locke cannot admit this point in the Tracts is that it would 
force him to distinguish between activities that count as “worship” and activities that do not, a 
distinction that Locke finds impossible to make in 1660.  
 
6.3 Locke on Toleration 
Between 1660 and 1662, Locke articulated one half of his secular project: the right of the 
state to interfere in religious activities in order to secure civil peace. In 1667, Locke applied the 
same principle of civil interests to a different problem: civil authorities who overstep their 
authority by pursuing supernatural, otherworldly ends. On this question, the principle of civil 
interests prohibits the state from promoting the spiritual or supernatural good of its citizens. 
Locke continues to argue within the same overarching secularist framework: the magistrate has 
the right to legislate on indifferent matters in order to secure civil interests, even when such 
legislation contradicts citizens’ deeply held religious convictions. Within this framework, Locke 
makes two important revisions to his understanding of the psychological and sociological aspects 
of religious worship. Based on these two changes in his understanding of worship, Locke revises 
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his policy recommendation, arguing that magistrates should not impose forms of religious 
worship, even for civil reasons. 
In the Essay, Locke more clearly lays out the principle of civil interests and the limits it 
places on civil power: 
That the whole trust, power, and authority of the magistrate is vested in him for no other 
purpose but to be made use of for the good, preservation, and peace of men in that society 
over which he is set, and therefore that this alone is and ought to be the standard and measure 
according to which he ought to square and proportion his laws, model and frame his 
government.498 
 
Having laid down this guiding principle for the question of toleration, Locke considers the 
question of the toleration of opinions and actions. He argues that the key question for 
determining whether an opinion or action has the right to be tolerated is whether it has an impact 
on society or not. Because “purely speculative” opinions and divine worship have no social 
impact, they ought never to be prohibited or commanded by civil power.499 Although this appears 
to be a radical reversal of his position on worship in the First Tract, it flows from the same 
principles as his earlier argument against Bagshaw.  
 As in the Tracts, Locke’s theory of civil power in the Essay relies on the idea of 
indifferency: Locke insists that the magistrate must possess the right to legislate on all truly 
indifferent matters. However, he makes a crucial adjustment to the definition of indifferency. In 
the First Tract, Locke argues that indifferent actions are those permitted by higher law and within 
our power to perform. This latter condition excludes matters of religious belief because we 
cannot alter our beliefs on command. This allowed Locke to make a distinction between 
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religious beliefs, which are involuntary, and religious actions, which are voluntary. In the Essay, 
Locke abandons this belief-action distinction and recognizes that religious worship cannot be 
divorced from religious conviction. If one’s beliefs about the sacraments cannot be altered on 
command, neither can one’s performance of the sacraments. To attempt to do so would 
undermine the integrity of one’s faith.500 
This change in Locke’s view of worship was not a sudden change brought about by his 
relationship with Shaftesbury; it was a question that he had been considering and refining since 
his years at Christ Church. In the First Tract, Locke accepts the idea of false imposition on the 
conscience as articulated by Luther and Melanchthon. He argues that while the magistrate has a 
right to impose actions on worshippers, he has no right to impose on their consciences. Although 
all actions are indifferent and may be imposed by the magistrate, there is a way of imposing them 
that also imposes the conscience. This occurs when the magistrate presents his laws as divinely 
ordained and therefore necessary for salvation. When governing external acts related to religion, 
the magistrate must make it clear that these actions are spiritually indifferent though civilly 
necessary.501  
By the writing of the Second Tract in 1662, Locke had already begun to rethink this sharp 
dichotomy between internal belief and external worship. Here, he distinguishes between three 
levels of religion. The first is the internal worship of God that takes place in the mind alone. The 
second is the external actions that necessarily accompany our beliefs and are therefore demanded 
by God: “he is not satisfied with the silent and almost furtive worship of the heart alone, but 
requires his worshippers openly to proclaim his name… Consequently he demands the 
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performance of those outward actions through which the inner worship of the soul may be 
expressed”.502 The third is the external circumstances in which these actions take place: “time, 
place, behaviour, appearance, and so forth”. It is only this third level that is truly indifferent with 
respect to the conscience and can therefore be surrendered to the magistrate.503 While it is unclear 
which actions or ceremonies fall in the second category and which fall under the broad category 
of indifferent “behaviour,” Locke had already broken the belief-action distinction and recognized 
the legitimate demands of conscience with respect to actions that may be in themselves 
indifferent. From here, it was a rather short walk to Locke’s final concession to the liberty of 
conscience in the Essay: “when I am worshipping my God in a way I think he has prescribed and 
will approve of, I cannot alter, omit, or add any circumstance in that which I think the true way 
of worship.”504 From this perspective, it is clear that Locke’s progression from 1660 to 1667 was 
hardly a radical change or a conversion in his political orientation. 
 After defending the liberty of the conscience in all aspects of religious worship in the 
Essay, Locke argues that there can be no claims to freedom of conscience in those opinions or 
actions that pertain to society. Here, the demands of civil interests step in to determine the 
validity of the claims of conscience. The boundary between the free conscience and the bound 
conscience rests on Locke’s distinction between those purely interior opinions and actions and 
those that concern society. When a claim of conscience is made with regard to the former, it 
must be respected. When a claim of conscience is made regarding the latter, it cannot be 
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upheld.505 Thus, in the Essay, Locke uses two separate criteria to judge claims of conscience. 
Individual consciences must be left unburdened in actions that are involuntary and actions that 
are purely self-regarding.506 Religious worship can only be protected insofar as it meets both of 
these criteria.  
As with much else, this distinction between genuine and false claims of conscience can 
be traced to the Tracts, though in those earlier works Locke drew the boundary in a different 
place.507 In both cases, the boundary rests on the principle of civil interests—the magistrate’s duty 
maintain order and public safety. In the Tracts, Locke allowed the civil magistrate greater 
latitude to determine what was necessary for securing civil interests. In the Essay, Locke makes a 
practical judgment for the magistrate that closes off one political option: religious worship can 
never threaten the civil peace. Based on Locke’s different characterizations of the magistrate and 
the people in the Tracts and the Essay, it appears that this decision was partly due to a change in 
Locke’s view of the relative trustworthiness of these two parties. In the Tracts Locke worries 
about the unruly mob using religion as a cover for tearing down the state. In the Essay his 
perspective shifts to one of mistrusting the intentions of the magistrate and viewing the citizens 
as merely seeking private communion with God.  
This decision to cordon off religious worship, however, begs the same question raised in 
the Tracts of how to differentiate between the two. In his defenses of toleration in the Essay and 
the Letter, Locke attempts to resolve this question by more carefully defining civil interests. By 
limiting the magistrate’s authority to civil interests, Locke ends up protecting more than just 
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religious worship but any opinions or actions that are self-regarding. By looking at how Locke’s 
theory of civil interests develops from the Tracts to the Letter Concerning Toleration (1685), we 
can see that the boundary between private conscience and public conscience rests on the 
difference between supernatural and natural knowledge, which belong to divine law and natural 
law, respectively. 
 
6.4 Civil Interests: Epistemological and Sociological Foundations 
Locke’s principle of civil interests, which serves to distinguish the religious from the 
political, rests on two arguments: an epistemological argument and a sociological argument. 
According to the epistemological argument, religious questions are inherently subject to 
widespread disagreement and ignorance and are therefore not appropriate matters of public law. 
According to the sociological argument, humans enter into political society in order to protect 
their bodies and property, and these needs are separate from religious questions. 
 Locke first makes the epistemological distinction between civil and religious matters in 
the Essay Concerning Toleration. Here Locke distinguishes between two principles for the 
toleration of opinions. The first principle is “the conscience or persuasion of the subjects” who 
hold such opinions. The second principle is whether “such opinions may conduce to the welfare 
and safety of [the] people.”508 Locke argues that the first principle can never be the basis of civil 
law because it is impossible to achieve agreement on religious questions. It is only the second 
principle that can serve a principle of legislation, for while there can be no agreement regarding 
the orthodoxy of religious beliefs, all reasonable people can agree on certain fundamental civil 
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interests.509 Locke elaborates on this principle of civil interests, saying that all civil laws must be 
made “for the security of the government and protection of the people in their lives, estates, and 
liberties, i.e. the preservation of the whole,” anticipating his later arguments in the Second 
Treatise.510 The epistemological argument rests on a two-fold proposition: first, there is general 
and permanent disagreement regarding religious questions; second, there are fundamental civil 
interests on which all reasonable people agree. 
The first part of this argument stems from the fact of intractable religious disagreement in 
human societies. For Locke, questions of salvation, when held up to the light of reason, yielded 
no definitive answers. In Locke’s mature theological work, The Reasonableness of Christianity, 
he attempted to distill certain core principles of Christianity using reason, but he arrived only at 
the fact that salvation comes from belief in Jesus as the messiah.511 This conclusion does not 
resolve the types of theological controversies that Locke saw as the cause of intra-Protestant 
sectarianism and persecution: “meats and habits, that places and times of worship etc.”512 Locke 
expands on this idea in the Letter Concerning Toleration, describing the various “frivolous 
things” over which one Christian sect might persecute another: clothing, the way one cut one’s 
hair, the mode and time of baptism, various dietary rules, and differences in preaching.513 
Moreover, Locke’s theological arguments in Reasonableness rest on the Protestant belief in the 
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Bible as the word of God and so do not resolve doctrinal conflicts involving Catholics, Jews, and 
Muslims, all of which are mentioned by Locke in the Essay Concerning Toleration.514 Nor could 
such arguments be of any use with pagans, whom Locke discusses in the Letter.515 Locke 
ultimately held that reason and experience alone could not penetrate questions of sin, salvation, 
and worship.  
The second part of this epistemological argument—general agreement on civil interests—
is plainly stated in the Essay. Locke acknowledges the uncertainty and fallibility involved in 
formulating prudent policy, but he insists that the magistrate’s duty to legislate “to the good, 
preservation, and quiet of all his subjects in this world”—the principle of civil interests—“is a 
rule so certain and so clear that he can scarce err in it, unless he do it wilfully.”516 The self-evident 
quality of civil interests is also the foundation of Locke’s entire argument in the Second Treatise 
of Government. Though the state of nature lacks a civil government, it is governed by the law of 
nature: “it is certain that there is such a Law, and that too, as intelligible and plain to a rational 
Creature, and a Studier of that Law, as the positive Laws of Common-wealths, nay possibly 
plainer”.517 In civil and political society, the law of nature remains unchanged and equally as 
binding. It is “plain and intelligible to all rational creatures.”518 The function of the magistrate is, 
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therefore, not to make judgments about fundamental truths or ends but rather to allow people to 
pursue their ends by dispassionately applying the laws of nature.519 
Still, one might be left unsatisfied with this somewhat tautological account of the 
knowability of civil interests and the unknowability of religious truth. Wootton has rightly noted 
that the Second Treatise assumes a universally accessible law of nature without defending this 
position.520 This gap is partially filled in by Locke’s account of natural law in a set of unpublished 
essays from around 1664 (published in 1954 as Essays on the Law of Nature).521 We know from 
the Second Treatise that Locke derived civil interests—life, liberty, and property—from the 
universal ends posited by natural law. The Essays on the Law of Nature reveal that Locke did not 
merely accept these ends axiomatically but grappled with the epistemological status of natural 
law. He believed that natural law by definition was accessible to all reasonable people, and he 
sought to demonstrate how this could be. 
In the Essays, Locke separates knowledge of natural law from two sources typically 
associated with divine knowledge: innate knowledge and tradition. Locke posits a third source as 
the basis of knowledge of natural law: “sense-perception.”522 This explains how natural law could 
be both universally accessible and imperfectly known. If natural law were based on tradition, 
those living outside that tradition would have no means to access it. If natural law were 
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“inscribed in our hearts,” all people would have equal and perfect knowledge of it.523 Locke 
argues that natural law reveals itself indirectly through sense experience, which must be 
examined and interpreted by reason. Experience affords all people some sense of natural law, but 
the extent of this knowledge depends on “[c]areful reflection, thought, and attention by the 
mind.”524 Sense-perception, Locke argues, presents us with a beautiful and orderly universe, 
which, upon reasoned reflection, could be none other than the work of a purposeful creator. This 
is the first prerequisite of knowledge of natural law: recognition of a lawgiver, who in this case is 
God. Sense-perception also tells us that we have certain innate needs, capabilities, and faculties. 
Reasoned reflection tells us that these innate traits are given to us by our creator for a purpose 
and that God must have a will for us. This is the second prerequisite of knowledge of natural 
law: recognition that God has a will for us and that this will is the content of natural law. These 
two prerequisites lead individuals to the discovery of the laws of nature through awareness of 
their needs and faculties. Locke posits three such basic laws: self-preservation, the creation of 
societies, and the maintenance of such societies.525 This epistemological account of natural law 
serves as Locke’s best answer to the question of how civil interests can be beyond reasonable 
dispute and, therefore, the appropriate content of public law.  
Locke’s second line of argument for civil interests is a sociological one. He argues that 
agreement on and enforcement of civil interests are central to social cooperation. Disagreement 
on religious beliefs and other “speculative opinions” has no effect on the health of a society so 
long as civil interests are upheld. This is the central argument of the Essay Concerning 
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Toleration. In the Essay, the single criterion that Locke uses to distinguish between these two is 
whether an opinion concerns only the holder of the opinion or whether it concerns the public 
peace of the community. Locke uses this principle to argue for a general toleration of religious 
worship: “Religious worship being that homage which I pay to that God I adore in a way I judge 
acceptable to him, and so being an action or commerce passing only between God and myself, 
hath in its own nature no reference at all to my governor, or to my neighbour, and so necessarily 
produces no action which disturbs the community.” Locke goes on to argue that there is nothing 
in religious worship “that can of itself make me either the worse subject to my prince, or worse 
neighbour to my fellow-subject.”526 On this basis, Locke also rejects the attempts on the part of 
public officials to impose virtue and morality on their subjects. Locke recognizes that the 
epistemological argument only goes so far in preventing overzealous governments from 
proselytizing. Thus, he argues that even when there is general agreement on the correctness and 
appropriateness of a virtue, a government ought not to attempt to improve its citizens’ morality. 
On this point, Locke distinguishes between two kinds of virtues: (1) those that are good in 
themselves and benefit the individuals who possess them and (2) those whose value derives from 
their effect on society. These latter virtues are the only proper subject of civil law because they 
are “the strong ties and bonds of society, which cannot be loosened without shattering the whole 
frame.”527 Here, the epistemological element drops out. Locke assumes that there is wide public 
agreement on certain moral virtues and that reason tells us that these virtues are beneficial in 
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themselves.528 Locke’s argument thus rests on the sociological fact that certain public virtues are 
necessary for the proper functioning of society.  
Locke provides a fuller explanation of the sociological effects of civil interests in the 
Second Treatise of Government. The law of nature plays a central role in this argument, but here 
it plays the role of a social norm and psychological fact rather than a divine mandate. (For 
Locke, natural law is all of these things.) In Chapter Three of the Second Treatise, Locke 
describes the causes of “the state of war.” Human beings are naturally predisposed by the law of 
nature to seek self-preservation above all else. Life itself—along with freedom from physical 
harm and suffering—is a primary human value. Therefore, when physical security is threatened 
in any way, individuals are naturally predisposed to both defend themselves and seek justice 
from the transgressor. Retributive justice for interpersonal harms is a fundamental aspect of civil 
society and government. When this norm of justice is codified and enforced by impartial 
government officials, all parties are satisfied that the law of nature has been upheld, and the state 
of war comes to an end. In a state of nature, however, the natural need for wronged individuals to 
seek justice leads to a cycle of violence and retribution that perpetuates the state of war and 
throws society into chaos.529 The legitimacy of government thus rests on its willingness and 
ability to uphold these basic laws of nature. This is not only because natural law demands it but 
also because social cooperation depends on the guarantee of such norms. 
The norm of property rights has this same dual quality: it is both a law of nature and a 
sociological fact. Locke argues that protection of individual property rights plays a similarly 
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pivotal role in the legitimacy of a civil government. Locke provides at least two social facts that 
grant property the status of a primary civil interest. The first is that the social norm of property is 
necessary for self-preservation, and therefore, threats to property can be seen as threats to one’s 
physical well-being. Locke argues that exclusive ownership over the fruits of one’s labor is a 
necessary precondition for subsistence. By this Locke simply means that in a subsistence 
economy, such as that of the American Indians, one must have exclusive ownership over the 
game that one kills or the crops that one cultivates in order to survive.530 The obvious limitation to 
this norm is that one cannot hoard more perishable goods than one can consume while one’s 
neighbors are starving. Such hoarding goes beyond the norm of self-preservation, and hoarders 
thus give up their rights to their surplus goods.531 The second social fact is that threats to property 
are viewed as threats to physical integrity. Locke posits that by removing something from its 
natural state and transforming it into something that can be consumed, one adds the labor of 
one’s body to that thing and makes that object an extension of oneself.532 For this reason, Locke 
considers one’s physical integrity and one’s property as essentially belonging to the same general 
category of “property.”533 This explains why, in his discussion of “the state of war,” Locke argues 
that a man has the right to use deadly force to defend himself against a thief. Locke argues that a 
thief, by using force to get another person under his will, breaches the primary interpersonal 
boundary of society; therefore, his actions are not much different from those of an assailant or 
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murderer.534 Regardless of whether one is convinced by Locke’s account of property, one cannot 
deny the sociological character of his argument. Locke is not only arguing for property as 
derived from divine mandate; he also sees property rights as a function that is necessary for the 
peace and stability of a society. 
Locke’s epistemological and sociological accounts of civil interests undergird a category 
of virtues that are strictly separate from the religious virtues expounded by various 
denominations. These are public, civic virtues that are necessary for the proper functioning of 
civil society and government. Among the primary public virtues extolled by Locke are: respect 
for the lives and property of fellow citizens, willingness to keep one’s promises and contracts,535 
and obedience to government authority. Because these virtues have no necessary connection to 
any specific confessional faith, Locke saw no reason why government promotion of civic virtues 
should entail the promotion of any particular faith. However, Locke also saw these civic virtues 
as setting the outermost limits of the freedom of conscience: any religion or opinion that 
explicitly contradicts these virtues has no right to toleration. Thus, his arguments against 
extending toleration to Catholics and atheists rested on the assumption that these doctrines were 
incompatible with civil obedience and promise-keeping.536 
 
6.5 Conclusions 
Locke scholars nearly universally agree that Locke’s later works—the Treatises of 
Government and the Letter Concerning Toleration—are a sharp break from the Tracts in their 
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refutation of Hobbesian Erastianism and their defense of the liberty of conscience. However, I 
have shown that Locke’s entire body of work is motivated by two worries: the political dangers 
of the idea of liberty of conscience and the tyranny of a religiously motivated government.  
Locke’s response to these dangers is an attempt to redefine the boundaries between 
church and state using the concept of “civil interests”. Locke recognizes that religious doctrine 
has so often been brought under the jurisdiction of the state because it has been regarded as a 
matter on which certain knowledge is possible. Locke thus relies on natural law theory to 
establish a sharp distinction between religious belief and moral reasoning. This return to dualism 
brings Locke quite close to Aquinas, who asserted that only the most basic human ends could be 
known through natural reason. Locke reconciles this dualism with civil sovereignty by ensuring 
that only the state possesses the means of coercion and punishment. Religious institutions retain 
certain rights against government interference but are stripped of all their previous coercive 
authority. When churches and individuals overstep these bounds of civility, they are immediately 























 From the vantage point of the twenty-first century, it may seem counterintuitive that the 
Thomist philosophy of natural law played a central role in the development of political 
secularism. Although we tend to associate secular government with the rise of non-theistic 
humanism, moral skepticism, or even atheism, natural law philosophy assumes the existence of a 
divine creator and lawgiver who has ordered humanity and the universe toward his purposes. I 
have endeavored to explain this paradox by showing how a theistic conception of natural law 
was used to liberate the concept of civil power from various theocratic philosophies. The 
autonomy of the natural order from the operations of sin and grace, as explained in Aquinas’s 
theology, allowed the early modern Thomists to argue that civil power was independent from 
ecclesiastical government and could be legitimately and justly wielded by heretics (Lutherans), 
infidels (Jews and Muslims), and pagans (the American Indians). Because civil power arose 
through natural law, its purposes were rational and could be understood by those who possessed 
ordinary intellectual faculties. Like other features of the natural world, civil government could be 
harnessed, manipulated, and altered to a great extent by human beings. Civil government thus 
operated in the secular world of human time and space, performing functions limited to this 
world. It could not be used to achieve ultimate human happiness and justification, which lay 
outside of this world. 
 This natural law tradition of civil philosophy was often opposed to two other early 
modern intellectual traditions, both of which are credited with the rise of the modern secular 
state. The first is the humanist tradition of moral skepticism that gave rise to the “reason of state” 
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philosophy of thinkers such as Botero, Lipsius, Grotius, and Hobbes.537 These thinkers also 
employed the language of natural law and natural rights but sought to legitimate all civil 
authority based on the principle of self-preservation. Instead of viewing political life as the 
means to achieve good ends such as community, virtue, and justice, this tradition focused instead 
on the avoidance of violence and death. The result is a far less demanding view of civil power: it 
both asks less of the state and allows the state greater freedom to pursue its ends through any 
means necessary. At the opposite pole of early modern thought was the modern republican 
tradition from Machiavelli to Rousseau, which influenced both the American founders and 
European liberals.538 It was also rooted in secular humanist ideals but rejected the Hobbesian ethic 
of civil peace in favor of civic virtue and republican liberty. While both of these traditions are 
thoroughly secular in their assumptions and justifications for political authority, they also tended 
to promote Erastian policies that imposed religious uniformity to achieve civic purposes. In 
attempting to liberate the state from ecclesiastical institutions, they brought spiritual authority 
under the civil sovereign. Because they relied on this spiritual unity to generate civic virtue and 
ward off factions, both republicans and skeptics tended to view the separation of temporal and 
spiritual authority as a danger to the health of the commonwealth. Neither philosophy contains 
the resources to defend the principled separation of religion and politics in the way that Thomist 
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philosophy does. Natural law thinkers dispensed with Erastian civil religion because they viewed 
secular government as holding its own divinely ordained moral authority equal to that of the 
Church.  
 Contemporary liberals may be left dissatisfied with the natural-law account of political 
and social life because of its reliance on the existence of God. Locke seems to validate these 
reservations by arguing that atheists cannot be admitted into political society.539 However, for 
Locke and other early modern natural law philosophers, atheism meant something quite different 
than what it means today. The rejection of God’s existence was a rejection of all moral 
obligations. For Locke in particular, the absence of any fear of divine judgment left the 
individual without any motivation for pursuing the good while avoiding evil. Like the Hobbesian 
man, he was left to pursue his own appetites and could only be restrained by fear of violence. For 
natural law thinkers in the Thomist tradition, political association was not held together by fear 
and punishment, or by socialization, but by the rational force of the law.540 While punishment is 
necessary to restrain the ignorant and to deliver justice, a civil association cannot exist unless its 
members view that association and its laws as goods in themselves. Laws are to be followed not 
only because their content is rational but also because obedience to the law makes civil 
association possible. For voluntarist natural law thinkers, from Vitoria to Locke, this orientation 
toward the law requires both the existence of and belief in God. The rationality of the law is 
necessary but not sufficient to bring the human will into conformity with the law. The will only 
submits to those rational laws promulgated by the superior will of the lawgiver, which is 
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ultimately God.541 This is not the same as the pure voluntarist position, according to which the 
good is only good because it is commanded by God. The Thomists adopted a hybrid 
intellectualist-voluntarist position in which God’s command did not transform indifferent actions 
into good actions, but rather bound the will to pursue inherently good actions. These thinkers 
were primarily concerned, then, with ensuring that political obligation was backed up by divine 
command. This is particularly important when political associations bring together citizens of 
diverse religious confessions. The obligation to obey the law must be elevated to a status equal to 
that of one’s religious obligations.  
 Thus, the significance of God in the natural law theory of secularism is a question of 
moral psychology: how can citizens of diverse theological convictions be motivated to obey the 
law even when it contradicts their private beliefs? If a significant number of citizens are atheists 
and agnostics, as is the case in liberal societies today, God can no longer serve as the foundation 
for civil obedience and civic unity. This contemporary problem should turn us back to the origins 
of natural law theory—to Aquinas. Recall that Aquinas embraces the pure intellectualist position 
according to which the natural law contains the fundamental precepts of practical reason that are 
themselves reasons for action. Once the intellect understands the natural law, the will follows. 
Because the intellect understands these precepts as goods to be pursued rather than abstract legal 
concepts, there is no need for a superior will to bind and obligate. Although the theologian 
understands that these reasons for action are from God, the rational individual may not 
necessarily see them this way. The existence of God is after all not self-evident in the way that 
                                               
541 Suárez, De Legibus I.5, pp. 66-7. 
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the precepts of natural law are.542 Aquinas thus separates the ontology of moral obligation, as 
man’s participation in the eternal law, from the phenomenology of moral obligation as the 
pursuit of good ends. This makes it possible for atheists and Christians to form political societies 
based on their shared perceptions of and commitment to certain fundamental goods: the 
preservation of life; the creation of families and the nurturing of children; knowledge and 
education; civic community and friendship.543  
 While the voluntarist philosophies of Suárez and Locke cannot speak to atheists and 
agnostics, it might prove to be a valuable tool for reconciling religious citizens with the secular 
state. When their religious convictions come into conflict with their civic duties, religious 
citizens will naturally consider the moral significance of the state and whether God would want 
them to obey or resist their governments. Natural law philosophy provides these citizens with a 
framework for navigating these questions. It encourages them to consider how the natural ends 
pursued by secular laws might be compatible with or supportive of their spiritual ends. When 
they appear incompatible, natural law thinking encourages citizens to consider whether their 
religious convictions might be contrary to natural law and the natural rights of other citizens. 
When citizens conclude that particular secular laws are not legitimate, natural law thinking urges 
citizens to consider the value of the legal order and the civic community and to disobey or resist 
in ways that strengthen rather than tear down this community. 
 By understanding the natural law arguments for political secularism, we gain important 
insights into some of the challenges of contemporary secularism. The secular state faces a crisis 
                                               
542 This view of Aquinas’s legal philosophy has been championed by John Finnis. See especially Finnis, 
Natural Law and Natural Rights, 30-48. 
543 Aquinas, ST I-II, 94.2. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 85-90. 
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of moral authority prompted by challenges from its religious citizens, who claim that secular 
laws undermine religious faith and infringe on the liberty of conscience. By looking back to the 
political-theological disputes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, defenders of political 
secularism can learn valuable lessons for justifying secular power in the face of these challenges. 
Even if they ultimately find natural law philosophy untenable, they should appreciate the ways in 
which natural law thinkers elevated and ennobled civil power without co-opting religious 
authority or undermining religious doctrine. If natural law cannot be recovered for the post-
modern era, we may need another moral philosophy of citizenship and legal obligation that can 
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